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Abstract 
 
With the increased complexity and higher safety commitment of modern safety–critical 
systems, safety assessment models of these systems are increasingly complicated and 
obscure. In practice, however, there is insufficient guidance on how to improve the 
understanding and evaluation of these models, while they are often used as important items 
of evidence in safety cases. This significantly threatens the confidence we can have in the 
soundness of safety cases.  
In this thesis, a coherent, structured approach to establishing confidence in safety assessment 
evidence is developed. Firstly, a means for the structured documentation of the core data 
elements of safety assessment models is defined, to support the development of both primary 
safety arguments and confidence arguments. Secondly, a model of evidence is developed to 
support the interfacing of safety assessment evidence with safety arguments. Thirdly, a 
structured cross-model inconsistency analysis method is proposed as a means of scrutinizing 
potentially inadequate models. Finally, an expanded argument construction process is 
established to add rigour to safety case development, and a number of argument patterns are 
designed to guide and inspire structured justification of the adequacy of safety assessment 
models as evidence for safety critical systems.  
The evaluation of the approach is carried out primarily through examples and cases studies. It 
is demonstrated that the approach is feasible and the confidence issue in safety assessment 
evidence is addressed more explicitly and more rigorously by using the approach. 
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1 Introduction 
Models are widely used for problem solving. They provide us with a means of describing the 
real-world problems that we observe or study, of recording our understanding of these 
problems, of making predictions of these problems, and sometimes of helping us to manage 
or control the problems being modelled. 
However, models could be ‘wrong’ if incompletely or incorrectly constructed, insufficiently 
validated, or improperly used. The following accident examples illustrate the existence and 
potentially harmful impact of inadequate models and/or the inadequate use of models, and 
indicate a significant need for a better understanding of various types of models and their use 
as evidence in safety cases. 
1.1 The Crater Model of Space Shuttle Columbia 
On 1 February, 2003, Space Shuttle Columbia broke up into debris on re-entry into the 
atmosphere on its return to Earth, with a complete loss of the shuttle and the seven crew 
members. It was Columbia’s 28th mission, coded as STS-107. According to the Columbia 
Accident Investigation Board (CAIB), the immediate cause of the accident was a breach in 
the thermal protection layer on the left wing [13]. During the launch, a foam insulation tile 
fell down and hit the front edge of the left wing. The strike led to a damaged area that 
permitted hot energy to penetrate and destroy the shuttle rapidly in the re-entry.  
A ‘Crater’ model had been used for the assessment of the damage of thermal protection after 
the strike by a foam tile during Columbia’s launch. Crater is a model developed for the 
prediction of possible penetration and damage by external objects, such as foam, ice, and 
metal debris. It runs with an algorithm specifically developed during the Apollo program and 
has been modified and calibrated with several test results for wider application scenarios 
[13]. From those test results, engineers inferred that Crater was ‘conservative’ - i.e. that the 
model tends to predict more damage than there is in reality. However, there were still a large 
set of conditions under which the accuracy of Crater remained to be validated. “When used 
within its validated limits, Crater provides conservative predictions. When used outside its 
validated limits, Crater’s precision is unknown” [13], as stated in the Columbia Accident 
investigation report  presented by CAIB. In the STS-107 mission, the estimated size of the 
foam tile (according to video and photo image analysis) was at maximum 640 times larger 
(about 400 times larger estimated by the CAIB later) in volume than the validated input 
 20 
 
domain of the Crater model. The use of Crater in this situation was absolutely uncertain and 
the interpretation of the prediction results could not be convincingly grounded.  
For Columbia STS-107, Crater predicted a degree of damage which was deeper than the 
thickness of the actual protection tile. But it was inconsistent with the results of some 
calibration tests with small projectiles which showed a less deep penetration. Additionally, 
Crater did not take into account the increased density of the lower tile layer model. 
Therefore, engineers misjudged that the actual damage from a foam collision in Columbia 
STS-107 would not be severe enough to cause failure of the thermal protection system. By 
contrast, the final test of a series of foam impact tests after the accident (that simulated 
collisions with similar left wing structures and similar foam projectiles) showed that the 
collision could produce a hole on the skin as big as 41cm by 42.5cm [121]. The test result 
comprises overwhelming evidence to disprove the impression that the potential breach 
damage of the front wing structure, resulted by a foam strike, was non-threatening.  
The inappropriate use of the Crater model in STS-107 is addressed specifically by the 
findings in the accident investigation report presented by CAIB. 
F3.8-6 NASA’s current tools, including the Crater model, are inadequate to 
evaluate Orbiter Thermal Protection System damage from debris impacts 
during pre-launch, on-orbit, and post-launch activity. [13] 
F6.3-11 Crater initially predicted tile damage deeper than the actual tile 
depth, but engineers used their judgment to conclude that damage would not 
penetrate the densified layer of tile. Similarly, RCC damage conclusions were 
based primarily on judgment and experience rather than analysis. [13] 
Crater, as a model, illustrates the importance of the valid usage of models and simulations in 
the engineering domain. As a response to the CAIB report, NASA initiated an effort to 
formulate a standard for the development, documentation and operation of models and 
simulations [38]. In 2008, NASA-STD-7009 Standard for Models and Simulations [151] was 
released as guidance for engineering requirements for models and simulations (M&S) in a 
wide range of applications. NASA-STD-7009 is not a prescriptive standard with 
specifications on how to satisfy the requirements through M&S processes; rather, it gives 
objectives on what should be done or achieved by M&S being used in decision-making. In 
the standard, some key requirements of M&S aimed at reducing the risks associated with 
critical decisions based on M&S are highlighted. These include requirements concerning 
verification, validation, uncertainty quantification, training, credibility assessment, 
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documentation, and configuration management. It is worth noting that the standard seriously 
recommends the use of credibility assessment when using results from M&S. Verification 
and Validation during M&S development are considered for the credibility of M&S in a wide 
intended application scope; Input Pedigree, Results Uncertainty and Result Robustness 
during M&S operations are considered for the credibility of M&S in a particular application; 
Use History, M&S Management, and People Qualification are considered as cross-cutting 
supporting evidence for the overall credibility of M&S. The explicit recommendations made 
by the standard concerning these credibility factors are a significant improvement towards 
assuring the proper use of M&S results.  
1.2 The Loss of Nimrod XV230 
On 2 September 2006, Nimrod XV230, a RAF aircraft, crashed during a mission over 
Afghanistan, with a total loss of the aircraft and the 14 crew on board. This catastrophic 
accident was initiated by fuel either leaking from joint positions or overflowing during an 
air-to-air refuelling before the aircraft headed to its operational area [91]. Some of the leaked 
fuel accumulated in a congested Tank Bay and was in contact with one of the areas with 
exposed high-temperature cross-feed ducting. The fuel in the hot section first auto-ignited 
and then ignited fuel in other areas. Within minutes, the midair fire spread out and the 
aircraft exploded and crashed without any chance of recovery.  
The Nimrod aircraft had been approved for operation by means of a traditional safety 
assessment and safety case acceptance process. On December 4 2007, an independent review 
on this disaster was announced (chaired by Charles Haddon-Cave QC) in order to examine 
the safety assessment activities related to Nimrod, to assess the overall process of safety case 
construction, to draw out lessons to be learned and to make practical recommendations. The 
review report was released on 28 October 2009. The loss of the Nimrod was deemed as the 
result of “a failure of leadership, culture and priorities” [91]. The report covers three main 
areas: the physical causes, the safety case, and the organizational causes. The safety case of 
Nimrod was described as “seriously defective” [91] with poor planning, poor management, 
and poor execution. Some of the safety analysis results, which had been adopted as evidence 
to justify the safety of the aircraft in the Nimrod safety case, were fragmentary and flawed. 
The lack of proper attention and effort on the quality of safety analysis, unfortunately, 
combined with other factors, resulted in the failure of the Nimrod safety case. It is stated in 
the Nimrod review report [91] that:  
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There was a big hole in its analysis: BAE Systems had left 40% of the hazards 
“Open” and 30% “Unclassified”. The work was, in any event, riddled with 
errors of fact, analysis and risk categorisation. The critical catastrophic fire 
hazard relating to the Cross-Feed/SCP duct (Hazard H73) had not been 
properly assessed and, in fact, was one of those left “Open” and 
“Unclassified”. [91] 
As described, the aforementioned Hazard Analysis by BAE Systems does not appear to be 
‘fit for purpose’ as evidence to demonstrate ‘safety’, because it demonstrates only an 
incomplete and undeveloped understanding of the potential hazards that are left unexamined, 
with no effective control measures planned and verified. Unfortunately, this unfinished and 
inadequate hazard analysis was not properly questioned and reviewed in the development of 
the Nimrod safety case. A good opportunity to detect and control the catastrophic Hazard 
H73 was missed, and the hazard survived as a flaw in the design modification and operation 
of Nimrod. However, safety cases are not a remedy for eliminating all residual problems left 
behind by poor analyses, inadequate outputs of safety assessment activities and 
unsatisfactory safety audits. It is dangerous to use safety cases as the final barrier or a single 
barrier to examine ‘whether the system is safe or not’. Although the safety case was 
criticised, Mr Haddon-Cave agreed that: 
The Safety Case concept has a useful role to play as an Airworthiness 
management tool for MOD military platforms. It provides a useful vehicle and 
reference point for risk management and, properly applied, should 
“encourage people to think as actively as they can to reduce risks”. [91]  
Safety cases, therefore, as a rationale and an approach to aid thinking, should not be treated 
merely as documentation, or as a substitute for comprehensive safety assessment and 
rigorous and independent reviews of the results of this safety assessment. The role of safety 
cases is to synthesize various forms of evidence and to clarify the reasoning gaps between 
safety claims and evidence items, in particular, with critical and active thinking. The validity 
of safety cases depends on both the validity of the argument structures and the validity of the 
safety evidence referenced in the argument structures. The basis of any safety case is the 
factual existence and soundness of the safety evidence presented. Any flawed and/or 
incomplete safety analysis results will fatally undermine the validity of the safety case. 
Accordingly, the quality of safety evidence must be addressed and justified; otherwise there 
can be no confidence in the achievement of safety objectives (concerning the risk posed by 
hazards in systems in development and operation) demonstrated by safety cases.  
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1.3 Lessons Learnt 
Safety modelling and analysis are common and crucial in the engineering of modern complex 
systems. However, it is not easy to determine whether safety modelling and analysis 
activities have been properly carried out and therefore have resulted in trustworthy results on 
which we can base our decisions. The two inquiry reports, the Columbia accident 
investigation report [13] and the Nimrod review [91], provide a comprehensive view of the 
unsatisfactory status of much of the current practice on safety oversight, safety guidance, the 
management of safety requirements, and safety analysis. There are many lessons that can be 
learnt from the two accidents, from the ethical perspective, the organizational perspective, 
the technological perspective, and the evaluation perspective. The main lessons that we can 
learn from the findings related to models and analysis results used for critical decision-
making are presented below. 
• A model can be right or wrong, depending on its content, its validity envelope and its 
context of usage. It usually represents some degree of truth about the subject being 
modelled from a certain view point, but should not be trusted unconditionally. 
• Trust in models (and/or their results) comes from in-depth understanding of those models 
and the application context. This should be obtained from purposefully-performed 
assessment activities, such as analyses, reviews and tests. 
• Intuition, past knowledge and experience of models or a particular problem domain may 
engender a ‘complacent’ view of the capability and validity of previously-justified 
models. We should not be quick to dismiss any contradictory, inconsistent, or undesired 
results arising from our usage of models. Instead, we should be open and active to them 
and investigate them thoroughly.  
• When employed as evidence, models are the grounds on which a safety argument is 
based. The validity of safety cases collapses if the quality of models cannot be assured or 
if they are not fit for the role of evidence for a specific branch of argument. Therefore, 
models must be sufficiently validated or assessed, as far as is practicable. 
In the following section, we will introduce an important type of model used in the system 
lifecycle for safety-critical systems, namely safety assessment models – a common form of 
safety evidence in safety cases.  
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1.4 Safety Assessment Models 
Safety assessment is a series of analytical and evaluative activities concerning system safety 
objectives that are carried out during system total life cycle. Safety assessment models are 
the outputs from these activities, and may be presented either in a tabular form, or in a 
graphical form, or in a numerical form. The development of safety assessment models is 
ideally integrated with system design, implementation and operation. Safety is a system 
property [129] that should be considered and designed into systems from the early 
development stages. In this thesis, we focus on typical qualitative safety assessment models 
at system development stages (not operational stages), depicting the safety characteristics of 
engineered systems (designed or real) in a given operational context, because “system safety 
emphasizes qualitative rather than quantitative approaches” [129] and models developed 
throughout this period are the most challenging ones regarding the problems of model 
validity and confidence in evidence. When safety assessment models are mentioned in the 
thesis, we do not mean methods or modelling techniques associated with safety analysis. 
As a system design evolves, a multitude of safety assessment models will be produced and 
updated by different people, based on a variety of techniques. Figure 1 illustrates an example 
‘V’ model of a safety analysis lifecycle. On the left-hand side, there is a top-down process, 
through which hierarchical safety requirements are identified and allocated according to 
various safety analyses at different levels, e.g. Hazard Identification. On the right-hand side, 
there is a bottom-up process, through which integration and requirement verification are 
carried out at different levels. The purpose of the safety process is to support companies in 
planning safety tasks and in showing compliance with system safety requirements. As 
illustrated in Figure 1, the overall safety analysis process in the outer ‘V’ interacts with the 
system development activities in the inner ‘V’ extensively. 
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Figure 1 Interaction of System Development and Safety Analysis (from [168]) 
Safety assessment models can be classified according to their own features, or the methods 
on which they are constructed, or the phases of a system life-cycle in which they are 
developed. The domain safety concerns and issues of a system are explored during various 
safety analyses with the following categories of duties (adapted from [211]).  
• Hazard identification (e.g. a hazard log) — safety analyses of this type are usually 
undertaken at the early stage of system design and will be updated according to design 
changes. The aim of the construction of this category of models is to identify potentially 
hazardous conditions in a proposed system in order to formulate the safety goals or 
requirements for later system development stages.  
• Causal analysis (e.g. a fault tree) — safety analyses of this type generally place emphasis 
on presenting the causal factors of hazardous or undesired conditions in the modelling 
process. A causal analysis starts with an unwanted event in a particular context and ends 
with the identification of potential contributing factors and their combinational 
relationships.  
• Consequence analysis (e.g. a FMEA worksheet) — safety analyses of this type focus on 
presenting the potential consequences of identified hazards. A consequence analysis 
assumes the existence of failure modes or other hazardous conditions and then assesses 
their effects on functions, humans, properties, or missions. Consequence analysis 
represents thinking in the opposite direction to causal analysis. Models generated on the 
basis of both types of analyses have causal-effect relationships recorded.  
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• Risk assessment (e.g. a risk matrix) — safety analyses of this type present data on the 
likelihood and severity of identified risks, which are required for making decisions on 
design acceptance or determining risk control measures. 
• Quantitative assessment (e.g. a Markov model) — safety analyses of this type have the 
feature of providing quantitative values of system safety parameters, usually the 
probabilities of undesired conditions. The quantitative results are generated on the basis 
of the structure of other qualitative analysis results such as a cause-consequence model or 
a state model. This type of analysis can be viewed as a particular case of risk assessment 
– with regard to the likelihood of risk in a numerical manner. 
However, it is challenging to assure the quality of the different forms of safety assessment 
models, either individually or as a whole, which determines whether we can have confidence 
in our judgment of the level of safety achieved in certification. Whilst safety assessment 
models attempt to model potentially random failure events (i.e. model aleatoric uncertainty), 
there is also epistemic uncertainty in our understanding of the system under study and the 
associated safety problems. In addition, there can be uncertainty in the representation of our 
understanding and the collection and processing of safety data. We must be cautious while 
using our safety assessment models as evidence to justify system safety. There are many 
potential factors that can affect our confidence in safety assessment models. Were a safety 
model to be interpreted without considering its limitations and its application scenarios, 
intended or novel, there would be little confidence, but only uncertainty, in our decisions on 
the rejection or acceptance of results from the model.  
1.5 Existing Practice 
After more than sixty years of development, safety practitioners in various industrial sectors 
are equipped with both a large collection of available analysis techniques (e.g. there are more 
than seven hundred safety methods listed in the NLR safety methods database [14]) and 
practical process guidance on the systematic implementation of these techniques. However, 
to date, there is insufficient guidance or best-practice on the evaluation of safety assessment 
models. 
In the early 1980s, Lloyd argued the need for assessment of the safety models [136] for 
aircraft safety assessment, although there were no standards in that area at that time. 
Leveson, in [129], explains the difficulty of validating safety analysis and declares that, in 
practice, few safety analyses are actually validated. Despite the pervasive and indispensible 
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usage of safety assessment models nowadays, they are also “a significant source of error” in 
system safety analysis [52]. 
Regulatory bodies have also acknowledged the importance of the evaluation of safety 
assessment models. For example, AMC 25.1309, the aerospace standard that describes 
acceptable means for showing compliance with the requirements of CS 25.1309, states 
clearly that “any analysis is only as accurate as the assumptions, data, and analytical 
techniques it uses” [68]. Currently, however, most of the existing guidance on the evaluation 
or assessment of safety analysis is concerned with the human aspects of safety reviews. 
There are few recommendations on how to integrate and justify multiple safety assessment 
models in practice. SAE ARP 4754A requires that “the outcomes of these validation method 
activities and their appropriateness are reviewable and should be done with independence” 
[180]. Unfortunately, no further concrete detail is provided on how to perform such a review. 
Furthermore, multiple safety analyses, as a body of evidence should be subjected to sufficient 
scrutiny for their interrelationships; otherwise, there will not be sufficient confidence in the 
fulfilment of the overall safety objectives of a system.  
1.6 Research Problem 
From the preceding discussion on lessons from accidents and current practice in safety 
assessment, it is clear that there is an urgent need for better guidance on how to validate and 
review various types of safety assessment models. However, the validity of safety assessment 
is notoriously difficult to deal with, especially during the system development lifecycle. An 
important reason for this difficulty is that safety assessment models are concerned with 
unintended system conditions leading to undesired consequences, which should not (and 
generally do not) frequently occur. It is hard (and in many cases impossible) to generate 
enough data in real operation or in realistic test scenarios to perform comprehensive 
validation prior to a system’s acceptance into operation. In addition, relying upon real data in 
this way can involve placing humans at risk. Besides that, the difficulty is exacerbated with 
the following factors - diversity of analysis techniques, complexity of models and systems 
under study, informal description with natural language and divergent format of data from 
models. 
But it is very valuable to have some reasonable feedback as early as possible about our 
understanding of the quality of these models and whether they are properly used for making 
decisions and judgments. Therefore, we change our view towards the problem with the 
following questions:  
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• How can we improve our understanding of safety assessment models and their role as 
evidence in safety cases? 
• How can we rigorously examine safety assessment models, especially when the models 
are resistant to validation against the real world?  
• How can we be more confident in the adequacy of safety assessment evidence in safety 
cases? 
As a result, our research aim is not to guarantee the validity of safety assessment models, 
which is heavily based upon engineering judgments and applications, but to understand 
safety assessment models better at the development stage of a system lifecycle and establish 
increased confidence in the use of safety assessment models in a given context. 
1.7 Thesis Proposition 
Following from the research problems described in the previous sections, the hypothesis 
proposed in this thesis is that: 
The use of a structured approach to the integration and justification of safety 
assessment evidence within safety cases facilitates the identification and 
potential resolution of issues which may otherwise reduce confidence in safety 
justification practice. 
The key term ‘structured’ used in the thesis hypothesis refers to the following thesis 
contributions:  
• structured information – clearly defined concepts, a definite and highly organised form 
of model and metadata for safety assessment evidence; 
• structured processes – decomposed but integrated steps with explicit inputs and outputs 
for model inconsistency analysis and safety argument construction; 
• structured guidance – systematic thinking patterns that enhance explicitness, clarity and 
rigour in evidence justification.  
1.8 Thesis Structure 
The thesis is divided into the following chapters: 
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Chapter 2 Literature Survey   
This chapter presents a review of literature on models in general, safety analysis techniques 
and safety case development. The essence of models and model validation is explored; a 
review of major widely-used safety analysis techniques and the latest trends in safety 
assessment are presented. Besides that, the general means of model validation and current 
research and practice in evaluating safety assessment models are provided and the progress 
on research work in the field of safety cases is reported. Through the review, the importance 
of and the need to establish confidence in safety assessment evidence used to support safety 
arguments are clearly grounded. 
Chapter 3 Safety Assessment Meta-Modelling   
This chapter presents a model of the domain of safety assessment modelling and a core data 
meta-model of safety assessment artefacts. The domain model organises the key factors 
involved in and associated with safety assessment modelling and used as the context of 
model evaluation. The core data meta-model addresses four types of core elements in 
common safety assessment models (metadata, validity contextual data, substance analysis 
results and conventional construction elements in safety assessment models) in support of 
evidence application and justification.  
Chapter 4 A Model of the Argument-Evidence Interface   
This chapter describes a model of evidence that depicts the connotation of evidence and 
interfaces safety assessment models with safety arguments. The model integrates views of 
evidence from the content perspective, the utilisation perspective and the evaluation 
perspective. Importantly, the nature and characteristics of safety assessment evidence and the 
existing view and representations of evidence and its relationship with arguments are 
analyzed in detail. The notion of the evidence assertion is elaborated for interfacing 
arguments and safety assessment evidence. The relationship between evidence and 
confidence in safety cases is discussed. 
Chapter 5 Managing Safety Model Inconsistency    
This chapter presents an inconsistency analysis method that deals with the potential 
consistency issue associated with multiple safety analyses. The method is established on the 
exploration and categorisation of the consistency problem amongst safety assessment models. 
The inconsistency analysis method comprises six phases and is supported by a structured 
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information model. The key analysis phases are explained with detailed steps and 
demonstrated with reference to a running example. 
Chapter 6 Using and Justifying Safety Assessment Evidence   
This chapter introduces an expanded argument construction process to underpin the 
establishment of confidence during safety case development, through which counter evidence 
and the justification of evidence are explicitly considered. Furthermore, three generic 
argument patterns are developed in order to support more rigorous argument construction for 
confidence establishment, in particular - through argumentation from both positive and 
negative perspectives, through justification of the adequacy of safety assessment models, and 
through justification of the cross-model inconsistency analysis.  
Chapter 7 Evaluation   
In this chapter, the contributions of the research are evaluated against the thesis proposition. 
The soundness of the concepts elaborated is discussed; the efficacy and practicality of the 
approach presented is illustrated with a case study with models of a braking system control 
unit in an industrial application context.  
Chapter 8 Conclusions and Future Work   
This chapter concludes the thesis, with highlights on the contributions of the thesis. Potential 
areas for further work that can be undertaken to extend and strengthen the work are also 
presented.  
Appendix A presents three argument patterns that are associated with the issue of confidence 
in using safety assessment evidence. 
Appendix B defines a safety assessment core data meta-model, a model of evidence and an 
information model of inconsistency analysis in the Eclipse Modelling Framework (EMF) 
[189]. 
Appendix C presents a case study of cross-model inconsistency analysis and argument 
construction on the basis of the safety assessment of a Braking System Control Unit of an 
aircraft Wheel Braking System taken from ARP 4761 [181].  
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2 Literature Survey 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings of the literature review of the research in the fields of 
modelling, safety assessment and safety argumentation. It aims to provide the background to 
the research presented in this thesis. Knowledge of modelling in general is essential for 
understanding the fundamental common features of various models and modelling process, 
which are also exhibited by safety-related models. The complexity of safety assessment 
models is revealed with the review of traditional and modern safety analysis techniques, 
typical safety assessment processes and existing evaluation efforts on safety-related models. 
Then the regime of safety cases, a particular application context of safety assessment models, 
is surveyed for the further research centred on integration and evaluation of safety 
assessment evidence with safety arguments. 
This chapter is divided into the following sections: 
• Models in general – definition of a ‘model’ and some common features of models 
• Model validation – concept, problems and means regarding the validation of models 
• Safety assessment modelling techniques – traditional qualitative techniques and 
techniques integrated with formal languages 
• Safety assessment processes – typical safety assessment processes and process-related 
issues 
• Evaluation of safety assessment models – existing research and practice 
• Safety and assurance cases 
o Essential argumentation elements and evaluation criteria 
o Existing requirements and research on assurance, evidence and argument  
o Confidence and models in safety cases. 
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2.2 Models in General 
Models, as a very broad concept, are used explicitly and implicitly in all disciplines. 
Principles and methods concerning models and modelling from other fields can aid the 
understanding, evaluation and utilization of safety assessment models. So before the specific 
discussion of safety assessment models, it is useful to review some general literature 
concerning models. 
2.2.1 Definition  
There have been many definitions of what is meant by the term ‘model’: 
•  “A representation of something else, designed for a specific purpose” [47]. 
•  “An abstract description of the real world; it is a simple presentation of more complex 
forms, processes, and functions of physical phenomena or ideas” [174]. 
•  “A distinct domain that corresponds by analogy to the real world domain” [107]. 
• “Modelling in the broadest sense is the cost-effective use of something in place of 
something else for some cognitive purpose”. “A model represents reality for the given 
purpose; the model is an abstraction of reality in the sense that it cannot represent all 
aspects of reality. This allows us to deal with the world in a simplified manner, avoiding 
the complexity, danger and irreversibility of reality.” [172] 
• “An analytical representation or quantification of a real system and the ways in which 
phenomena occur within that system, used to predict or assess the behaviour of the real 
system under specified (often hypothetical) conditions.” [103] 
According to these definitions, some essential characteristics of a model are summarized 
below.  
• It is designed or used for a specific purpose [47, 172]. A model cannot be good for all 
purposes. It should be evaluated according to its contribution to the purpose it was used 
for. 
• It is not real [47, 172]. The object being modelled is different from the model we 
designed to represent the object. A model could not represent all aspects of the object 
being modelled. Simplification and abstraction are two most essential features of models. 
Models with different abstraction levels vary from the real object in different ways. 
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• It is of something [172]. The objects being modelled are diverse and generally they are 
complex [174]. The object could be a device, a phenomenon, a process, a function, a 
concept, an idea, etc.  
• It is based on building up relationships. There should be some common or similar 
attributes between models and the objects being represented [107]. An analogy, metaphor 
or mapping exists between a model and a problem. Different models concentrate on 
different relationships. 
• It should be cost effective [172]. A model allows us to deal with things or situations 
which are too costly to deal with directly by using something that is simpler, safer or 
cheaper. 
Two main purposes of a model are ‘to facilitate understanding and enhance prediction’ [174]. 
In addition to the above two purposes, Levins [130] states another purpose as ‘to modify 
nature’. This also has been addressed as ‘control’ [206] or ‘prescription’ [143]. This aim 
means that we can intervene in the system being modelled in some way to achieve a state we 
desire. This goal does not exist for every model or under every circumstance and it can only 
be achieved on the basis of the achievement of the former two goals. 
It is necessary to distinguish between two types of representation of models. The first type of 
model is intended to represent the real world, or certain aspects of the real world. Then the 
real world problem can be safely explored and manipulated using the models, i.e. models for 
weather forecasts. In this case, we can get some feedback of the quality of our models from 
the real world. The second type of model is intended to represent the elements that should be 
present in an idealization of a system under research, which could be vague, ambiguous, and 
nonexistent at the beginning (for example, an aircraft design model). It is difficult to obtain 
operational feedback for the assessment of these models in advance of a system being 
allowed into operation. 
2.2.2 Model Building 
The construction of models is a creative and subjective exercise. The core of modelling is 
performing abstraction by aggregating elements that are strongly connected and separating 
groups of elements with less strong links [174]. Furthermore, Levins [130] points out that 
there are tradeoffs between different attributes of models during model construction. A 
model with maximized generality, realism, precision, manageability, and understandability is 
preferred. But these attributes cannot all achieve the maximum value at the same time. 
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Sacrificing one of the attributes might improve others. An adequate model comes through 
comprehensive thinking and considered tradeoffs - a painstaking process.  
In a model building process, it is normal and necessary to have assumptions and 
simplifications to make the complexity of the real-world problems tractable [78, 130, 174]. 
The reasons for making assumptions and simplifications include: a) there might be too many 
features or parameters to model, or b) too many features in a model would exceed our current 
capability of problem-solving, or c) the complicated results of complex models became 
meaningless or less understandable and make it more difficult to explain the problem. While 
making simplification in the models, we must preserve the essential features of a problem. 
Understanding of a problem is not achieved by general models alone, but by a relation 
between the general and the particular [130]. 
In complex systems, there is usually a cluster of models due to the complexity of a system 
and the capability of our mind [130]. Starting with small models and using the divide-and-
conquer technique will make the construction of a model a manageable task. It is also 
necessary to think about the relation of a model to other models during modelling, otherwise 
the usefulness of a model might be weakened within a larger system context. 
As Shannon recommended, we can build a model according to four simplified steps by[185]: 
a) specification of the model’s purpose; b) specification of the model’s components; c) 
specification of the parameters and variables associated with the components; d) and 
specification of the relationships between the components, parameters and variables. 
2.3 Model Validation 
Since more and more models are used in a variety of disciplines, there are increasing 
concerns about how to evaluate a model, such as “How can we tell whether a model is a good 
one?”, “How can we judge the strengths of different models?” [161]. This section presents a 
survey of different views on model validation and validation methods. 
2.3.1 Viewpoints on Validation 
Oreskes points out that ‘calling a model validated does not make it valid’ [160]. She also 
argues that ‘it is impossible to demonstrate the predictive reliability of any model of a 
complex natural system in advance of its actual use’. This is because usually the system 
being modelled is not a closed system, and the model of a system is always not unique [162]. 
All models embed some uncertainties [160] when the system being modelled is open. The 
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uncertainties could be theoretical, empirical, parametrical, or temporal. These uncertainties 
will have influences on the reliability of model prediction. In addition, she states that models 
may be conceptually flawed [160]. Thus she suggests using the terms ‘model evaluation’ or 
‘model assessment’ instead of ‘model validation’1. 
McCarl, in [143], also comments that ‘models can never be validated, only invalidated’. He 
argues that the possible results from a model validation process are: a) the model is proved to 
be invalid; or b) the model is confirmed with an increased degree of confidence. Hodges 
[101] holds the same point of view that the validity of models is not binary but accrues 
continuously between ‘not valid’ and ‘valid’ when they pass more validation tests. 
If a model can be validated and has passed its validation process, we often call or label it 
with the term ‘a valid model’ even if it is not a valid model. Numerous papers on model 
validation use the terminology ‘validate/validation’ in this way and it is widely accepted by 
most modellers and model-users. Hence it is unnecessary to avoid using the concept of 
‘model validation’ as long as we understand that current research on model validation is a 
form of confidence building [28] – we may have increased level of confidence in the so-
called ‘valid’ models because they have passed specific validation or evaluation processes. 
Miser and Quade [147] define model validation as ‘the process by which the analyst assures 
himself and others that a model is a representation of the phenomena being modelled that is 
adequate for the purposes of the study of which it is a part’. Many researchers [101, 182, 
190] agree that models should be validated according to their fitness for their intended 
purpose. In addition, models validated at a given time are not always valid, and continuous 
validation in operation should be conducted [143]. 
2.3.2 Means of Validation 
Despite the consensus on model validation according to its adequacy for purpose, most 
research on models has treated the validation of a model as the agreement of the model with 
‘reality’. There is only limited guidance on how to evaluate whether the abstract level and the 
precision level of models are appropriate to their anticipated use.  
Rykiel suggests three kinds of information should be clarified before model validation: “the 
purpose of the model”; “the criteria the model must meet to be declared acceptable for use”; 
“the context in which the model is intended to operate” [178]. However, such information is 
                                                          
1
 Some people use the term ‘model accreditation’, ‘model appraisal’. 
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not always easy to define and is, in practice, either scarcely covered in validation or only 
vaguely described. 
Much existing research concerns the validation of numerical models. There is not much 
discussion of techniques for the validation of qualitative models. More efforts on model 
validation in general are needed to increase our confidence in models and their outputs. 
Shannon suggests that establishing the possible validity of simulation models can be 
achieved by the following procedures [184]: 
• “Using common sense and logic throughout the study. 
• Taking maximum advantage of the knowledge and insight of those most familiar with the 
system under study. 
• Empirically testing by the use of appropriate statistical techniques all of the assumptions, 
hypotheses, etc. that possibly can be tested. 
• Paying close attention to details, checking and rechecking each step of the model 
building process. 
• Assuring that the model performs the way it was intended by using test cases, etc. during 
the debugging phase. 
• Comparing the input-output transformation of the model and the real world system 
(whenever possible). 
• Running field tests or peripheral research where feasible. 
• Performing sensitivity analysis on input variables, parameters, etc. 
• Checking carefully the predictions of the model and actual results achieved with the real 
world system.” [184] 
From the suggestion above, we can observe that the main approaches taken to evaluating 
models can be considered in two groups: a) by judgment from human knowledge and 
experience; b) by comparison of a model and its results with data from a statistical test, field 
use, or another model. The scope of our experience and knowledge and whether comparison 
data is available will determine the validation approach that is applicable in a given situation.  
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2.4 Safety Assessment Models 
Models in the safety domain exhibit the fundamental attributes of models in general as 
outlined above: i.e. they are not real, they are simplified and they are abstracted. Usually they 
are dealing with engineering systems - man-made systems interacting with natural systems. 
These man-made systems are specified as we think they ought to be. The safety assessment 
models we use to analyse or demonstrate system safety are always based on: a) a system 
model or at least a conceptual mental model; b) and a kind of safety analysis technique. 
As we have mentioned in Chapter 1, a large collection of methods have been developed to 
support system safety assessment, such as the ones presented in [14, 35]. Safety analysis 
techniques are broadly divided into two groups: qualitative techniques and quantitative 
techniques [173]. In this section, safety assessment models2 are primarily reviewed from the 
perspective of qualitative safety analysis techniques on which the model instances are based. 
Safety analysis approaches which deal essentially with causal failure relationships have been 
chosen for this survey. Models for systematic failures of components related to specific 
failure mechanisms are not covered in this survey. Models of accidents, human factors, or 
socio-technical issues are also beyond the scope of this study. 
2.4.1 Traditional Techniques 
In this subsection, four common safety analysis techniques, namely, Functional Hazard 
Assessment (FHA), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), 
Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP), are briefly outlined and references made to 
published evaluations of them. 
Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) 
Functional Hazard Assessment is recommended by SAE ARP 4754A [180] and is practiced 
at the beginning of the safety assessment process in the aviation industry. Through this 
approach, system functions are carefully examined and potential consequences caused by 
identified failure conditions are analyzed and classified according to their severity. In the 
aerospace domain, FHA is performed at both the aircraft level and the system level. Safety 
                                                          
2
  When ‘safety assessment model’ is mentioned, it could have two different meanings depending on the context of 
usage. The first meaning is a concrete model instance, which is the use of this term in this thesis. The other meaning 
is a specific type of safety analysis technique or method, which is addressed in this thesis as a safety analysis 
technique or a safety assessment meta-model.  
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objectives of both the aircraft level and the system level should be determined after FHA. An 
excerpt of an aircraft FHA table from SAE ARP 4761 [181] is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 A FHA Example (from [181]) 
FHA gives no support for the analysis of functional dependencies. The method does not 
generate any further information other than that input by analysts. It only presents our 
understanding about the loss of system functions and the associated effects. “Generation of 
the FHA at the highest appropriate level is dependent upon overall knowledge and 
experience and may require consultation of numerous specialists” [181].  
There are some implementation issues with FHA, since it is presented in a purely textual 
format. It is hard to clearly define the functions and failure conditions with unambiguous and 
adequate words [210]. In practice, the completeness of failure conditions can also be difficult 
to achieve. 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
Failure modes and effects analysis is one of the most commonly used and most effective 
reliability analysis methods [155]. It is an inductive analysis by which each of the potential 
failure modes in the system is analyzed to determine its resulting effects, and the resulting 
failure modes are classified by their severities and likelihood of occurrence. The findings of 
FMEA are usually documented textually in worksheets. A sample worksheet with typical 
column headings used by Electricité de France (excerpted from [201]) is shown in Table 1. 
Besides its use in reliability analysis, this method also provides useful information for 
maintainability and safety analysis. 
 39 
 
 
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS 
PROJECT ___________ 
SYSTEM ____________ 
 
REFERENCE DOCUMENTS ________ 
Component 
identification 
(Code,Name,  
Type, 
Location) 
Functions, 
States 
Failure 
modes 
Possible 
failure 
causes 
(internal, 
external 
causes) 
Effects 
on  
the 
system 
Effects  
on 
external 
systems 
Means  
of  
detection 
Inspection  
and test  
frequency 
Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 An Example of a FMEA Worksheet (from [201] ) 
Although it is easy to learn and use, this method has its limitations. It usually considers every 
single unit failure independently [129, 201], meaning that it is ineffective in dealing with 
multiple failures under diverse conditions in complex systems. The operating procedure of 
this method is not well-suited for the consideration of human factors [129]. In addition, it is 
difficult to trace the effects of low-level failures correctly through FMEA of complex 
systems [155]. 
FMEA is a method with limited analysis power. The effectiveness and quality of the analysis 
are heavily dependent on the knowledge and experience of the person performing the 
analysis. There is no support from this method to identify new failure modes [129]. “All the 
significant failure modes must be known in advance” [129]. Though it is clear that the 
purpose of FMEA is to examine possible failure modes and determine their impact on the 
product, the most significant problem that challenges the effectiveness of FMEA is the 
omission of failure modes [42]. The completeness of the analysis is always challenged by the 
‘unknown unknowns’. Besides that, it does not provide means to determine failure effects or 
mitigation measures. The power of this method lies in the humans who perform the analysis. 
Furthermore, FMEA is a task involving many hours of human effort. Practitioners always 
complain that doing FMEA is tedious and time-consuming [35, 201], especially for complex 
systems [129]. 
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Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
Fault tree analysis is one of the most popular safety analysis method used in safety 
engineering. Based on Boolean logic and with graphical representation, this method starts 
from an undesired system failure (top event) and continues by top-down analysis of possible 
causes of individual or combined part-level failures (basic events). The failure events and the 
logical connections between them are presented by standardized symbols. The traditional 
fault tree symbols are described in Table 2 (from [200]). 
 
Table 2 Fault Tree Symbols (from [200]) 
Primary Event Symbols 
 
BASIC EVENT - A basic initiating fault requiring no further development 
 
CONDITIONING EVENT - Specific conditions or restrictions that apply 
to any logic gate 
 
UNDEVELOPED EVENT – An event which is not further developed 
either because it is of insufficient consequence or because information is 
unavailable 
 
EXTERNAL EVENT – An event which is normally expected to occur 
Intermediate Event Symbols 
 
INTERMEDIATE EVENT – A fault event that occurs because of one or 
more antecedent causes acting through logic gates 
Gate Symbols 
 
AND – Output fault occurs if all of the input faults occur 
 
OR – Output fault occurs if at least one of the input faults occurs 
 
EXCLUSIVE OR – Output fault occurs if exactly one of the input faults 
occurs 
 
PRIORITY AND – Output fault occurs if all of the input faults occur in a 
specific sequence 
 
INHIBIT – Output occurs if the (single) input fault occurs in the presence 
of an enabling condition 
Transfer Symbols 
 
TRANSFER IN – Indicates that the tree is developed further at the 
corresponding TRANSFER OUT 
 
TRANSFER OUT – Indicates that this portion of the tree must be attached 
at the corresponding TRANSFER IN  
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An example of a simple fault tree from US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fault Tree 
Handbook [200] is given in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3 An Example of a Fault Tree (from [200]) 
FTA is capable of considering multiple failures and diverse types of failure causes (e.g. 
human error, maintenance error). It is a deductive approach [200]. The qualitative analysis of 
FTA can generate Minimal Cut Sets (MCSs), which are specific minimum combinations of 
failures that lead to the top event. The quantitative analysis of FTA can provide the 
probability of the top event if data concerning all of the basic events is available. Moreover, 
there are methods for assessing the importance of events which is very useful for prioritizing 
measures for reducing safety risk.  
However, a fault tree is only a simplified representation of complex system failure-cause 
relations. The fundamental assumption of its quantitative analysis is the independence of 
primary events in a tree [129, 201]. If this assumption is not valid for a real system, the FTA 
of that system is invalid. Although FTA is good for providing an intuitive and simple 
representation of failure-cause logical relations, the traditional logic gate symbols are not 
capable of displaying failures associated with time-ordering or time delay. FTA works well 
with binary states of a system (work or fail), but is weak at representing state transitions and 
partial failures in complex systems [129].  
The depth of FTA is limited by the availability of information on system structure. The 
correctness of logical relations and the completeness of identified relations are to a large 
extent decided by human knowledge and experience [165]. For complex systems, 
constructing a fault tree manually becomes an infeasible and unmanageable task [201]. If 
there are many undesired system level failures, separate fault trees need to be built for each 
of these top events [181].  
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For the reasons above, many studies have been focused on the improvement of FTA for 
increased expressive power and easier means of construction. Some of the studies have 
focussed on introducing new gates for failure logic description, such as the ‘Priority-AND 
(PAND)’ gate [67], the ‘AND-THEN (TAND)’ gate [209], the ‘Priority-OR (POR)’gate 
[202], the Simultaneous-AND gate [202]. But these new gates are used much less frequently 
in practice because they are less familiar to people who are used to traditional FTA. 
Furthermore, these extended fault-tree-like models with new gates no longer have the 
qualitative analysis part of FTA. Minimal cut sets are not given because the concept of MCS 
does not work while considering timing and sequence scenarios in the analysis of trees with 
new gates. Only the probability of an undesired top event is provided as the final analysis 
result of trees with new gates. Similar to traditional fault trees, the probability provided by 
the quantitative analysis of trees models with new gates is also based on the structures of tree 
models.  
Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) 
HAZOP [124] was initially developed in the process industry. It is a structured and 
systematic examination of potential conditions that may endanger personnel, equipment, or 
task. By using a set of recommended guidewords (e.g. No, More, Less, As Well As), we can 
intentionally deviate the behaviour or states of system components and analyze its possible 
causes, consequences, and potential means of treatment. The HAZOP meeting process and 
participants from multi-disciplinary team are important factors influencing the effectiveness 
of the analysis results. Besides its usage in process industries, this method has also been 
extended for analyzing other types of system, such as software [168], human errors or 
operational procedures [124]. 
2.4.2 Safety Analysis Based on Formal Languages 
More recently, researchers have explored the possibility of performing safety analysis based 
on models described in formal languages, which is also called ‘model’-based safety analysis 
[44, 111, 132, 163], and is largely driven by the motivation of achieving reusable and 
automated safety analysis. An important notion associated with these models is the idea of 
failure propagation and transformation.  
Failure Propagation Transformation Notation (FPTN) [76] is a graphical notation used to 
describe the causal relationships between failures. This notation encapsulates a number of 
related failure relationships into a FPTN module. The relations in a module might vary from 
causal relations extracted from FMEAs to causal relations represented by FTAs. The failures 
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contained in a module are not restricted to the range of failures of a single component, or 
failures of a single type, or failures of a same product level. FPTN modules can be connected 
together by matching failure-inputs and failure-outputs, rather than by the normal data flow, 
to illustrate the failure propagation and transformation with a ‘bigger’ module. This notation 
provides a more manageable way to trace failure effects back to failure modes or conditions 
between different levels. Failures in a FPTN module change and spread according to logical 
rules which are similar to the logic deployed in FTA.  
In [44], system safety assessment is supported by FSAP/NuSMV-SA, a platform with a 
graphical interface (FSAP) and a specialised model-checker for safety assessment based on 
NuSMV 2 [49]. The safety assessment is based on formally-defined models - a formal design 
model of a system (the system model), a formal model of desired properties of the system, 
and a formal model of expected failure modes of the components of the design model. An 
extended system model is formulated by enriching the system model by injecting previously 
defined failure modes into it. Then the enriched model is checked with formalized safety 
requirements via exhaustive state-space analysis to identify all sets of basic events which can 
trigger a top level event. The NuSMV-SA model-checker will automatically extract all these 
collections of basic events to construct a fault tree.  
One difference between this fault tree and a traditional one is that this tree is a two-layered 
fault tree constructed with basic events from detected minimal cut sets under ‘AND’ gates, 
and an ‘OR’ gate underneath the top event. By contrast, traditional FTA typically has more 
intermediate layers and the layout of gates is usually not so ‘tidy’. The top-down mode of 
thinking inherent in the process of developing a traditional FTA does not exist in those 
automatically-generated fault trees.  
AltaRica is a high-level formal modelling language with an unambiguous semantics [23, 43]. 
The language is capable of describing both functional and dysfunctional logical features of 
the system being modelled [43]. Full AltaRica contains features (e.g. handling of state) that 
are difficult to formulate in simple Boolean formulae [43]. A sub-branch of AltaRica that 
excludes those features is called AltaRica data-flow language. The AltaRica Data-Flow 
modelling practice is well in line with the failure transformation and propagation description 
needed by safety analysis. An example of a component modelled in AltaRica is presented in 
Section 3.4.2 later. The modelling and analysis can be supported by industrial tools [1], such 
as OCAS Cecilia developed by Dassault Aviation, Simfia V2 by EADS APSYS and Safety 
Designer by Dassault Systèmes. AltaRica has been used for safety assessment of complex 
systems [31, 32] and multi-physical systems modelling [19]. 
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However, physical system failure propagations could be difficult to model adequately (for 
instance, if a component failure is linked with bidirectional flows). AltaRica does not 
differentiate between transient and permanent faults. The AltaRica data model does not 
permit syntactical circular definition; time-delays need to be added to avoid loops. 
Furthermore there is no guarantee that all scenarios that cause one failure condition will be 
found [31]. Lisagor [132] suggested some ways to circumvent some of the limitations of 
AltaRica modelling, such as logical loops and reconfiguration handling, in the failure logic 
modelling (FLM) and analysis process. Adeline et al explored a validation process for 
AltaRica models [18].  
It is worth noting that these safety assessment models based on formal languages are 
different from traditional fault trees in nature. Indeed, they are not top-down analysis, but 
bottom-up analysis. Even though they have MCSs as the modelling outputs; the model-based 
analysis should not substitute for traditional FTA in the safety assessment process. Ortmeier 
et al [163] suggests that it is beneficial to perform traditional fault tree analysis 
independently from formal safety analysis models. It would be helpful to enable comparison 
between traditional fault trees and model based safety analysis results in order to cross-check 
our understanding of the system behaviours to some degree.  
2.5 Safety Assessment Processes 
No single technique is powerful enough to deal with the representation and analysis 
requirements for safety assessment of all kinds of systems at different development or 
operational stages. Hence, safety assessment processes, which incorporate safety activities 
based on different safety analysis techniques, are usually recommended and are widely 
adopted in combination with other system engineering processes [180]. In this section, a 
typical safety assessment process is outlined and issues concerning the enactment of safety 
assessment processes are briefly discussed. 
2.5.1 SAE ARP 4754A Safety Process 
In the domain of civil aviation, ARP 4754A [180] provides overall guidance for the 
development of civil aircraft and systems. It defines the safety assessment process and 
deliverables required along with the aircraft/system development process and other integral 
processes, taking into account the overall aircraft operating environment and functions. Both 
requirements validation and implementation verification are stressed for certification and 
product assurance in ARP 4754A.  
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As described in Section 1.4, a variety of safety assessment activities span the system 
development process. Figure 4 shows the detailed interactions between safety assessment and 
aviation system development activities and demonstrates clearly how the outputs of safety 
assessment are interrelated.  
 
Figure 4 ARP 4754A Safety Assessment Process Model (from [180]) 
The process starts with Aircraft-Level FHA. This step uses information from CCA (Common 
Cause Analysis), Aircraft Function Development, and System-Level FHA; it also establishes 
and supplies the derived safety requirements to Aircraft Function Allocation and System-
Level FHA. In a similar style, the PSSA (Preliminary System Safety Assessment) and SSA 
(System Safety Assessment) steps of the safety assessment process use information from 
corresponding design and other analyses and derive more detailed requirements for a lower 
level, and provide justification for the achievability of the requirements of a higher level until 
the complexity of system implementation can be managed. Finally, ASA (Aircraft Safety 
Assessment) should integrate the analysis results of previous safety activities to demonstrate 
the overall aircraft/system safety in accordance with the requirements derived during 
Aircraft-Level FHA and PASA (Preliminary Aircraft Safety Assessment). ARP 4761 [181] 
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presents detailed guidance on the corresponding safety assessment techniques employed at 
different stages of the ARP 4754A safety assessment process. 
2.5.2 Other Safety Processes 
There are some other standards and guidance that define a safety process or a safety 
lifecycle, which specifies the necessary activities involved in the specification, design, 
installation, operation and maintenance of a safety-critical system. These include MIL-STD-
882E [65], IEC 61508 [5], IEC 61511 [6].  
The safety processes defined in these standards vary in terms of their applicable domains and 
other details. MIL-STD-882E is developed especially for US military systems; IEC 61508 is 
generic for various safety-instrumented systems in a broad sense; whereas IEC 61511 is more 
specific and aimed at safety-instrumented systems in the process industry. However, the 
central objectives of these safety processes are the same - the identification and control of 
risk associated with undesired conditions at different levels of the system hierarchy during a 
certain time span, which is similar to the foundation of the ARP 4754A safety process.  
Although details of specific safety/hazard analysis methods are not the primary concern of 
these standards, the documentation of hazard analysis methods and techniques are commonly 
stressed in the requirements associated with these safety processes. However, the assessment 
of the quality of the process outputs are not sufficiently addressed, which may undermine 
confidence in the actual achievement of these processes. 
Safety assessment activities are, in nature, iterative and interactive [201]. The safety process 
adopted or customised in the development and operation of a specific system should take into 
account the existing best practice and the features of the specific system under study. 
2.5.3 Process-Related Issues 
Safety processes play an important role in system development and certification. With the 
recommended processes, which are usually verified and summarised from good practice, it is 
easy and clear for duty-holders to organize and plan activities and resources in the system 
development lifecycle. 
A systematic and rigorous process (usually as recommended by standards and guidance) is 
one of the aspects on which we base our confidence in achieved system safety because it 
implies that we have the overall knowledge and capability necessary to control safety issues 
related to complex systems. Taking account of more lessons from practice and incorporating 
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the latest progress in system development, we can update and improve recommended 
processes periodically, and can thereby establish a better foundation for confidence in safety. 
For example, from the safety assessment tasks depicted in [136], to the ARP 4754 safety 
assessment process [179] and the ARP 4754A safety assessment process [180], the generic 
safety assessment process adopted in the development of civil aviation systems is more and 
more systematic and practical. However, safety processes are not, and should not be, the 
single source of our confidence in system safety. 
There are potential issues that need to be considered for in-depth and pragmatic 
understanding of these processes and for the effective implementation of these processes. 
Two major issues are discussed below, concerning the imperfection of a purely process-
oriented safety culture. In fact, there has been lively critical discussion of the process-based 
and product-based standard and practice [28, 66, 118, 144]. 
First of all, the rationale underlying recommended safety processes as best practice are often 
implicit and exist only as hidden knowledge. Historically, the reasons for doing something in 
a certain way have been considered or been done implicitly. The underlying reasoning is not 
typically documented in a systematic form and is not included as a part of the certification 
document. Without understanding the rationale underpinning interrelationships between the 
safety activities, the contribution made by various safety analysis results towards achieving 
the system safety objectives is not sufficiently clear, and rigorous scrutiny and synthesis of 
the analysis results can be handicapped.  
Secondly, the safety process/activities planned and the actual enactment of a planned process 
are different. The traditional recommended safety assessment process is derived from 
industrial best practice and has been adopted and practiced for a long time. It allows us to 
tailor practices as required, and provides us with flexibility over the choice of activities. 
However, the recommended process or planned activities do not guarantee the quality of 
results generated from the enactment of a specific process. The safety of a system needs to be 
justified with outputs from the ‘as-performed process’, not just from the promise of the ‘as-
intended process’. This has been identified as a serious concern by some researchers [94, 
110]. 
In summary, processes are not in themselves perfect, and confidence in the eventual system 
attributes of the delivered system cannot be derived from processes alone. The issues 
discussed in this section must be considered and properly handled by both regulators and 
practitioners in order to provide assurance that the systems are designed, maintained and 
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operated in a safe manner. Both safety processes and safety evidence derived from those 
processes should be emphasized in safety management practice.  
2.6 Evaluation of Safety Assessment Models 
Safety assessment models are indispensable tools for us to identify, analyze, control, and 
evaluate system safety in many industries. Evaluation of safety assessment models has been a 
focus of concern for many years. However, some traditional safety analysis techniques (e.g. 
FTA) have been criticized for incompleteness and inaccuracy [80, 197]. Besides that, there 
could be various errors in a safety analysis process [51], e.g. over-simplification during 
modelling, omission of relevant failure modes, or inadvertent misapplication of data values. 
So the evaluation of safety assessment models, with regard to the methodology, the 
modelling process and the modelling results, is very important for a better understanding of 
the validity and reliability of safety assessment models and their outcomes. 
During the evolution of safety assessment techniques, much emphasis has been put on the 
description and comparison of the strengths and weakness of different modelling 
methodologies in order to help practitioners to decide which model will fulfil their needs best 
[14, 35]. There is also some detailed comparison of specific safety assessment models, which 
has tried to find the inherent transformation or the data correlations between safety 
assessment models. Section 2.6.1 presents some results from comparisons of the power 
relationships between different models. 
Only a few papers are found on assessing the quality of a single safety assessment method or 
the validity of the modelling results of a single safety assessment model. Leveson [129] 
states that we should treat safety analysis results with appropriate scepticism since very little 
validation has been done on these analysis techniques. Section 2.6.2 outlines the limited 
scope of the existing work in this area and highlights the difficulties inherent in the 
assessment of safety assessment models. 
2.6.1 Comparison of Safety Assessment Techniques 
Rouvroye et. al [173] have compared several popular safety analysis techniques from three 
perspectives – the information needed for the analysis process, the actions performed during 
the analysis process, and the results obtained from analysis processes. They give the relation 
of some quantitative analysis techniques that is ranked according to the modelling power of 
these techniques and conclude that “the analysis complexity and effort to perform an analysis 
increases as the modelling power increases” [173]. 
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Malhotra et al have studied the modelling power of different types of some commonly used 
safety assessment models [139]. They concentrate on the modelling power needed by the 
kind of dependencies within a system. Eight types of model are compared with the 
assumption that failure and repair time distributions of system components are distributed 
exponentially. As Figure 5 (from [139]) shows, some model forms can be transformed into 
other forms, which means they are equally powerful, such as from a reliability block diagram 
to a traditional fault tree or vice versa. But not all the conversion between models is 
bidirectional; some systems could be represented by a more powerful modelling approach, 
whereas there is no equivalent representation by a less powerful approach. For example, not 
every fault tree with repair events could be represented by a reliability graph. 
     
Figure 5 Power Hierarchy among Some Safety Analysis Models (from [139]) 
From a different point of view, Wilson and McDermid examine the input and output data 
relations of a set of safety analyses and models [212]. They present an underpinning data 
model to support integration of those analyses and models. The consistency and 
completeness of analysis can be checked according to the data propagation. 
Research on the comparison of various models gives us a better understanding of the 
capability of models and insights into how to make decisions on the selection of appropriate 
models. For large-scale complex systems, different safety assessment models should be used 
according to their power and the applicable situation and they should be integrated to 
generate safety assessment conclusions for the whole system. But the value of such research 
is limited to providing guidance for the application of the techniques, rather than assuring the 
validity of the combinational usage of these models. 
2.6.2 Existing Evaluation of Safety Assessment Models  
In terms of modelling approaches, many safety assessment techniques have been discussed in 
Section 2.4, and their advantages and disadvantages identified. Besides that, there is a body 
GSPN- Generalized stochastic Petri net 
CTMC- Continuous time Markov chain 
SRN- Stochastic reward net 
MRM- Markov reward model 
FTRE- Fault tree with repeated events 
RG- Reliability graph 
RBD- Reliability block diagram 
FT- Fault tree 
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of research questioning and validating different aspects of safety assessment models (the 
approach itself, the modelling process, or the modelling results), though these articles are not 
as numerous as the efforts on the improvement and application of safety assessment models. 
Some researchers question the methodology of FTA [80, 140, 177]. Manion is one of the 
significant ones. Manion criticizes the fault tree analysis method from an ethical point of 
view [140]. He questions the soundness of FTA epistemologically and methodologically in 
both theory and practice. Some of his major criticism of the weaknesses of FTA includes 
[140]: 
• Incompleteness of system description and vagueness of trade-off principles for setting 
system analytical boundaries; 
• Notable differences in fault trees generated for the same situation which indicate that 
there are no sound rules for branch construction; 
• Foundation on engineering judgments which indicate the method is not a simple 
deductive reasoning process; 
• Uncertain and inadequate data used to construct a fault tree undermine the ‘correctness’ 
of the fault tree. 
The limitations of FTA discussed in Section 2.4.1 are also evaluated in Manion’s paper. In 
short, he emphasizes that the inadequate understanding of the system and its failure logic and 
the unjustified assumptions in the FTA method make it far from an objective and scientific 
way of judging safety. Nevertheless, he has neglected to mention that FTA is not merely used 
in helping ‘judge’ safety at the time of certification, but also has a role in helping engineers 
to communicate understanding of the system and its failure mechanisms and in helping them 
to decide or select proper safety barriers in system design according to the causal 
relationships conveyed by the tree. Besides, he does not provide other better means of safety 
analysis, nor practical guidance or solutions to help safety analysts to change the current 
situation of unsound analysis. 
The analysis results should also be judged by analysts themselves and by others on ethical 
grounds [140]. It would be helpful if we could retrace and review principles and decisions 
related to modelling when we evaluate our models. But unfortunately, few safety models are 
extensively evaluated on the basis of the principles and decisions on which they are built. 
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There are a very limited number of published materials on the validation of results of safety 
assessment modelling. Wong and Yeh notice that the model validation step is ‘never 
mentioned’ or in fact ‘ignored’ in most safety assessment activity due to insufficient relevant 
data and the purpose of predicting ‘rare’ events [213]. They propose a process for the 
validation of the fault tree structure which depends on data availability. But the validation of 
single-event or multi-event occurrences by comparing observational data with the fault tree 
model could be ineffective due to the possibility that the data in the consistent range simply 
arose because of a coincidence rather than on the basis of the correct structure of the fault 
tree model. 
Adline [18] identifies two major techniques used for verifying formal safety analysis models. 
One is Step-by-Step Simulation; another is Model Checking. The simulation technique works 
on testing scenarios and human knowledge, which is widely used but not exhaustive. The 
model-checking technique is in fact verifying defined properties of a model: in some sense, 
checking the model’s conformity with the reality. However, the definition and formalization 
of the properties to be checked can be difficult. Even if the properties hold in a model, it 
means the model has desired features but not exactly that the model is a valid representation 
of the real system behaviour. He proposes a validation process for safety analysis based on 
dedicated formal models [18]. The process starts with a Specification of Failure propagation 
Model from informal documents, from which a series of test cases are generated with 
predefined criteria. After that, the outputs from the test cases running on the implementation 
of AltaRica Failure Propagation Model (including the nodes, units, and the overall model) 
are examined through expert judgments. This process is helpful in terms of checking the 
‘validity’ of formal safety analysis models. Nevertheless, the method does not ensure the 
completeness of the specification and test cases and is still heavily dependent on human 
intervention and expert knowledge.  
Suokas has carried out an evaluation of safety and risk analysis in the chemical industry in 
late 1980s. He proposes four main approaches in the evaluation [197]: 
• “complete parallel analysis of the same object; 
• parallel analysis on some parts of the same object; 
• comparison of the analysis with descriptions of accident(s) occurring in corresponding 
systems and with personal experience; 
• examination of the process behind the analysis”. 
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The first two approaches evaluate the reliability and coverage of the analysis results for the 
same object through: a) implementation of analysis by different people or teams and b) 
comparison with results from other different methods. However, in practice, it is too 
expensive to have many versions of analysis for one object. The third approach could reveal 
factors omitted or only occasionally identified from safety analysis. But it is late for feedback 
and it is inapplicable to systems that have little safety data generated in the operational phase. 
The fourth approach is indirect and was relatively new in the 1980s, but has been adopted 
widely in the past decade. The examination of analysis processes, however, is actually a 
means of establishing confidence in the degree of truth carried by the analysis results, rather 
than a means of demonstrating the validity of the analyses (as we have explained in Section 
2.5.3).  
As Shannon suggested, and we outlined in Section 2.3.2, there are many ways that we can 
perform model validation. However, except for those approaches that rely upon human 
knowledge and in-modelling checks, e.g. ‘using common sense and logic’ or ‘checking and 
rechecking each step of the model building process’, other means of validation suggested are 
almost inapplicable to the evaluation of safety assessment models. For example, the 
drawback of empirical tests or field tests is that the approach relies heavily upon an ability to 
test or to simulate the real world for safety issues and a capability of measuring the real-
world data. Most of the time, we don’t have the opportunity to compare models with data 
from the real world. Given that a safety assessment model is often used in a predictive 
fashion, dealing with hypothesized system behaviours that we think the system ought or not 
to exhibit, the value of the model is to provide us with thoughts about and a view of the 
problem domain in the future tense, rather than in the past tense. This poses great challenges 
to the ‘validation’ of safety assessment models. In fact, we can only pursue better confidence 
in the quality of safety assessment models. 
2.7 Safety and Assurance Cases 
As “a reasoned attempt to justify a conclusion” [85], an argument can be used as a form of 
inquiry and communication for persuasion. For the demonstration of system safety with 
safety assessment models, it is beneficial to incorporate argument-based approaches to 
bolster our claims on system safety. Similarly, for the demonstration of our understanding of 
various safety assessment models, argumentation is also helpful to provide support to our 
claims of model adequacy. This section firstly introduces general argumentation concepts 
that underpin the development and evaluation of safety cases. Then a review is provided on 
the development of the safety case domain and of recent research work that reflects interest 
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in the confidence issue in system assurance and the trend of a unified structure of arguments 
and evidence in assurance cases.  
2.7.1 Argumentation  
“An argument is a set of claims that a person puts forward in an attempt to show that some 
further claim is rationally acceptable” [85]. The most basic components in arguments are 
claims (expressed as propositions). The claims associated with evidence or reasons are the 
premises of an argument; and the claims on the view being defended is the conclusion of an 
argument [85]. The claims are interconnected and the conclusion is inferred if all relevant 
premises are satisfied. Toulmin identifies six elements in the structure of arguments – claims, 
data or grounds, warrants, backing, qualifiers, and rebuttals [198]. His work provides a good 
foundation for the analysis and construction of various kinds of arguments, regardless of the 
domain in which they are applied. 
An argument is a form of communication used for persuasion by citing evidence or reasons 
to backup our claims. Trudy states that an argument is “to solve controversy in a natural, 
non-violent way” [85]. Fox argues that argumentation has far greater representational power 
than traditional mathematical formalism based on probability or other quantitative concepts, 
and it is more versatile and robust under conditions of lack of knowledge [82]. 
The process of putting forward an argument, including the whole activity of “making claims, 
challenging them, backing them up by producing reasons, criticising those reasons, rebutting 
those criticisms” [199], is argumentation. 
General criteria of a good argument are identified in the ‘ARG’ conditions presented in [85]. 
These general criteria also demonstrate that the quality of the backing provided for a claim is 
crucial for a compelling argument. ‘A’ means acceptable – the data or evidence used in the 
argument must be accepted as a viable starting basis for an argument; ‘R’ means relevance – 
the data or evidence must be genuinely relevant to the concluding claim; ‘G’ means grounds 
– the data must provide sufficient grounds for the conclusion. The last two conditions deal 
with the proper connection from the data to the conclusion. Besides the logical aspects 
covered by the general criteria, arguments can also be evaluated according to another two 
criteria, dialectical and rhetorical criteria, for the effectiveness of their rational persuasion 
[55]. The dialectical criterion helps to investigate whether the objections and questions on 
arguments have been answered satisfactorily. The rhetorical criterion may take into account 
aesthetic consideration in the evaluation, which “examines an argument's effects on the 
audience” [55].  
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Graphical representation of argument and evidence was initiated by Toulmin [198] and 
Wigimore [208]. Toulmin’s schematic concentrates on the layout of an argument, whereas 
Wigimore’s chart focuses on the variety of evidence and the interrelated evidential 
relationships. The visualised representation of arguments has gained popularity in recent 
decades [123, 203] with tool support in different disciplines, such as education, philosophy, 
and artificial intelligence. Graphical notations for the presentation of structured safety 
arguments are useful for facilitating safety case development and reviews, due to the 
structure and clarity offered by the graphical views.  
2.7.2 Safety Case Overview 
The concept of presenting safety-related information and arguments in a formal report 
initially came from the nuclear industry, but the notion of ‘safety cases’ originated in major 
industrial accident control regulations introduced in the process sector in the UK in 1984 [4]. 
Lord Cullen, in his report on the Piper Alpha accident [58] in 1990, recommended the 
introduction of a safety case regime as part of the regulation of oil and gas facilities and 
operation. The philosophy of a safety case is to construct a clear, structured, compelling 
argument to demonstrate the safety of a system in a particular operational context.  
The definition of a Safety Case from UK Defence Standard 00-56 [149] is: 
“A structured argument, supported by a body of evidence that provides a 
compelling, comprehensible and valid case that a system is safe for a given 
application in a given operating environment”. 
The core of a ‘safety case’ is the safety argument. A safety argument communicates how the 
overall objectives and claims of the safety case can be shown to be supported by the 
available evidence (such as the safety analysis results). A safety argument is generally 
composed of a hierarchy of safety claims and evidence, together with the inferential steps 
that are believed to connect the claims to the evidence. The explicit presentation of a safety 
argument is intended to encourage rigorous thinking and questioning which is potentially of 
great value when demonstrating the outputs of novel products and novel methods [56, 154].  
Safety case development, review and acceptance has been adopted and practiced 
systematically in a wide number of industries, especially in Europe, for more than twenty 
years. Industries adopting the safety case method include railway, air traffic control, 
maritime, and defence. The mandatory requirements for safety cases in some industries (e.g. 
DS 00-56, EUROCONTROL’s Safety Assessment Methodology) show that the importance 
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of the role of safety arguments is acknowledged. The recent releases of international 
standards such as the ISO/IEC15026 (Part 1 and Part 2) [8, 9], ISO26262 [7], and a FDA 
guidance [74] also indicate increasing adoption and interest in the application of an 
argument-based approach for system assurance. The central theme of using arguments for 
justification of the achievement of system attributes has now been transferred and expanded 
beyond the area of safety engineering. There are security cases, reliability cases, 
dependability cases, trust cases, survivability cases, and assurance cases. Some aviation-
related systems have adopted this approach for system safety assurance, for example, 
integrated modular avionics [109], air traffic control [48, 75] and aircraft operational hazard 
control [71].  
In addition, there are three recent standardisation efforts by the Object Management Group 
(OMG) System Assurance Task Force [159], which aim to enforce knowledge exchange and 
integration of assurance cases. They are: the standardised Argumentation Metamodel (ARM) 
[156]; the Software Assurance Evidence Metamodel (SAEM) [158]; the Structured 
Assurance Case Metamodel (SACM) [159].  
2.7.3 Structured Argument 
To be ‘clear’ and ‘comprehensible’ is the fundamental requirement of a safety case. The way 
in which an argument is represented and organized will largely determine the effectiveness of 
communication between safety case providers and safety case reviewers. Despite the variety 
of approaches for argument representation, visualized arguments are a common method of 
presentation.  
Currently the most commonly used graphical notations for safety arguments are the Goal 
Structuring Notation (GSN) [89, 117] and the Claims, Arguments and Evidence notation 
(CAE) [17]. For a comprehensive description of all GSN symbols, the reader is referred to 
the GSN Community Standard [89]. The construction and management of safety cases is also 
supported by commercial software tools, such as CertWare Safety Case Workbench by 
NASA [29], ASCE [16] by Adelard and GSN Modeler [24] by Atego. An example safety 
argument represented in GSN from [113] is shown in Figure 6. In the example, the top-level 
safety goal is ‘Control System Logic contribution to system level hazards is sufficiently 
managed’. The top safety goal is supported by lower-level sub-goals indirectly through two 
argument strategies. At the lowest level, the sub-goals need not be further decomposed and 
can be clearly supported by reference to items of safety evidence, such as a system analysis 
model or the results of system testing. 
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Figure 6 An Example Argument Presented in GSN (adapted from [113]) 
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Due to the complexity of the safety arguments required for non-trivial systems, the 
organization of separate pieces of safety arguments is in demand for a better overview of the 
whole argument and a manageable argument construction process. The concept of a 
compositional safety case is proposed by Kelly in [119]. Safety case modules, safety case 
architecture, safety case contracts are introduced to decompose a potentially complicated 
safety case into small blocks, but at the same time to keep a cohesive character for each 
block and to maintain clear and informative interfaces with other blocks as far as possible. 
ARM [156], the argumentation meta-model, is intended to facilitate the communication of 
structured arguments between projects and the exchange of argument information between 
different tools. It provides the common structure and argumentation concept framework 
underlying several existing notations for assurance cases. The overview of ARM is shown in 
Figure 7. 
There is an atomic component of argument represented by ModelElement. Two key subtypes 
of ModelElement are ArgumentElement and ArgumentLink. An ArgumentLink connects 
ArgumentElement or other sub-types of ModelElement. A branch of argument can be 
packaged up as an ‘Argument’ and used as a ModelElement in another argument. Claims are 
the essential elements in an argument; they are the assertions with a True/False value stating 
our position or desired achievements. ArgumentLinks can be characterised as different sub-
types according to the types of ModelElements being connected. For example, a Claim can 
be linked with another Claim via a link of AssertedInference; an InformationElement can be 
linked with a Claim via a link of AssertedEvidence. 
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Figure 7 Argumentation Meta-Model (From [156]) 
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2.7.4 Safety Evidence 
A body of evidence is the grounds for the acceptance of a safety argument as compelling. DS 
00-56 explicitly and particularly stresses the importance of safety evidence with meaningful 
and instructive requirements on evidence, which are broadly suitable for the safety assurance 
of various systems. In DS 00-56 Part 1 [149], the requirements on the provision of evidence 
include: 
“9.5 The Safety Case shall contain a structured argument demonstrating that 
the evidence contained therein is sufficient to show that the system is safe. The 
argument shall be commensurate with the potential risk posed by the system, 
the complexity of the system and the unfamiliarity of the circumstances 
involved”. [149] 
“11.3.1 The quantity and quality of the evidence shall be commensurate with 
the potential risk posed by the system, the complexity of the system and the 
unfamiliarity of the circumstances involved”. [149] 
“11.3.2 The Contractor shall provide diverse evidence that safety 
requirements have been met, such that the overall safety argument is not 
compromised by errors or uncertainties in individual pieces of 
evidence”.[149] 
In addition, counter-evidence and the rigour of the scrutiny of evidence and the evidence 
generation process are also further addressed in DS 00-56 Part 2 [148].  
“9.5.6 Evidence that is discovered with the potential to undermine a 
previously accepted argument is referred to as counter-evidence. The process 
of searching for potential counter-evidence as well as the processes of 
recording, analysing and acting upon counter-evidence are an important part 
of a robust Safety Management System and should be documented in the Safety 
Case”.[148] 
“17.4.3 The counter-evidence should be documented, analysed and referenced 
by relevant safety claims”.[148] 
Similarly, safety experts [92] and regulators [73] are also concerned about the desired 
features of evidence, but there is no commonly accepted criteria for evidence yet in reality. 
Hamilton [92] identifies two types of evidence properties: objective properties and subjective 
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properties. The first type, such as existence, completeness, correctness can, according to the 
author, be objectively audited. The second type, such as relevance, sufficiency, contextual 
validity in context, is judgment-dependent and should be evaluated in the context of a safety 
argument. However, most of the objective properties suggested cannot be ‘objectively’ 
evaluated and the suitability and means of evaluation of these properties are dependent on the 
nature of the evidence presented. Some researchers recommend managing safety evidence 
with qualitative requirements on the types of evidence required [36] or assessing the strength 
of evidence [48, 77] that we need of the evidence submitted for assuring the correct 
implementation of system safety requirements. Two typical examples are AELs (Assurance 
Evidence Levels) [48] and SEALs (Safety Evidence Assurance Levels) [77]. The levels in 
[48, 77] are a qualitative tag that defines the breadth and strength of evidence, or even the 
specific types of analysis or forms of artefacts required. Grouping evidence with such 
requirements is informative for planning safety activities and resources. But users still need 
to interpret and select an appropriate evidence assurance level according to the features of 
their products or service to be assured.  
Another theme in the literature focuses on clarifying the level of assurance that the evidence 
can provide through evidence justification. In [96], a structured software evidence selection 
and justification process is proposed for evaluating software evidence in the context of 
arguments. ESALs (Evidence Safety Assurance Levels) are suggested in [170] as a means of 
setting requirements for the level of rigour of the justification of the soundness of evidence in 
the context of safety arguments. 
Some existing research work [164, 216] concerns the extraction of items of required 
evidence and their relations with system design and recommended processes from standards 
in order to help practitioners to plan their safety activities and deliverables for certification, 
such as the evidence meta-models specifically based on IEC61508 [164]. They are primarily 
process-oriented and constrained by the forms of evidence required or recommended by 
specific standards and guidance. The role and nature of safety evidence, therefore, is not 
explored and elicited in these models. 
The software assurance evidence meta-model (SAEM) [158] by the OMG, is used to 
describe the common vocabulary, features and attributes of evidence used in an assurance 
case. Figure 8 illustrates the core logical parts of assurance evidence. The logical parts of 
evidence, as presented in SAEM, spread from Exhibits, Fact Model, Properties, Evidence 
Evaluation, and Administration.  
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Figure 8 Key Parts of Software Assurance Evidence Meta-Model (from [158]) 
SAEM separates the meaning of evidence from the presentation or exhibition of evidence. It 
also integrates the evidence lifecycle data, the quality of evidence and the argumentation role 
of evidence into the meta-model. However, SAEM is complex, due to its motivation of 
supporting automation in the generation, exchange and management of assurance evidence. 
There is no clear interface between SAEM and ARM. Some overlapping data elements in 
ARM and SAEM should be rearranged to smooth the integration of evidence and argument 
within a coherent assurance case (or safety case). For example, in the fact model of SAEM, 
there is an assertion class which presents an argument’s content. The definitions of Assertion 
in the two meta-models are not the same, which might cause confusion in the establishment 
of assurance and/or in information exchange. The reconciliation and interpretation of 
interface elements between SAEM and ARM is an interesting and challenging task. 
 
Figure 9 Formal Assertion Class in SAEM (from [158]) 
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For example, in Figure 9, DomainAssertion has a property stmt which documents the 
statement of facts in natural language. Assertion in SAEM is a formally-represented 
relationship between domain objects through a reference to external vocabularies; whereas, 
in ARM, propositions in structured arguments are abstracted as Claim, which can be either 
formally or informally stated.  
2.7.5 Confidence Associated with Safety Cases 
Besides the importance of evidence, issues connected with uncertainty in safety arguments 
have also been addressed by some recent studies. Weaver examines the key sources of 
uncertainty which potentially affect the acceptance of safety cases [205]. Cyra and Gorski 
introduce a way of evaluating the strength of arguments as a whole in [59] by adopting 
Dempster-Shafer’s evidence theory to deal with the uncertainty originated from the lack of 
system knowledge. However, the requirement on independence between evidence for D-S 
theory will bottleneck the use of Cyra and Gorski’s method. Furthermore, to assign 
quantified data to argument elements is not a trivial task for complex systems. 
The use of multiple diverse arguments has been proposed as a technique to limit and control 
uncertainty about claims in arguments. Bloomfield et al [40] study how diverse argument 
‘legs’ work and how they benefit the degree of confidence we can have in safety claims. 
Littlewood et al in [134] evaluate increased confidence in safety claims based on a Bayesian 
belief network that reveals subtleties in interactions in arguments that might not be readily 
obvious. Similarly, Denney et al [63] identify and quantify the uncertainty in a safety 
argument and employ Bayesian networks to reason probabilistically about confidence.  
In recent work [97], Hawkins et al propose the ‘Assured Safety Argument’ approach for 
explicit differentiation of the primary safety argument3 and the confidence argument about 
the primary safety argument. The confidence argument part is also addressed as ‘meta-case’ 
[39] or ‘meta-argument’ [22, 204] linked with the main safety argument. The two types of 
arguments in an Assured Safety Argument are depicted as [97]:  
• “A safety argument that documents the arguments and evidence used to establish direct 
claims of system safety”.  
• “A confidence argument that justifies the sufficiency of confidence in this safety 
argument”. 
                                                          
3
 We use ‘primary safety argument’ to refer to the ‘safety argument’ depicted in [97] to avoid the confusion with the 
traditional use of ‘safety argument’ that covers both the primary safety part and the confidence part. 
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In this way, the core safety arguments related directly with domain safety objectives are 
separated from the argument and information that are adopted for establishing confidence in 
the core safety argument. Assurance Claim Points (ACPs), which can be represented using 
graphical identifiers in GSN diagrams, are introduced for three different types of asserted 
links in the primary safety argument to address aspects of the associated confidence 
argument. An example of the use of ACPs is presented in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10 An Example Use of ACPs (from [97]) 
The confidence argument presented in [97] provides a way of establishing confidence 
qualitatively. The scope of ACPs to be considered should be carefully determined according 
to the level of risk associated, especially for large-scale safety arguments where it would be 
impractical to consider all ACPs. 
Goodenough et al [83] introduce a framework of confidence with three types of defeater in 
argumentation – rebutting defeaters, undercutting defeaters, and undermining defeaters. They 
state that a confidence argument should be constructed on the basis of defeaters and 
confidence in a claim can be quantified with a Baconian Probability, which is an ordinal 
number that depicts the relationship between the number of defeaters against a claim and the 
number of eliminated defeaters identified. However, the values of Baconian Probability of 
different claims are not comparable and the approach assumes identified defeaters as a 
sufficient boundary of the confidence issues associated with a claim.  
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2.7.6 Models and Safety Cases 
Safety assessment models play a central role in the construction of a safety case [45]. 
Although we agree that information on models is useful for constructing a safety case, it is 
said that “there is little guidance available as to how to incorporate information from fault 
models into the safety case” [138]. Alexander et al point out that different types of models 
can provide different types of evidence at different effectiveness levels [21]. But they do not 
analyze how a specific model supports particular kinds of safety claim. Lutz and Patterson-
Hine formulate three questions to investigate how evidence from tool-supported fault 
modelling and analysis activities can be used to construct safety cases [138].  
1. “How readily can the fault models be used as evidence for a safety case”?  
2. “How can we use or adjust the modelling process to ease the construction 
of safety-case arguments”? 
3. “How well do steps to support construction of the safety case align with the 
developer’s interests”? 
Their exploration in this area is based on an Advanced Diagnostic and Prognostics Testbed 
(ADAPT) under development at NASA Ames. The ADAPT is not safety critical, but the 
investigations have shown that some evidence in a safety case can be provided by system 
fault models. From their experience, the ADAPT fault model can provide the following 
information as evidence for a safety case [138]: 
• “Evidence from the contingency analysis (e.g. the hazard identification)” 
• “Evidence from review of the fault model” 
• “Evidence from tool-supported static analysis of the fault model” 
• “Evidence from running the model”. 
They not only adopt the fault model as evidence, but have justified the use of the fault model 
through extensive review by domain experts, by comparison of simulation of scenarios in the 
model with actual system outputs, and by extensive exercising of the model. However, they 
treat the justification of the fault model as evidence in the same way as the modelling results 
are used, but do not distinguish it as the backing of evidence. It is necessary to treat the 
backing arguments separately according to Toulmin’s structure. 
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Both system models and safety assessment models typically change and evolve during the 
system development and implementation cycles. As well as the updating of models, the 
primary and backing arguments over these models need to be updated too. There are no 
studies on how to support the construction and management of safety arguments over several 
generations of safety models. 
On the whole, the importance of safety arguments concerning models has been recognized by 
practitioners [45] and required by regulators [149], but only limited research has been 
undertaken on the interrelationship between models and safety arguments. More research 
efforts should be established in this area, since the quality of these models is crucial for the 
quality and success of the whole safety case. We need to argue for safety with safety-related 
models as items of evidence, and to have a reasoned explanation of why a model can be 
considered ‘fit for purpose’. 
2.8 Summary 
This chapter presents a review of the existing literature related to model validity, safety 
assessment and justification. It is clear from the review that the validity of safety assessment 
models is important; however, it is also clear that this validity is difficult to examine and to 
justify. There is also a lack of established practice and guidance on how to assess safety 
assessment models as evidence in safety cases, except for informal review by human experts 
on the basis of their domain knowledge and experience. 
In reality, incomplete, flawed, unjustified or incompatible evidence may potentially lead us 
to a false conclusion as to the level of system safety achieved, which would be extremely 
dangerous for decision-making and for safety management. Therefore, especially in the light 
of the challenges posed by the number, scale, variety and complexity of safety assessment 
models in modern system development, we are obliged to explore potential problems and 
solutions regarding confidence establishment in using safety assessment models as evidence 
in safety cases. In the following chapters, we begin to develop a structured view of safety 
assessment evidence in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4; then we focus on model inconsistency 
analysis as a rigorous approach for the evaluation of safety assessment models in Chapter 5; 
and finally we integrate the use and justification of safety assessment evidence more 
systematically within structured safety case development processes in Chapter 6. 
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3 Safety Assessment Meta-Modelling 
3.1 Introduction 
In the safety domain, there are many types of safety assessment modelling techniques which 
vary from each other in terms of complexity, power, inputs, and assumptions. In addition, the 
safety assessment process within a product lifecycle encompasses miscellaneous interrelated 
safety assessment activities with multiple forms of modelling outputs. In order to evaluate 
these safety assessment modelling outputs comprehensively and to adopt them appropriately 
as evidence in safety cases, we must have a clear and comprehensive understanding of both 
the information elements contained in the safety assessment models and the domain factors 
involved in the safety assessment modelling processes used to produce them.  
However, existing guidance materials on safety assessment usually place considerable 
emphasis on safety assessment techniques and prescribed system safety processes for 
implementation purposes. They are generally not concerned, however, to introduce a specific 
view of safety assessment modelling processes from the perspective of factors that may 
influence the content and validity of safety assessment models. Moreover, existing models 
and meta-models for safety assessment are so diverse in terms of the modelling purposes and 
modelling constructs they employ that it is difficult to understand the relationships between 
model instances. Additionally, existing meta-models detailing the data elements in safety 
assessment models have not taken in to account all the data elements needed for evaluating 
the quality of these models. Some important but implicit aspects of models have been left 
out, such as the scope of a model or the assumptions made during modelling. With 
insufficient understanding of the data and the process of safety assessment modelling, it is 
difficult to have confidence in the safety assessment models that are used as evidence in 
safety cases.  
Safety assessment models are a type of common source data of safety evidence adopted in 
safety cases. In this thesis, the structured view of safety assessment evidence is divided into 
two parts: the view of safety assessment models (explored in this chapter) and the view of 
safety evidence (explored in Chapter 4). This chapter addresses the shortcomings of current 
guidance and models for safety assessment by defining a domain model and a core data 
meta-model for safety assessment modelling. We first analyse different factors involved in 
the overall safety assessment modelling domain and the interrelationships between these 
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factors. After that, a safety assessment core data meta-model (CoreDMM), which contains 
core information in major qualitative safety assessment artefacts, is presented in order to 
support the systematic justification of models in terms of their suitability of being addressed 
as items of evidence in safety cases.  
In terms of the approach for illustration of the concepts and the relationships related to safety 
assessment, the technique of meta-modelling from the software engineering domain is 
adopted here, because it is well suited to expressing and organising language and information 
structures at different abstraction levels, from the conceptual components of a method to 
concrete safety assessment data.  
3.2 Meta-Modelling 
A model is “a representation of something else, designed for a specific purpose” [47]. The 
prefix ‘meta’ means something abstract or of a higher kind. A meta-model is thus “an 
explicit model of the constructs and rules needed to build specific models within a domain of 
interest” [167]. Meta-models tackle the problem of complexity with abstraction at the level 
of a problem domain rather than abstraction at the level of computing solution space. 
A model or a meta-model is not absolute. A meta-model is a model itself and can be 
represented by another meta-model, which might be called as a meta-meta-model. The 
traditional meta-modelling infrastructure defined by the OMG consists of multi-level models 
with a four-layer structure [25], M3 Meta-Object Facility (MOF), M2 UML concepts, M1 
User concepts, M0 User data. The left-hand side of Figure 11 depicts the four layers of the 
OMG meta-modelling infrastructure. 
Safety 
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Modelling 
Construct
Artefact 
Data 
Structure
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Case 
Notation
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Assessment 
Model (Instance)
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Figure 11 OMG Meta-Modelling Infrastructure ( from [25]) and Safety Meta-Models 
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However, the OMG layered-model presents models primarily as instances of another model 
(a meta-model), from the perspective of language abstraction. A meta-model can also be 
viewed from another two perspectives [167]: 
• as a set of building blocks and rules used to build models and 
• as a model of a domain of interest.  
It is clear that the safety models and meta-models (depicted in Figure 11) are not presented at 
the same abstraction levels if we view them from these two perspectives. Atkins and Kuhne 
[25] identify the need for two separate and orthogonal dimensions of meta-modelling: the 
linguistic instantiation and the ontological instantiation. From the ontological perspective, 
safety assessment meta-modelling addresses concepts and modelling constructs at varied 
abstraction levels. Considering the linguistic dimension, we only address two levels in the 
OMG meta-modelling structure in our domain-specific use of this technique in system safety. 
The M1 level is used for organising elements of safety modelling languages, concepts and 
the relations between these elements. As illustrated in Figure 11, safety domain concepts 
(e.g. hazard, accident), safety modelling constructs (e.g. failure mode in FMEA, basic event 
in FTA) that are associated with safety analysis techniques, safety artefact data structures 
(e.g. the data column in an FMEA worksheet), safety case notations (e.g. Goal or Context in 
GSN) are deemed as models at the M1 level. These M1 level models, in our application 
scenario, are all described in UML that is at the M2 level. The M0 level is used for hosting 
objects/instances of those M1 models. As shown in Figure 11, models at the M0 level may be 
concrete safety analysis results that represent the safety features (e.g. failure behaviour) of a 
concrete system from a certain viewpoint or a safety case for that concrete system. The 
models at the M1 level serve as the meta-model of the models at the M0 level.  
As a higher-level abstraction of models, meta-modelling is adopted in safety assessment, 
model assessment, and safety cases (even they are presented at the same M1 level) in order:  
• to provide a structured description and definition of the core concepts in system safety 
and the modelling constructs that exist in safety analysis techniques  
• to serve as a bridge that provides assistance in the comprehension and comparison of data 
in safety assessment instances 
• to structure properties of safety evidence and its interface with argumentation. 
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In recent years, meta-modelling has been gaining increased popularity in the field of system 
safety. A number of existing safety-related meta-models at varied abstraction levels have 
been developed, and there has been general progress in rigorous software engineering 
techniques and the increasing integration of safety and system modelling activities. The 
central concepts in these meta-models include safety [46, 79, 90, 141, 145, 212], 
dependability [64], reliability [122], and risk [186], depending on the purpose and the scope 
of the meta-models. The existing safety meta-models that we have identified generally have 
one or more of the following primary roles:  
• as a model of the domain concepts and their relationships, such as the SEI safety 
information model [79].  
• as a model describing the modelling constructs of safety analysis techniques, e.g. those 
presented by Briones and Miguel [46, 145], those presented by Mason [141]. A large 
group of safety meta-models are of this type, due to the diversity of safety analysis 
methods and the varied implementation of these techniques by domain users.  
• as a model of safety process which is composed of various analysis and assessment 
activities, e.g. Habli’s meta-model [90]. Only a few models cover this aspect since there 
are many workflow meta-models and business process meta-models that are capable of 
describing the safety analysis process.  
• as a model of the output of safety analysis, e.g. the one presented by Wilson et al [212]. 
Few models are designed specifically from this perspective. This approach is quite useful 
for the bridging of domain concerns and analysis data types covered by specific safety 
analysis techniques. 
However, the role of safety assessment models as evidence in safety cases is not considered 
in these existing meta-models. To ease the communication of the understanding of models in 
the assessment of models and their integration with safety arguments, the two structured 
models presented in this chapter address two distinct aspects: the contextual factors in safety 
assessment modelling for evaluating models and the data elements associated with the 
evidential role of models in safety cases.  
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3.3 Safety Assessment Modelling  
3.3.1 Domain Context of Safety Assessment Modelling 
To have a better understanding of what has happened during the construction process of 
safety assessment models, a collection of ‘elements’ or ‘concepts’ need to be identified and 
the relationships between these concepts described and analyzed. A domain model4  that 
depicts the major concepts and their interrelationships in system safety modelling is 
presented in Figure 12. It describes the factors involved in and associated with common 
safety assessment modelling activities. It serves as the context of safety assessment 
modelling activities. As we have explained in Section 3.2, this domain model is a model at 
the M1 level that can be viewed (and addressed) as a meta-model for models at the M0 level. 
This meta-model is developed on the basis of the models/meta-models proposed in [30, 79]. 
The key elements identified by this model are the safety assessment model and its modelling 
context - the target system, the safety concern, the modelling method, the modelling tool, the 
modeller and the safety modelling process.  
 
Figure 12 A Domain Model of Safety Assessment Modelling 
In Figure 12, the overall safety assessment modelling domain is divided into four sectors – 
the problem sector, the technology sector, the implementation sector and the outcome sector. 
The problem sector and the technology sector supply information, knowledge, and support to 
the implementation sector, through which modellers carry out the modelling process and 
                                                          
4
 The term ‘domain model’ in this chapter means ‘a model of the domain of modelling’. It is more abstract than the 
same term used in model-driven engineering and in software engineering, where a ‘domain model’ usually refers to 
the representation of concepts and relationships associated with the problems, knowledge and/or requirements of a 
system, service or business. 
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generate safety assessment models as modelling outputs. Safety assessment models, in the 
outcome sector, represent the safety concerns regarding the specific target system. The 
modeller, in the implementation sector, plays an essential and active role in safety modelling, 
by communicating and synthesizing messages from various sources and abstraction levels.  
The elements in the domain model are described in the following subsections. 
Target System  
The target system is the system to be modelled. The system that we are interested in can 
evolve from an intended system with an oral description, to a designed system with 
engineering drawings, or to a real system in operation. The intended system defined at the 
very early stage of a system life cycle always has ‘function’ as its primary attribute and has 
‘safety’ as a secondary attribute, if safety attributes have indeed taken shape at that time. We 
cannot start the system safety modelling before we have at least a conceptual model of the 
system (to represent how the intended system will work). The safety modelling of a real 
system in operation largely involves modelling on the basis of observational operation data 
or accident data. The focus of this study lies in the target system to be modelled at the system 
development stage, which we named as a ‘designed system’. However, we must be conscious 
of the distinction between the intended system, the designed system and the real system we 
finally have. They are three different systems, concerning each of which we have some but 
incomplete knowledge. Differences exist between each grouping of any two of the three 
possible target systems. But in safety analysis practice, modellers sometimes mix them 
unintentionally.  
Safety Concern 
Safety is a property of the target system being modelled. Broadly speaking, safety concerns 
are factors or situations that we do not want to arise. Their existence or occurrence can lead 
to a negative impact on system functions or missions or even to injuries and loss of human 
life. Some safety concerns are expressed as concrete initiating hazardous factors related to 
the target system or its operational context, such as component failures or 
unintended/unsuitable discharge of poisonous materials; whereas some other safety concerns 
are expressed as overall unsafe situations involving the target system, such as mission 
failures or loss of properties. During safety analysis, we need to decompose higher level 
safety concerns into more concrete and specific ones or to trace them to their causes or 
effects in order to set control measures. In safety assessment, we are extending the safety 
analysis to check the achieved level of safety of the envisioned target system. The collection 
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of safety assessment model instances that are output from safety assessment processes 
systematically addresses various levels of safety concerns relating to the target-level system 
from different perspectives.  
Modelling Method 
As we have seen in Chapter 2, there is a variety of safety modelling approaches that can be 
adopted at system development stages, depending on the purpose of the safety assessment 
and the nature of the system to be modelled. Each modelling approach has its own particular 
limitations and strengths. Modellers need to have sufficient knowledge of a method prior to a 
specific modelling activity. The nature of the methods adopted will shape the content of the 
safety assessment results. Various modelling approaches have relationships between them. 
Some approaches have overlapping modelling intents. For example, both FTA and Markov 
analysis can be used for predicting the probability of a system failure. Some approaches have 
shared modelling constructs, e.g. a failure mode in FMEA may appear as a basic event in 
FTA. Most of these modelling methods - qualitative or quantitative - are supported by 
software tools in terms of data management, computational analysis or integrity checks. 
Modelling Tool 
Tools are usually software products which can support the modelling process in terms of 
graphical representation, computational processing, documentation and data retrieval. With a 
tool, large scale models can be more easily and efficiently manipulated. However, different 
safety tool environments can vary a lot in implementation details, data format and 
accessibility, even if they are serving the same modelling technique. The safety assessment 
models, if generated with a tool support, cannot normally be directly manipulated in another 
tool. The capability and limitation of a tool should be considered during the evaluation of 
safety assessment results. Different tools could have different data formats of safety 
assessment models based on the same modelling technique. 
Safety Modelling Process 
The process of safety modelling is characterized by modellers’ gradual description of their 
increasing understanding of the target system in the language of a specific safety assessment 
modelling approach. During this process, the modellers need to make a number of decisions 
and/or assumptions concerning the problem being modelled, in order to constrain the scope 
of the safety assessment model and to make the representation in the safety modelling 
feasible and manageable.  
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Modeller 
The people who construct safety models play an essential role in the process of safety 
modelling. Their understanding of the target system and their expert knowledge of the safety 
modelling approaches will fundamentally influence the quality of safety models. Although it 
is impossible to have total knowledge of a human-made system in design or in operation, 
modellers strive to have adequate understanding of the identified or envisioned parts of a 
target system as far as possible. They also try to avoid the inclusion of any accidental errors 
in the model. 
Safety Assessment Model 
As the outcome of the safety modelling effort, a safety model can take various forms such as 
text, diagrams, tabular format, or equations. Some safety models have only descriptive power 
in themselves, which means that these safety models represent exactly and only the 
information that has been input in safety modelling, e.g. an FMEA worksheet. Whereas some 
other safety models have some predictive power in that further results can be given after 
processing of the original input data in the modelling, e.g. the generation of minimal cut sets 
or the probability of the top level event in a fault tree. 
A general safety modelling process will run across all the elements in Figure 12. The specific 
steps in a safety modelling process will vary according to the various procedures of the 
different safety modelling methods adopted. For a target system with specific safety concerns 
or safety requirements, we should start the safety modelling task with a clear intent and scope 
(in terms of its purpose with the safety case and its desired contribution to knowledge). The 
intent of safety modelling originates from our concerns about the safety characteristics or 
behaviours of the system to be modelled. We are expecting to deepen our understanding of 
the target system through the planned safety modelling actions. Four typical purposes of the 
construction of safety assessment models are: a) for documentation and organization of our 
understanding of the safety of target systems; b) to generate safety requirements; c) to verify 
safety requirements; d) for design evaluation and selection. After that, modellers with the 
knowledge of the system to be modelled will adopt a certain safety modelling approach for 
the construction of their models, during which both explicit and implicit assumptions, 
abstractions and simplifications are made in order to make the problems in safety modelling 
tractable for the modelling intent. A system safety assessment model will be generated 
through this process. The safety assessment model and associated results (the model itself 
and sometimes further results defined and generated by input-data processing and model 
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implementation) will provide information to illustrate that the safety concerns are controlled 
or mitigated or that the safety requirements are satisfied. 
3.3.2 Contributing Factors to ‘Wrong’ Models 
Figure 12 describes the overall context of the safety assessment domain. There are four 
interim blocks in Figure 12 between a Safety Assessment Model and the Target System and 
Safety Concern represented by the Safety Assessment Model, namely, Modeller, Modelling 
Method, Modelling Tool, and Safety Modelling Process. The validity of a Safety Assessment 
Model is influenced by these four blocks. Typical factors associated with the four blocks that 
may contribute to the errors made in models are grouped and presented below. 
• Systematic factors 
o The Modeller’s incomplete understanding of the target system 
o The Modeller’s intention of presenting ‘safe’ systems 
o The Modeller’s conceptual errors 
o The limitations and assumptions of the Modelling Method 
o The limitation and configuration of the Modelling Tool (if a tool is adopted) 
• Random factors 
o The Modeller’s performance in the Safety Modelling Process (appropriate 
usage of the method and the tool) 
• Judgmental factors 
o The decisions and assumptions made in the Safety Modelling Process 
(regarding to the scope, representation and reasoning) 
Additionally, safety assessment models can be used in a ‘wrong’ way, if put into an 
inappropriate context or used beyond their validity envelope. It means that we need to be 
careful of our interpretation of the safety modelling results when we employ a model as 
evidence in any decision-making process.  
The three types of factors indicate that information concerning Modeller, Modelling Method, 
Modelling Tool, and Safety Modelling Process should be captured to assist the evaluation of 
safety assessment models in terms of their trustworthiness. However, existing practice shows 
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that such information is usually implicit, informal, or insufficiently or fragmentally 
documented from the information on our understanding of the problem domain, rather than 
being systematically documented as a part of a safety assessment artefact. Therefore, we 
suggest that descriptive information elements concerning modelling processes and decision 
information elements generated during modelling processes should be explicitly integrated 
with the descriptive information elements concerning a problem domain in a single generic 
model of safety assessment artefacts. The core data meta-model introduced in Section 3.4 
takes into account the data elements that are associated with the context of the modelling 
domain illustrated by the domain model in Figure 12. These data elements are useful for 
more comprehensive evaluation of safety assessment evidence (including examination of the 
models and justification of thie usage as evidence items in safety cases).  
3.4 Safety Assessment Core Data Meta-Model 
In this section, we propose a core data meta-model (CoreDMM) for the purpose of evaluating 
safety assessment models as evidence in safety cases. This model represents the structure of 
information elements associated with a specific model instance and its modelling process. It 
covers more than would a meta-model of an individual safety method or technique and it is 
more generic in terms of the representation of building blocks of various models. The 
features of CoreDMM include: 
• Increased transparency of data elements affecting or associated with the validity of safety 
assessment models 
• Highlighted data elements that determine the evidential capability of safety assessment 
models 
• Enhanced communication between different models via a set of generic core modelling 
constructs.  
CoreDMM is a UML model at the M1 level in the OMG meta-modelling structure. It is 
neither a meta-model at the M2 level like the UML concepts model nor a meta-model at the 
M3 level like the MOF, but is a meta-model of the instances of specific safety analysis in 
particular analysis techniques. This is unconventional. But it is unrealistic to define a core 
date model at M2 level that is capable of representing all variants of existing meta-models of 
safety analysis techniques with diverse modelling constructs. Depicting CoreDMM at M1 
level is convenient for a direct view of its relationships with various model instances. 
However, it may bring difficulties in terms of making use of the advantages of model-driven 
 76 
 
engineering (MDE), because some model operations (e.g. the concept mapping between 
CoreDMM and existing safety meta-models) are within the M1 level.  
The reasons for not employing existing meta-models of safety analysis techniques directly 
are two folds. Firstly, there are a number of safety analysis techniques (with varied modelling 
constructs), each of which has multiple versions of meta-models developed by different 
researchers. Although it is disadvantageous to omit some technique-specific details in model 
representation, unifying the core concepts and in a common core data model will ease the 
communication and comparison between models in different techniques, which is valued by 
the model inconsistency analysis in Chapter 5. Secondly, existing meta-models derived from 
safety analysis techniques have not explicitly taken into account the data about the safety 
assessment process and the validity context of the modelling output. But those data are 
indispensable for evidence justification in safety case development. Therefore, we develop 
CoreDMM on the basis of extracting core data elements from the existing safety meta-
models (e.g. [46, 145, 212]) for safety analysis techniques, but enclosing more data elements 
in CoreDMM than the ones presented in them, considering the need of use and evaluation of 
safety assessment evidence within safety cases according to the domain model presented in 
Section 3.3.1.  
3.4.1 Core Data Meta-Model (CoreDMM) Overview 
The proposed CoreDMM of safety assessment is depicted in Figure 13. A safety assessment 
model comprises four principal groups of data elements – the meta-data, the validity context 
data, the substance elements and the construction elements. There are two types of ‘whole-
part’ relationships in Figure 13. The filled diamonds in Figure 13 depict ‘composition’[175], 
which means that the deletion of a part will be triggered if the whole is deleted. The unfilled 
diamonds in the figure depict ‘aggregation’[175], which means that a part can belong to a 
whole but can also stay even if the whole is deleted.   
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Figure 13 Safety Assessment Core Data Meta-Model (CoreDMM) 
The SafetyAssessmentArtefact is the overall class that contains all of the structured data 
elements or information emerging throughout a safety assessment modelling process. Some 
are associated with the description of the implementation and technology sectors of the 
modelling domain (as shown in Figure 12); whereas others are formed, dictated or generated 
to represent understanding of the safety concerns of the subject system (real or envisioned) in 
the problem domain (as shown in the domain model in Figure 12).  
The MetaData of SafetyAssessmentArtefact are data elements or information about a safety 
assessment model. These MetaData present the key facts related to the 
SafetyAssessmentArtefact, such as what is the subject of a model, who created the model, 
when is the model created, which modelling method is adopted, with which tool is the model 
constructed, and so on. It can also be used for the identification of a 
SafetyAssessmentArtefact. Usually, the MetaData elements are not controversial in terms of 
their concrete values, which are determined with the commencement and completion of 
modelling. They are not information about or associated with the problem domain. But they 
are not always explicitly documented or stored with other elements of a 
SafetyAssessmentArtefact. At the implementation level, there are no constraints on whether to 
store MetaData with data together or separately, as long as MetaData have been documented 
and are easily accessible during safety case development. The subtypes of the MetaData 
contain only simplified content for identification, e.g. the name of a modeller, the name of a 
tool, rather than more precise details such as the competency of a modeller, the features of a 
tool or a method.  
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The ValidityContext of SafetyAssessmentArtefact are also data elements or information about 
a safety assessment model. But they are different from the MetaData in that they constrain 
the overall validity of a SafetyAssessmentArtefact and they are directly associated with the 
problem domain being modelled. This set of data elements are often overlooked or not 
explicitly documented in real practice. Some of them are also relatively ‘resistant’ to 
structured documentation and can only be depicted in an informal way using natural 
language (e.g. the assumptions made by a model). However, they are important when we 
want to use a model in safety cases as an item of evidence. Many standards and guidance 
documents have addressed the documentation of these data elements in the requirements on 
models or usage of models, e.g. [68, 151]. But whether these data about a 
SafetyAssessmentArtefact have been sufficiently elicited is highly dependent on the domain 
knowledge and expertise of the modeller. They are valuable for the proper comprehension 
and correct interpretation of a model in its application context, even though these data are 
based on the modeller’s declaration or assumptions concerning the purpose, scope, 
assumption or limitation of a safety assessment model. For example, we may need to know 
the scope of a safety assessment model in order to avoid abuse of the model or its results 
beyond its claimed scope. The adoption of safety analysis results for a different purpose from 
its original intent should be carefully justified. 
The SubstanceElement of SafetyAssessmentArtefact is the information element about the 
essential contents of safety assessment models, which are conclusive data elements which 
depict the safety characteristics of a domain objects. They are usually associated with the 
purpose of modelling and the capability of the modelling methods. From the existing 
literature [46, 79, 212], we have found that the three most common types of results expected 
from existing safety assessment models are: a set of identified hazardous conditions, the 
minimum combinations of conditions that can lead to an undesired consequence, and the 
probability of a specific undesired condition. A SafetyAssessmentArtefact may provide 
multiple substance elements; they can be grouped in to three set types – the set of 
probabilities (PSet), the set of Minimal Cut Sets (MCSSet), and the set of identified hazards 
(HazardSet). Explicit representation of The SubstanceElements of a 
SafetyAssessmentArtefact will ease the communication between the content of safety 
assessment artefacts and the claims of safety arguments in safety assurance process. For 
large-scale safety assessment models for complex systems, in particular, the 
SubstanceElements will enable clear and easy access to the core evidential content expressed 
by models. It is worth noting that PSet and HazardSet are the ‘aggregation’s of P or 
Condition. It is because the SubstanceElement is highlighted specifically for eliciting parts of 
SafetyAssessmentArtefact that are employed as evidence source data. The 
 79 
 
SafetyAssessmentArtefact, rather than the subtypes of SubstanceElement, is the physical 
container of the elements aggregated by PSet and HazardSet. In addition, P and PSet are 
typical SubstanceElement of quantitative safety assessment models. Although quantitative 
modelling results are not considered in this thesis, they are included in CoreDMM for the 
overall representativeness of the model.  
The ConstructionElement of SafetyAssessmentArtefact represents the key building blocks in 
the domain of safety assessment, which are fundamental and shared across different 
qualitative safety analysis techniques. Here we carry on the style of Wilson’s safety data 
model [212]. The ConstructionElement presented in CoreDMM is more abstract than the 
concrete building blocks in safety analysis techniques. Condition is the kernel of qualitative 
safety meta-models. Although it is depicted with varied terms (such as hazard, accident, 
failure, failure mode, failure event) in other safety meta-models, the essence of this notion is 
to depict the failure behaviours of the subject under analysis or factors that are contributors to 
these concerns. The ‘state’ and ‘flow’ notions in AltaRica language are not modelled as a 
condition in this meta-model, because they are formal modelling constructs and are different 
from the common cause-effect modelling constructs shared by other qualitative safety 
analysis techniques. The LogicalRelationships between conditions represent our 
comprehension and knowledge of system safety behaviours, which are valuable for 
decomposing safety objectives and prioritizing the focus of safety activities. These 
relationships are an important and inherent part of both structural safety analysis techniques 
and their results. Whether or not a system is an element of the core data model is arguable. 
Some safety meta-models do not present it explicitly as a component block in the models, 
e.g. the FTA meta-model in [46]. Nevertheless, many safety meta-models treat a system as 
an explicit element, which eases the integration of system structural or functional modelling 
data with the corresponding system safety analysis data. SystemElement presented in 
CoreDMM indicates the system elements that are considered in safety assessment modelling. 
None consideration of a higher level system element would not prohibit the consideration of 
its lower level components. Thus it is modelled as an aggregation of itself, which is different 
from the composition relation between system elements usually presented in a system model. 
ConstructionElement covers only the core generic modelling constructs in safety assessment 
modelling. If other details of a model in a particular safety technique are needed, we still 
need to use meta-models of specific techniques to document the model. 
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3.4.2 Representation of Typical Safety Assessment Models 
CoreDMM is capable of expressing the core analysis data of safety assessment models based 
on major qualitative safety analysis techniques. Some examples of models represented with 
CoreDMM are presented in this section. Safety assessment models vary a lot in the structure 
of their construction elements, but not much in the structure of the meta-data, validity context 
and substance elements. Therefore, one example is presented to demonstrate the instantiation 
of the MetaData, the ValidityContext and the SubstanceElement of CoreDMM; while three 
examples are presented to demonstrate the instantiation of the ConstructionElement of 
CoreDMM. Unlike the conventional way of using object models, the four example models 
presented are not used for expressing object sequences or activities in an application 
scenario, but are used for illustrating the expressive capability of CoreDMM through 
instantiating it with data from concrete safety analysis artefacts.  
In practice, some of the MetaData, the ValidityContext and the SubstanceElement of a safety 
assessment model may have been described in natural language in the safety assessment 
report that is delivered after a safety assessment modelling process. To ensure that none of 
the required elements is lost and that there is an easy means to access these information 
elements, we suggest documenting meta-data according to the structure in CoreDMM. The 
example instantiation presented in Figure 14 is based on a hypothetical safety analysis report, 
developed only for the purpose of illustrating the instantiation of the three types of data 
elements. Each block in Figure 14 represents an object at the M0 level that instantiates an 
element of CoreDMM at the M1 level. For example, ‘SAM-Hypo: 
SafetyAssessmentArtefact’ in Figure 14 is an object instantiation of 
SafetyAssessmentArtefact of CoreDMM; ‘SAM-Hypo:SafetyAssessmentArtefact’, a concrete 
analysis artefact, uses ‘FMEA’ as the safety analysis technique. ‘FMEA:Method’ in Figure 
14 is the instantiation of Method of CoreDMM.  
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Figure 14 CoreDMM Instantiation of a Hypothetical Analysis 
Table 3 illustrates a record from an FMEA table (adapted from ARP 4761 [181]). 
 
Function 
Name 
Failure 
Mode 
Flight 
Phase 
Failure 
Rate (e-6) 
Failure 
Effect 
Detection 
Method 
Comments 
Power 
Supply of 
+5 Volt 
+5 V out of 
spec. 
All 0.2143 Power 
supply 
shutdown 
Power 
supply 
monitor 
trips 
BSCU 
channel 
fails 
Table 3 An FMEA Record (excerpted from [181]) 
The partial safety assessment model of the FMEA data presented in Table 3 is illustrated in 
Figure 15 as an instantiation of CoreDMM. Each block in Figure 15 represents an object 
corrsponding to the core analysis data in Table 3. For example, ‘Power Supply: 
SystemElement’ in Figure 15 represents ‘Power Supply of +5 Volt’ in the first column of 
Table 3. Similarly, the blocks in Figure 15 are objects instantiating elements of CoreDMM. 
For example, ‘Power Supply: SystemElement’ in Figure 15 is an instance of SystemElement 
in CoreDMM. 
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Figure 15 CoreDMM Instantiation of a Record in FMEA 
A branch of a fault tree is adapted from ARP 4761 [181], as illustrated in Figure 16. 
Unannunciated loss of all 
wheel braking
Normal brake system 
does not operate (no 
annunciation)
Alternate brake system 
does not operate (no 
annunciation)
Emergency brake system 
does not operate (no 
annunciation)
 
Figure 16 Part of a Fault Tree (excerpted from [181]) 
A partial safety assessment model for the fault tree analysis data presented in Figure 16 is 
illustrated in Figure 17 as an instantiation of CoreDMM. The instantiation aims to illustrate 
how the construction element instances of a fault tree analysis artefact are expressed and 
organized on the basis of CoreDMM, rather than to achieve good communication with field 
engineers, which is better achieved with the traditional graphical fault tree notation. By 
contrast with the previous example of FMEA instantiation, some of the blocks in Figure 17 
use information extracted from the fault tree in Figure 16. The data about system elements 
are embodied in the description of events in the fault tree in Figure 16, but are represented 
explicitly as individual blocks in Figure 17. For example, the ‘Normal brake system does not 
operate’ event in Figure 16 is mapped into two objects in Figure 17 – 
‘NormalBrakeSystem:SystemElement’ and ‘NBS-not operate:Condition’. In this way, the 
four events in the fault tree in Figure 16 have been recorded as four instances of 
SystemElement and four instances of Condition in Figure 17. Although the extraction of the 
data needed by CoreDMM requires considerable input and knowledge from users, the efforts 
is repaid by clearer relationships between data elements than otherwise occur in some 
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analyses (e.g. the association between system elements and failure events hidden in the 
informal description of failure events in a fault tree). CoreDMM is not designed for 
automatic model transformation between varied safety assessment models, but to document 
concerete analysis results with the granuality to support further analysis of safety assessment 
models.  
 
Figure 17 CoreDMM Instantiation of a Part of a Fault Tree 
The construction elements of an AltaRica model are different from the traditional FMEA or 
FTA model. The LogicalRelationship Class in CoreDMM is not suitable for representing the 
logical relations embedded in formal propositions in the AltaRica Language. But the data 
elements shared by traditional models and AltaRica models, such as the substance elements, 
the system elements and conditions, can be represented on the basis of CoreDMM. These 
shared data are the foundation of potential analysis carried out across the different types of 
models. 
Figure 18 presents a typical AltaRica data flow declaration of a Node, which represents the 
nominal and failure behaviour of a valve [169]. From the example, we can see that the 
particular features of a node are described in state variables: the internal changes of a valve, 
triggered by ‘events’, follow the transition rules defined in the ‘trans’ section of the 
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declaration; the communication content of the node with other nodes is defined as flow 
variables; the constraints on the node description variables are described as assertions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18 An Example of AltaRica Data Flow Declaration (from [169]) 
Figure 19 depicts a model of a valve instance in a specific system, originally defined by the 
AltaRica Node description in Figure 18, represented with CoreDMM instances. For example, 
three events declared in Figure 18, ‘open’, ‘close’, ‘fail’, are represented as three objects of 
‘Condition’ in CoreDMM, shown as ‘open:Condition’, ‘close:Condition’ and ‘fail:Condition’ 
in Figure 19. 
 
Figure 19 CoreDMM Instantiation of a Valve Defined in AltaRica 
Some of the traditional analysis information is not depicted in the instantiation of CoreDMM, 
such as the detection method of a failure mode in the FMEA model, the type of logical 
node Valve; 
   state open:bool, stuck:bool; 
   flow i:bool:in, o:bool:out; 
   event open, close, fail; 
   trans 
      open and not stuck |- close -> open:=false; 
      not open and not stuck |- open -> open:=true; 
      not stuck |- fail -> stuck:=true; 
   assert open => i=o, not open => not o; 
init open=true, stuck=false; 
edon 
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relationship AND between events in a fault tree. But these can be recorded as an attribute of 
the class objects. The examples aim to show the relationships between the key construction 
elements in CoreDMM and the potential real model data only. 
3.4.3 Relations with Other Safety Assessment Meta-Models 
As we have stated in Section 3.2, there are some existing safety meta-models. In this section, 
we outline three such models, paying particular attention to their core characteristics and 
their relationships with CoreDMM.  
SEI Safety Information Model  
Firesmith, in [79], presents an information model which identifies and defines the core 
functional concepts underlying safety engineering and emphasizes their similarity to the 
concepts which underlie security and survivability engineering. As a meta-model for core 
domain concepts, this model aims to provide a standard terminology and a set of concepts 
that explain the understanding of safety, but it is not intended for direct instantiation by real 
specific safety analysis scenarios. In this model, the concept of safety has been treated as a 
quality factor, which brings together the notions in safety with the notions in requirements 
engineering. No other safety meta-models have safety as an individual node in the model, 
which implies the high ontological abstraction level of the model that is determined by the 
nature of this model. 
The subjects in common addressed by safety analysis approaches are presented in this model 
as Safety Risk, Hazard, Accident, and Harm. Causal linkage, which is a focus of many safety 
analysis approaches, is presented between the four concepts in the model. In the context of 
[79], a System in the model is the software product. But the model could be adapted to the 
safety of other (non-software) systems, for example it could mean other technological 
systems designed and operated by human being. In this model, Asset and System are linked 
together but presented separately in the model as two nodes. It is beneficial to differentiate 
Asset, which covers things of value and need to be protected, from System, which generally 
covers only the object under analysis. The concept of Asset helps us describe the subjects of 
our safety concerns more precisely. 
Wilson’s Safety Data Model  
Wilson et al develop an abstract data model [212] that aims to integrate safety analysis data 
from different safety analysis techniques. It is not designed according to a specific safety 
analysis technique, but instead extracts common core data elements from ten approaches 
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regarding to hazard identification, cause analysis, consequence analysis, risk analysis and 
system modelling. The flow of data between different safety analyses is managed and the 
rules governing interactions between the data are maintained in order to have a coherent view 
of the system and its safety characteristics along with the construction of safety analysis. 
However, the safety assessment process is invisible in this model and the model does not 
distinguish the function of data elements even if the data elements were generated on the 
basis of different modelling techniques.  
System has been identified as a necessary entity in this data model as a result of the 
circumstance that all the safety analysis techniques under this study are carried out with 
relations to a certain kind of system model, implicitly or explicitly. So the minimum 
requirement is that the data model can model systems and their components. The core entity 
in the model is named as Condition. A condition “is an abstraction used to capture some 
‘state of affairs’ in the system, be it an event or system state”[212]. Conditions can be faults, 
failures, hazards, and accidents, which play the same role as the corresponding three notions 
adopted in the aforementioned SEI safety meta-model. The causal relationships between 
conditions are depicted in more detail, given that the cause and the consequence are all 
presented as individual entities. On the basis of this data model, the pair-wise dataflow rules 
between entities provide assistance to the completeness and consistency between safety 
analyses, e.g. the consistency between safety analysis and the system model, or the 
completeness of the consequences considered in HAZOP and FTA. 
Briones et al’s Safety Model  
Many safety analysis techniques have their language syntax expressed by meta-models. The 
meta-models in [46] represent the two most widely-used structural analysis techniques and 
are developed to complement the system architectural modelling languages, FMEA and FTA. 
In contrast to the previous two safety meta-models, Briones et al place their safety analysis 
meta-models at the M2 level of the OMG modelling infrastructure. Both system modelling 
languages and safety analysis languages are viewed as instances of MOF. Their meta-models 
assist the transformation of safety-annotated system architecture models to safety analysis 
models of the system. 
The first feature of the two meta-models is that both of them have a specific element for the 
description of the analysis as a whole, the FmecaSystem and the FtaSystem in the meta-
models. These two blocks serve as containers, which hold all of the global analysis properties 
and the main blocks of the system or the root block of a fault tree. The Block in the FMECA 
meta-model represents the system component hierarchy, whereas there are no implicit system 
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blocks or component blocks in the FTA meta-model. The Event block in the FTA meta-
model can be a failure of a system element, but its relation to the system entities is not 
depicted in the model. The system element and associated relationships are useful if we want 
to integrate safety models with system models. 
The FailureMode depicts how the system fails at different hierarchical levels. The causal 
relationship between failure modes is depicted as an association on the concept of 
FailureMode itself. Similarly, the Event represents the core analysis subject in the FTA meta-
model. However, the relationships between events are not self-pointing, but between the 
Event and the subtype of DerivedEvent. An extra feature of the FTA meta-model is that the 
analysis results generated after the processing of FTA inputs are also presented in the model, 
e.g. MinimumCutSet. For safety analysis methods that have some processing power, the form 
of processed results turn out to be the major transferable information queried and referenced 
for further usage. To present them as blocks separately but not to generate items afresh is 
more convenient for the evaluation of safety analysis. 
Our core data meta-model differs from the three meta-models discussed here by considering 
the following three issues. Firstly, the detailed description of the safety assessment model as 
a whole (with metadata and validity context data) is not included in other safety analysis 
meta-models (except the ones in [46], some of the data are elicited as modelling blocks ). But 
the overall description of safety analysis results is very useful throughout the evaluation of 
the results. Secondly, the pre-existing safety meta-models have been developed for varied 
purposes, but few incorporate the idea of integration of safety modelling and assurance needs 
beforehand. Therefore, the substantial elements indicating the safety assessment outcomes, 
which directly relate to safety requirements or safety claims, have not been addressed with 
appropriate emphasis in these models. In short, the information needed for evaluation of 
safety assessment models is not fully covered and the models are not organised with the 
consideration of facilitating and supporting the task of evaluation. Thirdly, the core 
construction elements are in a more abstract form than the construction elements in other 
meta-models for safety analysis techniques (except for the model in [212]). It is not sufficient 
to represent all analysis data completely, but forms a common basis for understanding and 
establishing relationships between different models. 
3.4.4 Relations with System Assurance Meta-Models 
From the viewpoint of system safety assurance, it is necessary to understand how safety 
assessment models are related to or integrated with safety arguments as safety evidence in 
safety cases, since they are one important type of information widely used to support the 
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argument presented in safety cases. The structure and content of data elements in CoreDMM 
is designed with the purpose of being clear and sufficient to meet the need of using safety 
assessment models as evidence. In this section, we will explicate the relationship of 
CoreDMM with argumentation and evidence, basing our discussion on the analysis of 
existing assurance meta-models presented earlier.  
As we described in Chapter 2, the OMG has published ARM, the meta-model for 
argumentation, and SAEM, the meta-model for evidence, in order to facilitate and normalize 
data exchange and communication in software assurance cases. The Structured Assurance 
Case Metamodel (SACM), which integrates ARM and SAEM, is shortly to be released in its 
first version.  
Currently, ARM provides an element InformationElement which can be instantiated as a 
reference description to link argument elements with “the citation of a source of that relates 
to the structured argument” [156]. The InformationElement in ARM serves as a placeholder 
for connecting real information sources with the argument via different subtypes of 
ArgumentLink in ARM. However, there are no constraints or recommendations presented in 
ARM regarding what kind of information sources are prohibited or expected and which 
subtype of ArgumentLink should be used for a particular situation.  
Currently, SAEM is generic and it combines the entity of evidence and other evidence-
related data into a whole package. But it depicts the entity part in such a simple way that it 
has not provided the features necessary to record the details of a complex item of evidence, 
such as a safety assessment model. CoreDMM presented in this chapter can serve as a special 
case of the entity part of evidence, while other evidence-related data (such as propositions 
made on entities and evidence properties) can be separated from the entity part and be 
addressed by a particular evidence meta-model (this will be presented in Chapter 4 below). 
This enables more practical manipulation of complex information concerning evidence and 
its relationships with arguments. The relationships between the three meta-models are 
depicted in Figure 20.  
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 Figure 20 Relationship of Safety Assessment Artefact and Assurance Meta-Models 
In this thesis, we will study the relationship of safety assessment evidence with 
argumentation on the basis of ARM. But in terms of the evidence itself, as we can learn from 
Figure 20, it is explored with two distinct meta-models (for the entity part of evidence and 
for the conception part of evidence respectively), but not on the basis of SAEM, which 
overlaps partially with each package depicted in Figure 20. 
3.5 Application of CoreDMM 
The safety assessment CoreDMM presented in Section 3.4.1 is formulated on the basis of 
other safety assessment meta-models and the modelling domain model presented in Section 
3.3.1. CoreDMM aims to provide support for structuring the key data elements that are 
needed in using safety assessment models as evidence and evaluating safety assessment 
models in the context of safety arguments. To be more specific, CoreDMM can be applied in 
the following areas:  
• To support the communication and integration of models as evidence within safety cases. 
CoreDMM separates different data elements in safety assessment models into four 
groups, which facilitates accessing the most appropriate data elements during the 
development of both the primary safety argument and the confidence argument.  
• To support the examination of consistency between different safety assessment models. 
CoreDMM enables bypassing of the inconsistent concept frames of different modelling 
techniques, and makes model comparison for inconsistency identification more 
manageable at the model instance level. The interpretation and justification of 
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inconsistencies so identified will also be supported by the validity context data required 
by CoreDMM. 
• To support the evaluation of safety assessment models in the context of safety arguments. 
Beyond the primitive modelling constructs of a model (e.g. failure event) CoreDMM 
integrates additional data elements that are necessary for describing a safety assessment 
model as an overall entity, such as the requirements on its metadata, its validity context 
and its substance results. Evaluating a safety assessment model with respect to the four 
groups of data elements comprehensively will increase our confidence in using a model 
appropriately in safety cases. 
3.6 Summary 
In this chapter, a domain model is presented for a better understanding of the context of 
safety assessment modelling and a generic data model (CoreDMM) for describing the 
common content of safety assessment modelling artefacts. The domain model of safety 
modelling captures the major factors that are potentially hazard sources of flawed models. It 
brings forward the importance and need of explicit consideration of ‘MetaData’ and 
‘ValidityContext’ in CoreDMM in support of the evaluation of safety analysis results.  
Besides that, CoreDMM also takes into account construction elements of typical safety 
assessment models (as other meta-models of safety analysis techniques have done) and 
highlights the substance elements of safety assessment models for their evidential role. The 
set of data elements in CoreDMM provides a structured view of safety assessment artefacts, 
which forms a common basis for analyzing the content of different model instances that are 
based on different safety analysis techniques. Chapter 4 provides a structured view of generic 
evidence that signifies that safety evidence is more than safety artefacts. In combination, 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 establish a detailed view of safety assessment evidence. Chapter 5 
demonstrates how inconsistency analysis of safety assessment models can be conducted with 
the support of CoreDMM. Chapter 6 describes how the justification of the usage of a model 
as evidence can be structured around the factors presented in the domain context of safety 
assessment modelling. 
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4 A Model of Argument-Evidence Interface 
4.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2, we presented the history of safety cases and recent developments in theory and 
practice in that field. The concept of an argument presented using informal logic, as a means 
of demonstrating system safety and facilitating safety management, has been adopted 
alongside system development and operation in many different industries. The argumentation 
part of safety cases, such as issues regarding safety claims or the inferential relationships 
between them, has been well-developed in the past two decades. By contrast, the concept of 
evidence in safety cases, which is also an important component of safety cases as required by 
regulations, has received less attention in existing academic work, especially its role within 
safety cases and its relationship with arguments.  
From the published literature, standards and guidance, we observe that the confidence in 
safety evidence is significantly threatened by the following issues. 
• No widely-accepted definition of evidence in safety. Various definitions focus on 
different aspects of evidence, e.g. its source data, its documentation or its role in 
supporting an argument.  
• A simplified view of the relationship between evidence and argument. The interface 
between evidence and argument is usually presented only as references to source data 
that are associated with domain safety claims. However, the reasoning linking what we 
can obtain from evidence to the domain safety claims being supported by the evidence is 
unclear. It is difficult, with current documentation and representation of evidence in 
safety cases, to determine how, and to what extent, the items of evidence fit their role in a 
specific application context.   
• Unstructured justification of evidence. This issue is caused, on one hand, by an unclear 
understanding of confidence in safety. Actually, existing guidance and practice on review 
and evaluation of safety deliverables and activities have not distinguished sharply 
between demonstrated safety and demonstrated confidence in the adequacy of evidence. 
On the other hand, given the previous two deficiencies, there has not been a sufficiently 
clear and structured view of the features of evidence that are expected for establishing 
our confidence in safety cases. 
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In this chapter, we define the concept of evidence in the context of safety cases on the basis 
of comparison of definitions in several disciplines. We also define a model of evidence 
(EviM) in order to have a clear view of the grounds on which established confidence 
associated with safety cases is based. Within this model, the notion of the ‘evidence 
assertion’ is introduced as the interface element to help integrate safety assessment evidence 
and argument effectively. This model of evidence will motivate a more comprehensive 
documentation of items of evidence as objects linked with arguments, rather than simply as 
data source references that embody the links to the items of evidence. The data elements 
within this model are designed to support a more explicit evidential role of each individual 
item of evidence and facilitate the potential reuse of an item of evidence in other application 
context.  
Before we introduce EviM in Section 4.5, we analyse the nature of evidence in Section 4.2, 
the classification of safety evidence in Section 4.3, and the evidence-argument relationship in 
practice in Section4.4. The relationship of safety evidence to confidence in safety cases is 
finally discussed in Section 4.6. 
4.2 The Concept of Evidence  
In practice, the concept of safety evidence is not well-elaborated in guidance and the 
understanding and usage of evidence is diverse. As presented in Chapter 2, a commonly-cited 
definition of a safety case is from DS 00-56 [149]. 
 “A structured argument, supported by a body of evidence that provides a 
compelling, comprehensible and valid case that a system is safe for a given 
application in a given operating environment”. 
It is clear from the definition that ‘a body of evidence’ is a part of a safety case. However, 
DS 00-56 does not provide a definition of ‘evidence’. This, sometimes, leads to inconsistent 
and arbitrary usage of this notion by practitioners. For example, evidence in safety may be 
viewed as artefacts, documents, facts, or statements of facts in different situations. This, 
unsurprisingly, causes confusion and sometimes misconception of safety evidence in safety 
engineering practice. It is also harmful for the development of compelling safety cases.  
In recent years, the importance of evidence has been highlighted in the development of 
dependable software systems [106] and more people are concerned about the inspection, 
analysis, and requirements on evidence presented in safety cases [92, 96, 106, 170]. 
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However, the meaning of this concept, which is crucial for the proper usage of evidence in 
safety cases, has not been addressed adequately.  
The meaning of a term or concept has two dimensions [146]: 
• The connotation of the concept, which is also referred as intension, essence or nature. It 
depicts the abstract meaning of a term, which serves as shared principles and 
characteristics that apply to all objects of that concept.  
• The denotation of the concept, which is also referred as extension or reference. It depicts 
the specific meaning of a term and the individuals to which the term is referred, which 
addresses the features of a group of individuals of the concept that are not possessed by 
other objects of the concept. 
In this section we will probe the connotation meaning of evidence in different disciplines and 
explore the common understanding of this concept within the domain of safety cases. This is 
the foundation for proper comprehension, interpretation, usage and documentation of 
evidence in safety. The classification of safety evidence, which addresses the denotation of 
the concept of evidence, is presented in Section 4.3. 
4.2.1 Evidence in Other Domains 
Evidence is a notion that has been studied in the fields of philosophy and law for a 
considerable time. In the past two decades, evidence-based medicine and evidence-based 
health-care have grown in popularity. In order to gain an initial understanding of the concept, 
we refer to different definitions of evidence in three domains for insights – from the fields of 
philosophy, law and medicine. 
Definition 1. That which tends to prove the existence or nonexistence of some 
fact. It may consist of testimony, documentary evidence, real evidence5, and, 
when admissible, hearsay evidence.  
(From A Dictionary of Law [128]) 
Definition 2. The assembled information and facts on which rational, logical 
decisions are based in the diverse forums of human discourse, including courts 
of law, and in the practice of evidence-based medicine among many others. 
(From A Dictionary of Public Health [127]) 
                                                          
5
 Real evidence is “Evidence in the form of material objects (e.g. weapons)” [128]. 
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Definition 3. That which raises or lowers the probability of a proposition. The 
central question of epistemology is the structure of this process and its 
ultimate rationale. 
(From The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy [37]) 
The rigour of the function of evidence in the three disciplines is not the same. In the realm of 
law, evidence is presented to help establish (to the court) that something existed or happened 
in the past. Once admitted, evidence tends to work as a foundational proof that substantiates 
subsequent reasoning or tests hypotheses towards a truth or fact. In medicine, especially in 
evidence-based medical decision-making, evidence is collected from various sources and 
evaluated for its applicability and validity in order to determine whether it is suitable for 
supporting the treatment decision of a patient at hand [88]. Matching the available evidence 
and the specific application scenario to confirm the ‘fitness of usage’ is a primary task of 
evidence-based medicine. The user of evidence needs the information concerning how the 
evidence is generated, but is not responsible for the generation of such evidence. In 
philosophy, the definition has not constrained the form or content of evidence, but places 
emphasis fully on the intent of presenting evidence. The power of evidence in philosophy is 
of some degree; it confirms or refutes a proposition, but not in an absolute sense, instead 
changing the probability of the proposition only. 
Despite the subtle differences between the three definitions, there are also some common 
points. Firstly, evidence is something that contains information. The information may come 
in different forms and from varied sources in each domain, e.g. from observation and 
measurement, or from expert judgment or testing and analysis. Secondly, evidence is the 
grounds and starting-point of subsequent reasoning towards a claim or conclusion. The 
information, for which we adopt something as evidence, does not need support by other 
evidence for its content. But testimony to the quality of an item of evidence can be supported 
by other evidence. Even though it is not reflected in aforementioned definitions, literature in 
law, philosophy and medicine unanimously highlights the importance of evidence evaluation 
or appraisal with significance. Because evidence can be fallible, trust in evidence must be 
settled by rigorous scrutiny or examination of evidence in the context of its usage. We should 
not attach more responsibility on an item of evidence than that which goes beyond its 
capability or use it in an unsuitable or inapplicable context. 
The functional role of evidence in safety cases is close to the definition in philosophy, but 
different from the ones in law and medicine. In legal cases, evidence is used to ‘prove’ a 
hypothesis regarding things that happened or existed in the past. In evidence-based medicine, 
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evidence is used to ‘inform’ something, existing like a knowledge base, which is browsed, 
filtered and adopted after applicability and validity checks are made within the target 
application context. Depending on the type of evidence, the authenticity, the relevance or 
other features of source information, data or material objects are challenged before its 
admission as supporting evidence for medical treatment decisions [88]. In safety, evidence is 
used to ‘justify’ something, usually the achievement of safety goals or safety claims elicited. 
In this regard, the trustworthiness of the source data of evidence and the evidential features 
of a single or multiple items of evidence are of our concern and should be justified for a 
compelling safety cases. We will depict these features in Section 4.5.  
4.2.2 Evidence in Safety Domain 
There are several guidance materials [15, 73, 158] that provide definitions of evidence in the 
safety domain. But each of them is presented in a particular context and has its limitations.  
Definition 4. Which is used as the basis of the safety argument. This can be 
either facts, assumptions, or subclaims derived from a lower-level sub-
argument. 
(From Adelard Safety Case Development Manual [15, 33]) 
Definition 5. Safety Evidence is information, based on established fact or 
expert judgement, which is presented to show that the Safety Argument to 
which it relates is valid. 
 (From EUROCONTROL Safety Case Development Manual [73]) 
Definition 6. A document or other exhibit that provides justification to a 
certain claim. 
(From the OMG SAEM Software Assurance Evidence Metamodel [158]) 
Definition 4 addresses the concept of evidence from the perspective of its functional role in 
safety cases. This definition, which is proposed in context of the CAE notation [17], 
however, is unclear about the nature of evidence. The examples of evidence presented in this 
definition, e.g. facts, assumptions and subclaims, are debatable. For instance, treating 
subclaims as evidence may lead to confusion in safety case development.  
Definition 5 clarifies both the nature and function of safety evidence clearly. Information is 
the core. However, it leaves out the possibility of counter-evidence which can challenge 
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claims in safety arguments. Another issue is that a potential misconception may follow from 
the definition - ‘if there is evidence presented, the argument is true’. It would be good to 
clarify that both justification of an argument structure and justification of evidence are 
necessary to understand the level of truth expressed by a safety argument. One way to avoid 
the potential misconception is to build relationships between evidence and claims, rather than 
between evidence and argument. 
Definition 6 focuses on the documentation aspect of evidence. It is convenient for data 
management of items of evidence. But the nature of being an information element and its 
role as the grounds of argument are underspecified in the definition. There is another relevant 
definition in SAEM, the term of ‘Evidence item’, which is “A unique element of the body of 
evidence, such as an exhibit, a claim, or other element of meaning associated with an exhibit, 
an evidence attribute of one of the predefined relations between evidence elements 
representing assertions made during the evidence collection and evaluation of evidence” 
[158]. The ‘Evidence item’ addressed actually means a data element presented in SAEM, 
which is different from the meaning of an ‘item of evidence’ as we use it in assurance cases.  
4.2.3 Common Basis 
From the discussion presented in the previous two sections, we can see that evidence is 
defined in various ways and it is difficult to achieve a general definition with all features 
presented for all types of evidence. Nevertheless, we argue that the following aspects need to 
be agreed as common bases for understanding the nature and role of evidence in safety. 
• Evidence is information, but usually more than simply just the actual source data of 
evidence. The source data of evidence may come from a mixture of different sources, e.g. 
established facts, expert judgment, outcomes of engineering activities, or field service. 
The source data of evidence can only properly be termed ‘evidence’ when it is in use for 
a specific purpose, e.g. supporting or challenging a specific safety claim, which may or 
may not be different from the initial intent of generating the source data. The 
propositional information associated with the use of evidence source data should be 
addressed as part of evidence.  
• Evidence is not the same as truth. It is something that we produce and adopt to represent 
some degree of truth (as depicted by Definition 3 in Section 4.2.1) or merely 
understanding of potential truth (in the past or in the future) from a specific perspective 
in a certain scope, in order to justify various safety goals. The degree of truth represented 
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by an item of evidence is uncertain and must be subjected to rigorous evaluation within 
an application context.  
• Evidence does not simply equate to documents or artefacts. It is more about the 
information that we can draw out and use as evidential grounds, rather than the physical 
instantiation. Artefacts from system development or safety assessment may contain more 
details than, and should contain, the information that is necessary for the judgment 
involved in designating and evaluating evidence during the development of safety cases. 
• Evidence is the grounds and starting-point of arguments. It serves (either supports or 
challenges) claims within a safety argument. 
• Evidence should be examined in context of safety arguments. Whilst it is possible to 
perform some evaluation of evidence outside the context of a specific safety case (e.g. 
examining the rigor of a safety assessment method) it should be recognised that this is 
only part of the justification of evidence that is required in the context of a safety case. 
Other issues to be addressed include relevance, coverage, and consistency. 
• The association between evidence and safety claims is a multiplicity relationship. One 
item of evidence can support more than one claim; one claim can be supported by 
multiple items of evidence. 
• The association between items of evidence and physical artefacts being cited is a 
multiplicity relationship. One physical artefact may provide two items of evidence. For 
example, a fault tree report may contain both the quantitative analysis result of a fault 
tree and the human review results of that fault tree. The partition and organization of 
information into artefacts is dependent on particular practice in the systems engineering 
life cycle. 
The working definition of evidence proposed in this thesis is: 
Evidence is information that serves as the grounds and starting-point of 
(safety) arguments, based on which the degree of truth of the claims in 
arguments can be established, challenged and contextualised. 
4.3 Classification of Evidence in Safety Cases  
This section presents a discussion on the classification schemes of safety evidence that 
extrapolates the denotation of the concept of evidence.  
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Schum proposes a ‘substance-blind’ approach of classifying evidence [183], which sets 
classification schemes of evidence regardless of the substance or content of an item of 
evidence. The recurrent classification schemes developed by Schum (such as classification 
based on believability, relevance, or inferential force) are based upon the ‘inferential 
credentials or properties’ of evidence, within its argumentation context. In the safety domain, 
there are two popular classifications of safety evidence presented in safety standards and 
guidance [48, 73, 148]. One classification stresses the directness or indirectness of support 
provided by evidence, which is similar to the classification scheme set by Schum based on 
the ‘relevance’ property of evidence; another stresses the data source of an item of evidence, 
which presents the varied denotations of evidence in safety. 
Firstly, items of evidence in safety cases can be divided into two groups, according to their 
relationships with the claims being supported – direct evidence and backing evidence [48, 
73]. Direct evidence is articulated as the evidence of system safety. Backing evidence is 
usually only indirectly relevant to system safety. It is used as evidence for increasing 
confidence only, rather than demonstrating the level of safety achieved. It may be process 
evidence, evidence related to the qualification or features of a tool, a method or personnel 
associated with the development of a system, or evidence from the review of specific 
analysis results. This way of classification of evidence focuses primarily on the ‘relevance’ 
between evidence and claims in arguments. Where the arguments in safety cases are clearly 
distinguished as ‘safety argument’ and ‘confidence argument’ [97] it is clear that direct 
evidence belongs to the safety argument and backing evidence belongs to the confidence 
argument. Direct evidence and backing evidence have complementary roles in safety cases. 
Without direct evidence, system safety cannot be demonstrated sufficiently. Without backing 
evidence, the confidence in safety cases cannot be well-established. 
Another kind of evidence classification is based on the type or feature of the source data of 
evidence. But the individual classes are not the same in different guidance materials, 
depending on the nature of target systems covered by the guidance. Schum states that the 
task of evidence classification may be endless or fruitless if it is categorized by the substance 
of evidence [183]. However, it is common practice in many specific domains (such as law 
and safety). In terms of providing guidance concerning generation, collection and use of 
items of evidence in a specific domain, it is beneficial to consider the types of substantial 
content of evidence in classification. As we mentioned before, evidence in safety may come 
from a variety of sources, such as test, analysis, judgment, demonstration, field service, 
management, standard compliance, specific validation or verification, or good practice. The 
factors to be considered in the evaluation of items of evidence must take into account the 
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characteristics of that specific type of evidence, usually differing from the characteristics of 
another type of evidence. 
For example, evidence for demonstrating the satisfaction of the applicable safety 
requirements commonly comes from four major sources [195]: 
• Analytical evidence (including results from simulation, hazard analysis, cause analysis, 
consequence analysis, behaviour modelling etc.) 
• Empirical evidence (observation and measurement of behaviours from various types of 
testing, historical operation, or real practice.) 
• Adherence evidence (adherence to standards, guidance, design rules, prescribed process, 
accepted best practice etc.6) 
• Engineering judgement (inspection, review, or expert opinion based on personal 
knowledge, engineering experience and creative thoughts.) 
Besides the classification scheme presented above, evidence can also be classified according 
to the types of the safety claims being supported. In [204], evidence is categorised into three 
groups: evidence for requirements validation, evidence for requirements satisfaction, and 
evidence for requirements traceability. However, if the higher-level argument structure of a 
system are not decomposed with respect to the safety claims (as requirements validation, 
satisfaction, traceability), this type of classification of evidence is not helpful in terms of 
understanding, planning or selecting evidence during the development of safety cases. 
In addition, new types of evidence will emerge with the advance of new methods, new 
objectives, new technology and new problems. The types of evidence that can be used to 
underpin safety claims in safety cases should be recommended as part of best practice by 
regulators to help the comprehension, use and management of evidence in a specific domain. 
However, due to the diversity and complexity of potential evidence types, a clear argument-
evidence interface is needed and must be based on the clarified connotation of evidence.  
4.4 Relationship between Evidence and Argument 
This section explains the need of a model of evidence for safety cases, through discussing the 
relationship of evidence and Toulmin’s argument model, the inadequacy of existing view of 
                                                          
6
 Sometimes it is referred to as ‘qualitative evidence’. But this label may confuse with other types of evidence, such 
as qualitative analytical evidence or qualitative judgement from experts. 
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evidence-argument relationship, and the limitation of current representation of evidence with 
structured argument notations. 
4.4.1 Toulmin’s Argument Structure  
Much of the work on structured arguments in safety cases stems from the conceptual frame 
and layout of argument proposed by Toulmin. The general layout for arguments presented by 
Toulmin [198] (as shown in Figure 21) describes the elements that exists in arguments and 
their function in the argumentation process. This argument model addresses the logical 
representation of arguments explicitly as a rational justification rather than a formal inference 
according to a set of fixed mathematical principles. It provides a good foundation for the 
analysis and construction of many kinds of arguments, regardless of the domain in which 
they are applied.  
 
 
Figure 21 Toulmin’s Argument Model 
According to Toulmin’s structure, we do not attempt to establish truth through 
argumentation, but to establish reasonable justification for the acceptance of a claim. Much 
work has been developed on the basis of the original Toulmin’s argument model [99]. It has 
been used to represent the reasoning process in a variety of disciplines, such as law, 
education, medicine and artificial intelligence.  
Claim  the statement we wish to justify; 
Data/ground  the fact we appeal to; the grounds or information on which our claim is 
based; 
Warrant  a statement authorising the step from data to claim is true; an inference 
rule; 
Backing a reason for trusting the warrant; 
Qualifier  a term or phrase reflecting the degree to which the data supports the 
claim, e.g. generally, probably 
Rebuttal  specific circumstances in which the argument will fail to support the 
claim as exceptions. 
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The key function of Toulmin’s argument model is not to strengthen the grounds on which the 
argument is founded, but rather to show how to proceed from them as a starting-point to the 
claim. One significant contribution of Toulmin’s model is the explicit representation of the 
‘warrant’ and ‘backing’ elements of an argument. Knowledge of the data and the claim alone 
does not necessarily convince us that the claim will be drawn from the data. A mechanism is 
required to work as a justification of the inference from the data to the claim. That is the 
function of a warrant. A backing is used to provide grounds for a warrant. Toulmin has 
stressed the importance of backing by stating that “the soundness of our claims to knowledge 
turns on the adequacy of the arguments by which we back them” [198].  
Besides the strength of the inference rule, the credibility and acceptability of data or grounds 
is equally important for the soundness of argument. Justified grounds is one of the important 
conditions of good reasoning based on Toulmin’s model [100]. However, the notion of 
data/grounds is broad. It can be similar to the notion of an acceptable proposition in logic and 
it can also be viewed as the concept of evidence in law. In the safety engineering domain, the 
grounds of argument are not generally well-presented in safety cases, perhaps due to the wide 
variety of formats and scale of items of safety evidence. Most items of safety evidence are 
themselves complicated artefacts from system design, analysis or test activities. Direct 
references to these artefacts do not communicate clearly why they are capable of supporting 
a claim. The particular information from the evidence source data used as the ground for 
determining the truth value of a claim is not evident. In addition, the rationale of the adoption 
of items of evidence and the justification of the suitability of items of evidence adopted 
cannot fit into one single block in a notation. Therefore, thinking of the clarity issue, 
regarding both comprehension and representation, we need a model of safety evidence that 
can help us organise evidence-related information and interface safety evidence with 
arguments in a structured manner. This is the subject of Section 4.5.  
4.4.2 A Simplified View of Evidence  
In a safety case, there are usually a large number of evidence items presented in support of 
the argument for the top level safety claim. A simple view of the relationship between safety 
evidence and argument in safety cases is illustrated in Figure 22 in GSN terms. 
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Figure 22 Simplified View of Argument-Evidence Interface 
In Figure 22, the triangle depicts the overall safety case. In the upper part, there is the 
structured argument that consists of safety claims at various abstraction levels. At the lower 
part of the figure lie references to the items of safety evidence that support the safety 
argument. In the figure, it may seem that the relationship of argument and evidence is fairly 
simple, just as links that connect the references to items of evidence with the safety claims 
being supported. 
However, the view is not so neat and simple in reality. Firstly, evidence is not only presented 
simply at the ‘bottom’ of a graphical representation, in GSN terms, as solutions to bottom 
level claims. Some evidence may also support higher level claims directly. Sometimes, 
evidence is needed and used as context to support the decomposition of safety claims. For 
example, the results from an aircraft-level FHA may be used for setting up the safety 
objectives of aircraft functional systems. Secondly, for the ultimate aim of obtaining a 
compelling safety case, evidence itself should be justified for its role of evidence in the 
context of specific safety arguments in order to establish confidence in the grounds of an 
argument. The justification of the evidential properties of evidence may be separate lines of 
argument by themselves that are associated with the argument structure presented. These 
backing lines of argument are also not shown (as an explicit part) in Figure 22. Finally, there 
is a question concerning whether the interface between argument and evidence can be 
represented in a unified format, because safety evidence may be of a variety of forms and 
from many different sources.   
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4.4.3 Evidence Representation in Notations  
Argument and evidence can be represented in both textual and graphical forms in safety 
cases. Two graphical notations are currently in wide use – GSN [89] and CAE [17]. Both of 
them are supported by software tools, which greatly ease the management and review of 
structured safety cases. 
Notation Example 
Text-based notation 
(from [102]) 
Claim 1.1.1: H1 has been eliminated. 
Evidence 1.1.1: Formal verification 
CAE [17] 
 
GSN [89] 
 
Solution_Sn1
Fault Tree for 
Hazard H1
 
    
     
 
Table 4 Examples of Evidence Represented in Notations 
Let us look at three examples of evidence representation in Table 4. In the textual form, the 
item of evidence is depicted in natural language and numbered in correspondence to the 
claim that it supports. In CAE [17], the item of evidence is represented by a rectangle with a 
description of the item of evidence. In GSN [89], an item of evidence may be represented by 
two types of graphical elements. It may be presented as Solution, which is represented by a 
circle, if it supports a safety goal. It may also be presented as Context, shown as a round-
cornered rectangle, if it contextualises the decomposition of safety goals. 
We can see from Table 4 that the citation of an item of evidence in a safety case is different 
from the actual source data of that item of evidence. However, it can be unclear as to how 
and why an item of evidence fulfils its particular usage instance, solely from such a graphical 
representation. We should not take for granted the content of evidence items and their 
‘fitness-for-usage’. A citation or reference enables us to have access to source data, but not to 
grasp the part of information that is embodied by the source data of evidence and is being 
used in the context of an argument.  
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Similarly, the relationships between an argument and a body of evidence can be represented 
in either a textual format or in a graphical format. The links between argument and evidence, 
if represented in a textual form, are implied by the identification numbers attached with the 
references or descriptions of items of evidence. In graphical forms, the relationships are 
always represented by directed lines between graphical symbols.  
As we have mentioned in Table 4, in GSN, evidence can be represented by Solution or 
Context. An item of evidence as a Solution will connect with a Goal that represents a claim 
to be supported. The connection between them is represented by an arrowed line called 
SupportedBy (historically, also called SolvedBy). Figure 23 (a) illustrates this case of 
representation. A Solution only provides a reference to an item of evidence. The generation, 
collection and management of the source data of evidence is usually beyond the capability 
and responsibility of argumentation tool support. Some evidence is presented as Context in 
support of the decomposition of safety objectives. A Context is linked with another graphical 
symbol by a hollow-arrowed line called InContextOf. Figure 23 (b) is an example for this 
kind of usage of evidence. 
 
Figure 23 Representation of Argument-Evidence Relationships in GSN 
The CAE notation for safety argument construction has three building blocks – Claim, 
Argument and Evidence [15, 17]. The relationship between an Evidence node and other 
argument elements – Claim and Argument nodes – is simple. The function of an item of 
evidence serving as context is not represented in CAE. The link between an item of evidence 
(represented as an Evidence node) with the Claim node to be supported can be connected 
directly by a linking line named as IsEvidenceFor or indirectly with intermediate annotation 
by an Argument node for the rationale of adopting that item of evidence. Argument nodes are 
optional [17] and may be presented if the links between Evidence and Claim nodes are not 
straightforward. Figure 24 presents two views of evidence-argument relationships depicted in 
the CAE notation. Similar to Solution in GSN, the Evidence node in CAE is also a 
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description of the citation or reference to the source data of an item of evidence, which 
should not be confused with the concept of evidence presented in Section 4.2. 
 
Figure 24 Representation of Argument-Evidence Relationships in CAE 
Therefore, it is obvious that current representation of evidence in safety cases with graphical 
notations does not address the essence of items of evidence. The essential content of 
evidence that exhibits its evidential power is not explicitly shown or stated in the existing 
forms of graphical representation, but preserved by the actual data source of evidence 
somewhere else. If an item of evidence is complicated or information-rich, such as a safety 
analysis report of hundreds of pages, it would be difficult to understand and assure the 
logical connection between an item of evidence that is cited in a structured argument and the 
specific claim that is supported by that item of evidence. 
4.5 A Model of Evidence (EviM) 
This section defines a model of evidence (EviM) for capturing the relationship between 
evidence items and safety arguments. Three viewpoints that are integrated within the model 
are introduced in Section 4.5.1 before the presentation of EviM in Section 4.5.2. Section 
4.5.3 explains the relationship of EviM and a structured argumentation model. Section 4.5.4 
~ Section 4.5.7 elaborate the interface element - ‘evidence assertion’ in EviM. Additionally, 
‘Trustworthiness’ and ‘Appropriateness’, two evidential properties associated with evidence 
items, are explained in Section 4.5.8.  
4.5.1 Three Perspectives 
Based on the definition of evidence in safety cases in Section 4.2, we claim that the model of 
evidence in safety cases should integrate views of evidence from three distinct perspectives. 
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• The content perspective 
• The utilisation perspective 
• The evaluation perspective 
When we talk about the content of an item of evidence, sometimes it is interpreted merely as 
the content of the source data of evidence that embodies the information to be used as 
evidence. However, it is inappropriate to neglect the role of evidence in an argument that is 
also part of the content of an item of evidence. First of all, different observations can be 
made concerning the source data of evidence depending on viewpoint. If we observe the 
evidence source data from the viewpoint of being an item of evidence for a particular domain 
safety claim, for example, the content of our concern is quite specific. Secondly, an assertion 
or proposition is a different concept from a data item. The evidence source data may contain 
a variety of data items (e.g. the various data items in CoreDMM presented in Chapter 3)7. An 
item of evidence, for its intended role within a safety case, should clearly define assertions in 
order to connect it with proper argument elements (in addition to the source data of evidence 
or references to the source data). A proposition should be clearly separated from the concepts 
of individuals, objects, and properties etc. that are deemed as data items in the evidence 
source data. Data items (from evidence source data) will imply the truth value of 
propositions. Propositions that are contained in an item of evidence are unique in that they 
are designated with a value of ‘True’ inherently without further supporting argument or 
evidence. These propositions based on evidence source data are often implicit in existing 
practice. In the model of evidence presented in the following section (Section 4.5.2), these 
propositions are explicitly addressed and presented as evidence assertions (to be defined and 
elaborated in Section 4.5.4).  
The utilisation perspective is primarily concerned with the linkage of an item of evidence 
with its source data and its argumentation context, which must be elicited and documented 
clearly in safety case development. From this perspective, we aim at answering the following 
two questions, “Where is the evidence from?” and “Where is the evidence used?”. During the 
development stage of a safety case lifecycle, an item of evidence must be connected with a 
piece of evidence source data planned at the beginning of the stage, or realised at the end of 
the stage. Additionally, the connections between items of evidence with argument elements 
(claims or links between argument elements) within a safety case must be explicitly 
                                                          
7
 The complexity of data items is two-fold. Firstly, the number of different types of data items. Secondly, the number 
of data items of a same type. Some source data of evidence may contain few data items, e.g. the prescriptive 
measures defined by a standard for a specific hazard. 
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presented. Otherwise, an item of evidence is not yet actually adopted as a part in a safety 
case.  
The evaluation of evidence includes the evaluation of the source data of evidence and the 
evaluation of its usage within the context of an argument. The evaluation of the usage of 
evidence places emphasis on the capability and sufficiency of evidence (the evidential 
properties of evidence items) in terms of its function of supporting claims. We should carry 
out the evaluation with consideration of the specific application scenario, whereas the 
evaluation of the source data of evidence (e.g. a fault tree or a software testing result) can be 
considered without associating it with a domain claim.  
The following section introduces the evidence metamodel, EviM, which integrates relevant 
information of evidence from the three perspectives. 
4.5.2 EviM Overview  
Figure 25 depicts EviM, a conceptual model of evidence represented in UML, in the context 
of safety cases, which stresses the connotation of evidence. The data elements of EviM, 
which place emphasis on the essential content and the role of evidence in safety cases, have 
been established based on the analysis of the concepts of evidence performed in Section 4.2.  
2
Argumentation
Source Data of 
Evidence
*
*
EvidenceAssertion
EvidenceItem
1
*
EvidenceSet
1
*
1
*
1..*
0..*
EvResultAssertion
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EvSetProperty
1
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Appropriateness Sufficiency
Independence
Diversity Consistency
Safety Evidence
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Figure 25 A Model of Evidence in Safety Cases (EviM) 
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EviM consists of five key elements: EvidenceItem, EvidenceSet, EvidenceAssertion, 
EvItemProperty and EvSetProperty. EviM is a model at the M1 level in the OMG meta-
modelling architecture presented in Figure 11 in Chapter 3. It expands the ‘Evidence’ 
package presented in Figure 20 in Chapter 3, which describes the relationships between 
safety assessment artefacts and assurance meta-models. Importantly, EviM distinguishes the 
collective evidence set that can be used to support a particular safety case, and the items of 
evidence contained in that set, which themselves are composites of the evidence source data, 
the necessary metadata and the propositions and evidential properties. 
EvidenceItem describes the items of evidence adopted or referenced in safety cases. This 
element is basically a container class of evidence-related information, including references to 
safety analysis artefacts, evidential properties for a single item of evidence, and assertions 
made for the information embodied within an evidence entity. EvidenceItem references data 
from safety assessment artefacts, but does not contain the source data. As described in 
Section 4.2.3, evidence should not equate to documents or analysis artefacts. However, it is 
popular for safety assessment artefacts to be termed ‘evidence’ by safety practitioners, 
because we have some prior knowledge of their intended usage as evidence for safety claims. 
But we must understand that, in fact, safety assessment artefacts are source data of evidence 
without explicitly-stated evidential roles and evidential properties. 
A collection of evidence items for a safety claim or an argument module [119] can be packed 
up as a set of evidence items, depicted as EvidenceSet in Figure 25. The objects of 
EvidenceSet can possess a different set of evidential properties to be considered from the 
ones under concern for objects of EvidenceItem. 
The EvidenceAssertion in Figure 25 represents the core propositional content of an item of 
evidence that is obtained from the source data of evidence. EvidenceAssertion is a subtype of 
Claim in ARM [156]. It is proposed specifically to clarify the usage of information embodied 
by an evidence entity in argumentation. EvidenceAssertion is further subtyped as 
EvResultAssertion and EvDescriptiveAssertion. The notion of EvidenceAssertion and its sub-
types are explained in Section 4.5.4 ~ Section 4.5.7. 
As shown in Figure 25, we define the properties of an item of evidence (EvItemProperty) and 
those of a set of evidence items (EvSetProperty) as individual classes by themselves. The 
reason for this is to clarify that the evidential properties are characteristics specifically 
concerned for EvidenceItem or EvidenceSet in argumentation context that need thorough 
consideration in safety case construction and reviews. 
 109 
 
EvItemProperty and EvSetProperty should be obtained through the evaluation of the usage of 
EvidenceItem and EvidenceSet rather than the evaluation of the source data of evidence by 
themselves without the context of argumentation. In a compelling safety case, each 
individual item of evidence and its relationship with the argument presented should possess 
two properties – Trustworthiness and Appropriateness. Moreover, a set of evidence items 
should also exhibit some special properties, such as sufficiency (or coverage), independence, 
diversity, and consistency. These properties concern more with the interrelationships between 
items of evidence and the factors influencing their collective supportive capability. The 
properties of EvidenceSet have not been explored further in this thesis, except the property of 
Consistency, which is studied later in Chapter 5. 
All these evidential properties, if achieved, help ensure the level of confidence we can have 
in the grounds of a safety argument. Two of the properties presented in Figure 25 are 
depicted with dashed-line rectangles, because they are in fact properties of the relationships 
between an item of evidence and an argument element, typically, a domain safety claim. We 
present them in EviM primarily for a comprehensive view of various evidential properties 
that are relevant to items of evidence.  
EvidenceAssertion in Figure 25 is associated with elements in an argumentation model (e.g. a 
domain safety claim, or a relationship between two argumentation elements in ARM [156]). 
The explanation of relationships between EvidenceAssertion and argumentation elements in 
ARM is presented in Section 4.5.3. The source data of an object of EvidenceItem, comes 
from system development and operation, e.g. safety assessment models under study in this 
thesis.   
We have not presented administrative data about evidence in EviM, because EviM is a 
conceptual model. During safety argument construction, we concern more about the metadata 
of the source data of evidence such as who performed the analysis and the method that was 
used in generating the source data of evidence, rather than the metadata associated with the 
application of specific items of evidence (such as who linked the source data of evidence 
with the claims in safety arguments, or when the source data of evidence was designated as 
an item of evidence for a claim). For management of evidence data at the implementation 
level, administrative data elements associated with items of evidence could be added to 
EviM.   
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4.5.3 Relations with ARM 
The overview of ARM is presented in Section 2.7.3. The two core argument elements in 
ARM that interact with EviM are Claim and AssertedRelationship. Claims are recorded 
propositions within a structured argument [156]. AssertedRelationships are abstract 
associations that connect structured argument elements.  
 
Figure 26 Asserted Relationships in ARM 
There are five subtypes of AssertedRelationship in ARM [156], as depicted in Figure 26. The 
cited source data of an item of evidence is linked with other argument elements through three 
subtypes of AssertedRelationships - AssertedEvidence, AssertedCounterEvidence, 
AssertedContext (as defined in [156]). 
“The AssertedEvidence association class records the declaration that one or 
more items of Evidence (cited by InformationItems) provides information that 
helps establish the truth of a Claim. It is important to note that such a 
declaration is itself an assertion on behalf of the user. The information (cited 
by an InformationItem) may provide evidence for more than one Claim” [156]. 
“AssertedCounterEvidence can be used to associate evidence (cited by 
InformationElements) to a Claim, where this evidence is being asserted to 
infer that the Claim is false. It is important to note that such a declaration is 
itself an assertion on behalf of the user” [156]. 
“The AssertedContext association class declares that the information cited by 
an InformationElement provides a context for the interpretation and definition 
of a Claim or ArgumentReasoning element” [156]. 
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The relations of EviM and ARM are twofold. Firstly, EvidenceAssertion proposed in EviM is 
a subtype of Claim in ARM. Figure 27 illustrates the relationships between 
EvidenceAssertion in EviM and Claim in ARM (the shaded blocks are elements in EviM; the 
blocks with a white background are elements in ARM).  
 
Figure 27 Evidence Assertion – a Subtype of Claim 
Both EvidenceAssertion and Claim are propositions, which can be true or false in value. One 
prominent difference between them is the origin of the propositions. Claim abstracted in 
ARM for argumentation is the abstraction of expected claims in a problem domain, which are 
propositions, with their values determined or undetermined, about the real world subjects; 
whereas EvidenceAssertion in EviM is drawn from and for the source data of evidence, 
which are true propositions about modelled subjects on the basis of the content of the source 
data of evidence. We only present true propositions that can be directly8 established from the 
evidence source data. The reasons for it include: a) they are part of the meaning exhibited by 
the evidence source data that is of our interest; b) the potential false propositions that can be 
associated with evidence source data are pointless and boundless. It is worth noting that 
EvidenceAssertions are components of an EvidenceItem, but not components of an argument. 
Secondly, EvidenceAssertion in EviM is one of the external target elements linked with the 
ArgumentElement or ArgumentLink in ARM. In ARM, the source and target links associated 
with ArgumentLink are connected with the top level ModelElement (which is of the highest 
level of abstraction). This enables the powerful expression of all kinds of potential 
connections between argument elements of different subtypes. However, it also makes the 
permitted and prohibited connections between various subtypes of argument model elements 
less clear. Figure 28 illustrates the subtypes of ArgumentLink that can be connected with the 
                                                          
8
 ‘Directness’ in terms of not extrapolating beyond the nature of the source information itself. 
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evidence assertions of an item of evidence. Regarding the interface between evidence and 
argument, we can see that instances of EvidenceItem (citing source data of evidence outside 
of an ARM model) are special in that they can serve only as a source object of an 
ArgumentLink. 
 
Figure 28 Argument Links between Evidence and Argument 
4.5.4 Evidence Assertion  
The notion of the ‘evidence assertion’ has been suggested in the OMG ARM [156] and GSN 
community standard Version 1 [89]. However, the explanation of this notion is not yet 
sufficient for practical application. The following sections explain this concept further. 
An evidence assertion is a statement that we can take as a true proposition according to the 
content of the source data of evidence. Representing evidence assertions drawn from source 
data explicitly can provide us a clear view of what is apparent from an item of evidence. 
Evidence assertions are not intended to record judgements about the source data of evidence, 
but instead document propositions that can be established directly from the information 
embodied by the source data of evidence. The truth value of an evidence assertion is not 
intended to be debatable. However, true evidence assertions do not directly mean that the 
corresponding domain claims are true, unless the trustworthiness of items of evidence and 
the appropriateness of claim-evidence relationships are justified.  
The description of evidence assertion in ARM includes the following key points [156]: 
• The nature of an evidence assertion is a claim. 
• An evidence assertion is minimal and does not need supporting argumentation. 
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• An evidence assertion is the interface element to integrate argument and evidence.  
Based on these key points, we propose the definition of Evidence Assertion in this thesis as: 
An Evidence Assertion is a minimal proposition that describes straightforward 
‘factual information’ concerning an item of evidence. It does not need support 
from further arguments or evidence and it directly concerns the source data of 
an item of evidence without involving subjective judgment. 
As a specific type of claim, an evidence assertion is unique in its source and function. An 
evidence assertion is drawn directly from the content of the source data of evidence. It is a 
true proposition according to what is presented in the source data of evidence that is about 
subjects under our concern. An evidence assertion can be used as grounds or context for a 
domain safety claim.  
Evidence assertions should be distinguished from domain safety claims in arguments. A 
domain safety claim is what we want to state in the problem ‘application’ domain; it is a 
statement concerning the subjects (or concerns) in a real problem domain. Unlike an 
evidence assertion, the truth of a domain claim is uncertain unless supporting argument and 
evidence are provided. Domain safety claims may form a hierarchy of claims which 
represent how higher level safety goals are decomposed into more concrete ones; they can be 
supported by either claims or evidence. By contrast, an evidence assertion is a propositional 
statement on the subjects in an item of evidence that model or represent subjects in the real 
problem domain; it does not need any further support, either from claims or from evidence.  
An evidence assertion differs from the data items contained in the source. It is a claim that is 
about what is embodied by those data items. The true or false value of an evidence assertion 
is not determined by the facts of a problem domain in reality, but endowed by the facts of 
presence or absence of specific data items in the source data of evidence. Our confidence in 
terms of whether an evidence assertion can infer the True value of a domain claim in the real 
problem domain depends on the trustworthiness of an evidence item and the appropriateness 
of its usage.  
There are two subtypes of evidence assertions: 
• Evidence Result Assertion  
• Evidence Descriptive Assertion 
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The Evidence Result Assertion is described in Section 4.5.5; the Evidence Descriptive 
Assertion is explained in Section 4.5.6. 
4.5.5 Evidence Result Assertion 
An evidence result assertion is a proposition that can be made from the source data of 
evidence and can be used to support domain claims in safety arguments. It answers the 
question, “What does an item of evidence say?”. For example, we may use a fault tree as an 
item of evidence. Then the EvidenceResultAssertion contained in this item of evidence could 
be ‘The probability of modelled EventX is 1.0×10-4”. 
Formulating evidence result assertions from items of evidence directly has two advantages.  
• It may help to clarify the role or function of potential items of evidence as early as 
possible.  
• It may also ease the management of items of evidence in parallel to the management of 
safety cases.  
EvidenceResultAssertion can serve as the ‘data’ element in Toulmin’s model directly. It is 
the starting-point of a line of safety argument. The subject of an EvidenceResultAssertion 
addresses some aspect of the source data of evidence which represents the subject in the 
problem domain (e.g. a modelled subject in a model). For example, the principal noun of a 
domain claim may be “the probability of an undesired event Ex”; Ex is the undesired event in 
the problem domain. By contrast, the principal noun of a corresponding evidence result 
assertion of an item of evidence (e.g. a fault tree) may be “the probability of a modelled 
undesired event Em”; Em is the top event in that fault tree that models or represents Ex. In 
reality, EvidenceResultAssertion of safety assessment evidence may have features or styles 
determined by the types of safety evidence (e.g. the substantial analysis outputs of a safety 
analysis technique). As the definition of evidence assertion indicated, the Boolean value of 
an evidence result assertion is true if the item of evidence has been generated and is in use or 
expected to be true if the item of evidence is planned to be available. 
There are two ways through which we can identify potential features of evidence result 
assertions. The first way is to examine the lower level domain safety claims that are 
presented in a safety case or a safety case pattern. For example, if there was a goal in a safety 
case, depicted as “the probability of a failure condition X does not exceed 1×10-6 per flight 
hour”, then the evidence result assertion being expected would be that “the probability of the 
modelled failure condition X is {Px} per flight hour”. The {Px} in the expected evidence 
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result assertion should be a number less than 1×10-6. They are close in terms of the format 
and the subject of the expression.  
The example above is almost self-evident; however, it is not always effective to identify, in 
this way, the potential features of evidence assertions in the domains that are not rich in 
prescriptive requirements and good practice. Because there could be a trap that might lead us 
to unrealistic expectation of the forms of evidence result assertions desired, when a domain 
safety claim contained in a safety case has not been well-decomposed to a proper level.  
For example, CS25.1309 (b) [68] has set safety goals for failure conditions that are classified 
as Catastrophic. It can be easily derived from CS25.1309 (b) that two forms of evidence 
result assertions are expected for potential items of evidence to be used for justification of the 
sufficient control of Catastrophic failure conditions: 
• “The probability of Catastrophic Failure Condition X presented in {Evi} is {Px} per 
flight hour”, where {Evi} is an item of evidence and {Px} is a number less than 1×10-9. 
• “There is no single point failure identified in {Evi} that can lead to the Catastrophic 
Failure Condition X”, where {Evi} is an item of evidence. 
If a domain safety claim in a safety case under study was at a higher abstraction level, such 
as ‘Equipment X is fail safe’ or ‘The configuration logic is acceptably fault free’, the 
granularity of these domain safety claims needs to be refined before reasonable features of 
potential evidence result assertions can be derived. From engineering practice, we understand 
that it is more plausible to read out whether a failure scenario has been considered and how it 
is considered from an item of evidence rather than whether a domain subject of concern is 
‘fault free’ or ‘fail safe’. For safety assessment evidence, normally, the subject of an 
evidence result assertion is within a range of permitted substance elements (e.g. the 
probability or MCSs of an undesired event) and construction elements that are contained in a 
safety assessment model. The domain claims with concepts (e.g. ‘fail safe’) that resist being 
directly modelled as a part of a model, should be decomposed into lower level sub-goals that 
can be supported directly by items of evidence. A domain claim with safety concepts or 
features of a system that cannot be addressed by a model directly is not permitted to be 
supported directly by evidence result assertions.  
The second way of identifying evidence result assertions is to observe available evidence 
presently in use or recommended by standards and guidance. For example, we can ask 
ourselves questions such as ‘what do we expect to learn from a specific safety analysis (e.g. 
FTA)’?, ‘what do we expect to learn from a specific test’?, ‘what can we assert about the 
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safety characteristic of a domain subject according to an item of evidence’?. The answers 
should be a concrete statement that is about a modelled subject (which is of the 
corresponding subject in the problem domain) and is related to the purpose of generating that 
item of evidence. The forms of evidence result assertions formulated in this way rely upon 
our understanding of the purpose of various types of evidence and their potential use in 
safety cases. For example, Table 5 presents the main forms of evidence result assertions that 
we can make from the safety analyses as recommended by the safety assessment process in 
ARP 4754A. 
Types of  
Safety Analysis  
Examples of Evidence Result Assertion  
FHA •      Failure condition FCx modelled in FHAa is a Catastrophic failure 
condition of Aircraft AC 
(according to an aircraft level FHA model- FHAa) 
FTA •      The probability of failure condition FCx modelled in FTAb is Px. 
•      Failure condition FCx modelled in FTAb was caused by more than 
one failure event in FTAb. 
(according to a fault tree model - FTAb) 
FMEA •      Component X modelled in FMEAc has three failure modes. 
•      Failure Mode A of Component X modelled in FMEAc may lead to 
Failure Effect B. 
(according to an FMEA - FMEAc) 
Markov •      The probability of sub-system X being in an operational state, 
modelled in MARd, is Px. 
(according to a Markov model- MARd) 
CMA •      Failure event A and failure event B are independent in CMAe. 
(according to a common model analysis- CMAe) 
ZSA •      There is a hazardous Failure Condition FCy in Zone X in ZSAf. 
(identified in a zonal safety analysis - ZSAf). 
PRA (e.g. 
lightning ) 
•      The lightning interaction modelled in CMg (between the skin and 
structure of Aircraft AC) is acceptably safe. 
(according to a Computational Model - CMg)  
Table 5 Examples of Evidence Result Assertion 
But we must keep in mind that matching and re-examining evidence result assertions are 
indispensable tasks when we adopt an item of evidence in a safety case. Some evidence 
result assertions that are drawn before integrating evidence with arguments might be 
unsuitable for a certain usage; some other evidence result assertions might have been 
neglected before the integration. Explicit documentation of the evidence result assertions of 
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an item of evidence, especially the one used as direct evidence for a domain safety claim, is 
helpful for accumulating both the existing and the expected usage of the evidence source 
data, which can provide an easy understanding of the evidence-argument relationship and 
help facilitate the potential reuse of evidence items in some new context. For the safety 
assessment evidence under study in this thesis, the evidence result assertions should be based 
on the instances of SubstanceElements of safety analyses (as depicted in CoreDMM 
presented in Section 3.4.1). 
The elicitation of evidence result assertions may present some extra work during safety case 
development. However, it is important to make these result assertions as clear as possible 
according to the ‘facts’ conveyed by an item of evidence. It is dangerous to support a domain 
safety claim with an item of evidence that is much less capable and effective than that which 
is needed. The gap between what we can say according to the source data of evidence and 
what a domain safety claim is about, if unacknowledged or unresolved, could undermine the 
overall confidence in safety cases significantly. In existing practice, we commonly are 
unaware of such gaps that are implicit with evidence result assertions unstated.  
In graphical representation of structured safety arguments, it has not been stipulated as 
necessary to explicitly present evidence result assertions as concrete argument components 
with a symbol. However, it is necessary to understand the role of an evidence result assertion 
within the graphical view. In a safety case lifecycle, evidence result assertions should be 
included as a required data item for every item of evidence. Figure 29 (a) depicts the 
common view of evidence-claim interfaces (in GSN terms) in existing practice. The Solution 
cites the ‘Evidence’ for the Claim in the pictorial view. Figure 29 (b) presents the functional 
position of an evidence result assertion that links an item of evidence with a domain safety 
claim. The argument link La1 is broken down into three new elements, Lb1, a goal depicting 
an evidence result assertion, and Lb2. It can be clear to examine the relationship between a 
claim and an item of evidence in two steps: ‘does the item of evidence contain the expected 
form of evidence result assertions required for support of the claim?’ and ‘could the evidence 
result assertion of the item of evidence infer the truth or falsity of the claim?’. Figure 29 (c) 
presents the position of an evidence result assertion in a common graphical view as Figure 29 
(a) illustrated. The link between a claim and a solution, Lc1, is unchanged from La1. However, 
as we know, the Solution is only a reference placeholder, which possesses no evidential 
power logically. It is the evidence result assertion of the item of evidence being referenced 
that provides the support to the claim. The Lb2 in Figure 29 (b) is a relation that does not need 
support or justification (according to our definition of evidence assertions). So to be succinct 
in a graphical view, the evidence-claim relationship can be represented as it were in existing 
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practice. But the evidence result assertion (as it is used in the fashion illustrated in Figure 29 
(c)) should be explicit and accessible as a part of the item of evidence being cited.  
Evidence 
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Figure 29 Role of Evidence Result Assertion Presented in GSN 
For the discussion so far, we have viewed evidence result assertions in the context of citing 
the source data of evidence to support or challenge a domain safety claim. As described in 
Section 4.4.2, the source data of evidence items is sometimes used as the context of argument 
elements. In this situation, in fact, evidence result assertions are not obligatory information 
elements of the application scenario. Because the source data of an item of evidence (e.g. a 
FMEA model), is used for providing raw data (e.g. a list of failure modes) to assist the 
generation or decomposition of safety goals, rather than be used for inferring the truth or 
falsity of a domain safety claim. However, the concept of evidence assertions is still 
important. In this situation, the evidence assertions of an item of evidence still exist, but not 
as the interface elements that connect the item of evidence with other structured argument 
elements in a primary safety argument. Each item of evidence can play a multiple role in 
safety cases, as context or supporting evidence, or both.  
4.5.6 Evidence Descriptive Assertion 
Alongside evidence result assertions, there are also other assertions we can make according 
to (and about) the content of the source data of an item of evidence. Evidence descriptive 
assertions are propositions that describe an item of evidence but that cannot be directly 
observed from the source data of an item of evidence. They are not used to support domain 
safety claims, but for providing support for the confidence argument associated with the 
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primary safety argument elements (e.g. the backing argument that supports the applicability 
of a fault tree that is used as direct evidence in a safety case).  
Evidence descriptive assertions are statements about the source data of evidence or the 
process of which the source data of evidence is generated. The subject of an evidence 
descriptive assertion can be a wide variety of things. In reality, it is impossible and 
unnecessary to try to elicit them completely. Instead, they should be formulated according to 
the details required by the backing arguments of the safety case. Typically, we are concerned 
of the evidence descriptive assertions that address factors that may influence the confidence 
in the usage of evidence. For example, the modeller, the tool, the method (the contributing 
factors for ‘wrong’ models as depicted in Section 3.3.2) of an item of safety assessment 
evidence should have corresponding evidence descriptive assertions elicited. These evidence 
descriptive assertions can help present factual information that is necessary for the evaluation 
of the trustworthiness of an item of evidence and the appropriateness of the usage of that 
item of evidence in a safety case. Evidence descriptive assertions can introduce clues and 
facts that help us to make decisions during evidence evaluation. For example, consider again 
a fault tree (FTx) as an item of evidence. Two examples of evidence descriptive assertions of 
the fault tree (FTx) are – “The repair events are not considered in FTx” or “Operator errors 
have been considered in FTx”. The normal metadata (for example, the metadata depicted in 
CoreDMM in Section 3.4.1) from the source data of an item of evidence can be addressed by 
evidence descriptive assertions if needed, e.g. “FTx is constructed by Engineer Y” or “FTx is 
constructed with FaultTree+ Tool”.  
An item of evidence may have many evidence descriptive assertions. It is difficult to 
enumerate all potential descriptive assertions completely and it is unreasonable to ask for all 
details without a focus. For safety assessment models under study in this thesis, we observe 
some common contextual factors that are shared in the backing of safety assessment 
evidence, e.g. the scope of an item of evidence, the administrative metadata of an item of 
evidence. Table 6 presents some typical types of evidence descriptive assertions we can 
make from safety analyses. 
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Subjects of Evidence 
Descriptive Assertion 
Examples of Evidence Descriptive Assertion  
Scope •      Human factors are considered in Evidence Evi 
•      System component Cx is considered in Evidence Evi 
Modeller  •      Evidence Evi is created by Engineer X. 
Limitation  •      Repair events are not considered in Evidence Evi 
•      Timing issues are not considered in Evidence Evi 
Tool •      Evidence Evi is generated with Toolx 
Data source •     The essential failure data used in Evidence Evi is from Handbook Hx 
Table 6 Examples of Evidence Descriptive Assertion 
4.5.7 Eliciting Evidence Assertions 
In system safety processes, evidence assertions can be elicited either with the generation of 
the source data of evidence or with the adoption of an item of evidence within a safety case. 
The important thing is to take evidence assertions into account properly in order to 
demonstrate our understanding of various items of evidence and their application context, to 
ease the integration of evidence with argument, and to support the development of 
confidence argument associated with evidence.  
Based on the common understanding of typical outputs of safety engineering activities and 
the features of evidence in typical public safety cases, we propose a classification scheme of 
typical evidence assertions. Figure 30 illustrates the typology of evidence assertion that 
should be considered in practice. It is not intended to be an exhaustive list, but can act as an 
aid to thinking, in particular, guiding the formulation of evidence assertions in terms of the 
common subjects they might address. 
Evidence result assertions are classified into two classes – quantitative result assertions and 
qualitative result assertions. Quantitative result assertions are statements based upon safety 
analysis results that are in a numerical manner. Qualitative result assertions are statements 
based upon safety analysis results addressing the demonstration of qualitative safety features 
(e.g. levels of redundancy).  
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Figure 30 A Typology of Evidence Assertions 
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Evidence descriptive assertions are classified into four classes – scope assertions, 
administrative assertions, assumption assertions and limitation assertions. Some examples 
are given in Figure 30 for each type of descriptive assertion. While eliciting evidence 
assertions for a specific item of evidence, users need to consider the types of evidence 
assertions (as recommended in Figure 30) for inspiration and to concretize the content of 
evidence assertions according to the feature of the item of evidence and its specific 
application context. For example, a fault tree model as an item of evidence will not have 
evidence result assertions on ‘independency between failure events’. 
EvidenceAssertion is a core component of EviM. It is useful for facilitating the application 
and justification of evidence in safety case development. Three questions should be 
considered in the process of  evidence selection and justification [96]. 
1. “Is the type of evidence capable of supporting the safety claim?” 
2. “Is the particular instance of that type of evidence capable of supporting 
the safety claim?” 
3. “Can the instance of that type of evidence be trusted to deliver the expected 
capability?” 
The two subtypes of EvidenceAssertion can help in the answers to these questions. The form 
of the evidence result assertion of an instance of a type of evidence should meet the need of a 
domain safety claim. The content of the evidence result assertion of an instance of a specific 
type of evidence determines whether the instance of evidence is supportive. The evidence 
descriptive assertions (e.g. one associated with assumptions of a model) of an instance of the 
specific type of evidence constrain whether the supportive relationship holds for the domain 
safety claim. Furthermore, the evidence descriptive assertions associated with the generation 
of the source data of the evidence are useful for determining the trustworthiness of the 
specific item of evidence. 
4.5.8 Trustworthiness and Appropriateness 
Trustworthiness, in social, political and economic contexts, intends to establish and maintain 
cooperation [93]. As a desired property of evidence in safety cases, trustworthiness depicts 
whether we can have our belief in the content of an item of evidence as what is said by the 
source data of evidence. It is affected by many factors [204] such as: ‘bugs’ in the item of 
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evidence presented, the rigour of review, the qualification of a tool adopted, the experience 
and competence of the personnel. 
Trustworthiness is a property of evidence that can be evaluated in its own right for the 
information embodied within the source data of evidence. It represents a degree of 
confidence that we have for the information embodied by items of evidence – in other words, 
whether we can believe that the evidence result assertion of an item of evidence is a true 
proposition. We argue that trustworthiness is based on both the external grounds and the 
internal grounds of an item of evidence.   
The external grounds for trustworthiness (of safety assessment evidence) lies in the quality of 
process elements associated with the generation of an item of evidence, such as the 
qualification of modelling tools, the competency and knowledge of personnel, and the 
capability of an analysis technique. The quality of the process elements of a safety 
assessment activity may influence the overall number of systematic and random flaws 
contained in the outputs of a modelling process (e.g. a tool may introduce a computational 
error; a technique may exclude consideration of a specific failure mechanism; inexperienced 
modeller may introduce more wrong input data) . The trustworthiness of an item of evidence 
originated from the external grounds will imply our belief in that the overall number of 
potential flaws within the source data of an item of evidence is low. 
The internal grounds of trustworthiness (of safety assessment evidence) lies in the rigour of 
scrutiny of the construction and substance elements of the source data of evidence, rather 
than reviews of the process elements contained in the source data of evidence. If the source 
data of evidence has been rigorously examined for potential representation and understanding 
flaws against our knowable truth in the real world and the result is positive (which means 
that only a few flaws identified within the declared boundary of a model), we may claim that 
the item of evidence is trustworthy. The internal grounds are distinct from the external 
grounds. Trustworthiness based on the internal grounds will imply our certainty in the 
absence or scarcity of errors or flaws of concrete types that have been checked in reviews. 
Trustworthiness based on the internal grounds is and must be claimed within the declared 
boundary of model instances. ‘Bugs’ identified in the review of the source data of evidence 
may damage trustworthiness completely; whereas weak external grounds can only undermine 
trustworthiness to some degree. In addition, the internal grounds for the trustworthiness of 
evidence also require further trustworthiness regarding the scrutiny activity and the scrutiny 
results regarding an item of evidence. 
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Appropriateness is a property associated with the links between different argument elements. 
As a property of these links, appropriateness covers a varied set of concerns, depending on 
the (sub)type of argument links. For an AssertedEvidence link between an item of evidence 
and a domain claim, appropriateness depicts the suitability (relevance and support) of an item 
of evidence to uphold the declared relationship with a specific argument element. 
Appropriateness of asserted evidence links will render the acceptable true/false values of 
domain claims. When the safety argument is constructed at the early stages of a project, the 
appropriateness property of an AssertedEvidence link is not a prominent issue9, since we can 
always expect that there are one or more items of evidence which will provide sufficient 
support to the domain claims. We can present the links and the desired evidence items for 
them in the structured argument diagram. The desired evidence items, which are placeholders 
for future real instances, must be instantiated later when real items of evidence are completed 
and released formally. When we instantiate a citation of a desired evidence with a real 
instance of evidence, the appropriateness of the item of evidence must be carefully 
reconsidered.  
Sometimes, appropriateness, as a property of the links between argument elements, has been 
misunderstood as a property of the class or objects of EvidenceItem. We represent this 
property in EviM with a dashed-line rectangle, to indicate that this property does not belong 
to EvidenceItem and must be evaluated in context of three concrete objects (an item of 
evidence, a domain claim, and the relationship between them).  
There is no proportional relationship between the property of appropriateness and the 
property of trustworthiness. A trustworthy item of evidence may be inappropriate for 
supporting a specific claim; untrustworthy evidence should not be adopted even if it looks 
appropriate in the context of an argument structure. Even if an evidence result assertion 
supports a domain claim, the evidence-claim relationship may or may not be appropriate. If 
the declared validity boundary of an item of evidence (e.g. the scope, limitations or 
assumptions of safety assessment models required by CoreDMM) is sufficiently elicited and 
accepted for the usage instance of the item of evidence, the declared evidence-claim 
relationship may be appropriate.  
                                                          
9
 If there are COTS (Commercial-Off-The-Shelf) components or legacy parts adopted in the project, we may examine 
instantly the appropriateness of AssertedEvidence links in a safety case, which are associated with those components, 
if the items of evidence cited is available. 
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4.6 Relationship between Evidence and Confidence 
4.6.1 Confidence in Safety Cases 
The definition of confidence in Oxford Dictionaries is “the state of feeling certain about the 
truth of something” [2]. In safety domain, our confidence in safety may relate to the truth 
value of a claim, or the occurrence of an event, or the existence of a state. Confidence is not 
objective. It is dependent on what we know and how we think. However, even though 
confidence is a subjective issue, it is desirable and necessary to build it up systematically and 
to demonstrate it explicitly, rather than leave it unmanaged or take it for granted blindly.  
It is increasingly recognized that we need justified confidence in system safety demonstrated 
in a safety case. In order to understand the contribution of safety assessment evidence to the 
overall confidence in system safety, we will start with an investigation of various factors on 
which we can establish our confidence. Figure 31 depicts a framework of confidence in 
safety cases. It decomposes our view of confidence in safety cases into two parts: the 
confidence established on safety cases processes and the confidence established on the output 
of a specific safety case process.  
 
Figure 31 Framework of Confidence in Safety Cases 
The confidence that originates from processes can be divided into two types: confidence 
obtained from the rigour or capability of the prescribed generic process (e.g. whether a 
systematic argument construction process is employed in support of the argument 
development) and confidence obtained from the proper implementation or enactment of the 
prescribed process (e.g. whether the personnel implementing the argument construction are 
competent and experienced in the domain). Furthermore, confidence based on generic 
process capability involves two parts: the rigour or power of the argument construction 
process and the rigour or robustness of the evidence collection and evaluation process. 
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Biased selection of evidence or insufficient evaluation of evidential properties in the 
argumentation context will undermine our confidence in the safety case generated. In 
Chapter 6, we will introduce a more rigorous argument construction process to support the 
construction of compelling safety cases. From the process perspective, we can only have the 
confidence in the overall quality of a safety case, but appeal to general processes cannot 
guarantee or even justify the appropriateness of a specific part of an argument branch or the 
trustworthiness of a specific item of evidence.  
Confidence in a system safety case may also be established on the basis of argument 
structures and a body of evidence (the content of a safety case), which are the artefact 
generated from a safety case development process in a system lifecycle. Through the 
evaluation of the detailed content of a safety case, including the claims and relationships in 
arguments and the body of evidence individually and collectively, we can obtain more 
confidence in addition to the confidence established on safety cases. Justifying evidence is 
part of the evaluation of a safety case artefact.   
In practice, we suggest establishing confidence in safety cases from both the process 
perspective and the product perspective, because the two aspects are complementary, but not 
substitutes for each other. The evaluation based on the content should have more priority if 
the time and resources are permitted in the project lifecycle. 
Fundamentally, confidence in the safety argued by a safety case is grounded on the quality 
(or validity) of the safety case itself. DS 00-56 [148] recommends “validated safety cases”, 
which requires rigorous scrutiny of both safety argument and evidence. If we deem a primary 
safety argument and associated evidence to be the source on which our confidence in the 
system safety demonstrated relies, we need to consider confidence in the following three 
aspects in the confidence arguments: 
• Confidence in the strength of the primary safety argument structure 
• Confidence in the appropriateness of the use of the various items of evidence 
• Confidence in the trustworthiness of a body of supporting safety evidence 
Where we say the primary safety argument structure is strong, it means the set of links 
(asserted inferences, asserted contexts) between argument elements are acceptable and 
sufficient to render the higher level claim from lower level ones. The argument structure can 
be evaluated initially with the assumptions that the end or ground level domain claims are all 
True. The ‘true’ or ‘false’ values of ground domain claims are determined later, influenced 
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by the appropriateness of asserted evidence relationships in context of the specific argument. 
The trustworthiness of evidence depicts the extent to which we believe the information or 
propositions that are said by an item of evidence. The justification of safety assessment 
models as evidence in safety cases will be addressed in Chapter 6. 
4.6.2 Importance of Evidence towards the Establishment of 
Confidence  
We can learn from the confidence framework presented in Figure 31 that sufficient 
confidence in a safety case must be established on the basis of a body of adequate evidence. 
Our aim is to demonstrate in a safety case that the top level safety claim has been achieved. 
A sound and compelling safety case, ultimately, must have true premises with a high degree 
of confidence. The ‘truth’ value of the hierarchy of higher-level safety claims comes from the 
appropriateness of all asserted argument linking elements in a safety argument and the truth 
of the leaf-level domain safety claims. Importantly, the confidence in the true top-level 
domain safety claim is grounded on the support provided by the body of evidence connected 
through the primary safety argument. The origin of confidence in safety, therefore, finally 
settles down onto the trustworthiness of evidence items and the appropriateness of the usage 
of these evidence items. 
In addition, considering and citing the source data of evidence properly is a vital part of 
safety case construction. Knowing how to handle and consider the different roles (e.g. 
supporting evidence or context) that are played by various items of evidence is important in 
an argument construction process. Although we address only the positive role of evidence (as 
supporting evidence) in this chapter, we will describe how to consider the potential negative 
role of some items of evidence in Chapter 6. 
Safety cases can be viewed as a holistic model of system safety which synthesise many 
different forms of evidence, including safety assessment models. The desire to manage the 
issue of confidence in safety cases implies that we devote some resource to assuring the 
trustworthiness of evidence and the appropriateness of the usage of evidence and the task of 
incorporating counter evidence in safety cases. As a result, establishing confidence in safety 
assessment evidence is further studied from three aspects: the rigorous scrutiny of items of 
evidence, especially on cross-model inconsistency (in Chapter 5), the comprehensive 
exploration and consideration of counter evidence in safety case construction (in Chapter 6), 
and the structured justification of evidence items, in particular, qualitative safety assessment 
models (in Chapter 6). 
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4.7 Summary 
In this chapter, we have studied some relevant definitions and elaborated the concept of 
evidence in the context of safety cases. A conceptual model of evidence (EviM) is proposed 
for the purpose of explicit integration of the source data of evidence and safety argument. 
EviM highlights the propositional content of an item of evidence and the evidential 
properties associated with evidence in any argumentation context. The notion of the 
‘evidence assertion’, the interface element between argument and items of evidence, is 
described and illustrated with examples. EviM will help in explicitly considering the content, 
utilisation and evaluation of evidence and will facilitate more rigorous application and 
justification of safety evidence in safety cases. In addition, the confidence issue in safety 
cases is also discussed and the relationship of evidence with confidence is clarified and 
highlighted. In this chapter, evidence is primarily examined only from the perspective of its 
positive role in safety argument as supporting evidence. In Chapter 6, its potential role as 
counter evidence is discussed and considered in argument construction and argument 
patterns. 
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5 Managing Safety Model Inconsistency 
5.1 Introduction 
As explained in Section 2.6.2, evaluation of safety analysis is difficult and with insufficient 
practice. In this chapter, we focus on model consistency as a means of evaluating safety 
assessment models, a common type of safety evidence in safety cases. The issue of model 
inconsistency among safety assessment models is a pervasive problem throughout the 
development of modern complex systems. The consistency of models is easy to require but 
difficult to confirm. Safety standards normally require consistency in safety requirements and 
safety analysis, but with little further guidance of the notion and few recommended measures 
to examine consistency [194]. Most of the existing investigation of consistency among safety 
assessment models is performed informally through periodical reviews of safety assessment 
activities, which rely heavily on expert knowledge and experience10. In these reviews, the 
expected consistency relationships employed are usually implicit and the implementation 
process of consistency-checking is opaque. With this ‘black-box’ view of consistency 
between models, it is difficult to claim and to persuade others that the safety assessment 
models being used as evidence in safety cases are consistent. Moreover, the opaque view 
may hinder the accumulation and dissemination of the domain knowledge and experience on 
how to evaluate model inconsistency. 
In this chapter, we present a structured method to managing inconsistency across safety 
assessment models. The chapter starts with the clarification of the meaning and classification 
of model consistency in system safety. Then typical consistency relationships between safety 
assessment models are analyzed. To reduce the informality and implicitness of consistency 
analysis in practice, the method defines explicitly the information requirement and the 
detailed steps of inconsistency analysis that can bring more transparency and structure to the 
model comparison process. The justification and utilisation of the inconsistency analysis 
itself are also considered in the method.  
                                                          
10
  The current state of consistency analysis between safety assessment models was obtained through personal 
communication with safety experts during MISSA project meetings.  
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5.2 The Territory of Consistency  
5.2.1 Range of Meaning 
The usage of the term of consistency varies significantly according to its context. Regulatory 
bodies have acknowledged the problem of inconsistent safety analyses in standards (e.g. 
[148, 180, 181]). However, most of the standards pinpoint only some specific scenarios 
required for consistency. In DS 00-56 [148], the “consistency of assumptions about operating 
procedures of risk classification” is required and contractors must “maintain consistency 
between safety-related documentation and the system configuration”. In ARP 4761 [181], it 
is stated that the “wording of failure effects need to be checked for consistency”. Whereas 
ARP 4754A [180] requires “consistency between the requirement set”, “consistency between 
functional hazard assessment results”, “common naming conventions” for events in safety 
analysis, and “consistency of analysis methods in the verification of safety requirements”. In 
practice, the occurrences of the term ‘consistency’ are linked with diverse subjects such as 
recommended safety processes, guidance of analysis techniques, safety planning, system 
design, system safety requirements, or the overall safety analysis results. The meaning of 
consistency in safety can be: a) having completed suggested or planned activities; b) having 
followed required or recommended analytical steps and syntax rules; c) having shown 
compliance with safety objectives; 4) having confirmed that the analysis is based on the 
‘right’ design information; d) the logic and data in safety analysis are in agreement with each 
other. 
In the context of this thesis, we address the term of consistency only as model consistency (as 
the last type of consistency mentioned above). The subjects that are associated with model 
consistency are the logic and data at different abstraction levels in safety assessment models. 
Consistent models imply that the relationships between overlapping or similar elements of 
two safety assessment models are in agreement with some relationship that is prescribed to 
hold. The prescribed relationship can be either expected similarity or expected differences. It 
is difficult to ensure that two models or more are consistent. Sometimes, the level of 
consistency achieved is analyzed and demonstrated through the investigation of potential 
inconsistencies across models or subjects that should be consistent, e.g. requirement 
inconsistency management [153], UML model and meta-model inconsistency in Model-
Driven Development (MDD) [171, 191]. However, we understand that the diversity of the 
forms and data formats of safety analysis and the informality of many data items in safety 
assessment models (e.g. the textual description of failure events in a traditional fault tree) 
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make it impossible to implement highly-automated consistency analysis across safety 
assessment models, as what can be achieved in software engineering (e.g. [171]).   
In traditional logic, “two or more statements are called consistent if they are simultaneously 
true under some interpretation” [26]. This is the semantic meaning of consistency. In modern 
logic, the consistency of a set of statements means that “no formula ‘P & –P’ is derivable” 
from those statements by the rules of some logical calculus [26], which is the syntactic 
description. The semantic and syntactic definition of consistency underpins the investigation 
of inconsistency in different areas. Nuseibeh et al. [153] define an inconsistency as “any 
situation in which a set of descriptions does not obey some relationship that should hold 
between them. The relationship between descriptions can be expressed as a consistency rule 
against which the descriptions can be checked”. This view is close to our mission of 
examining inconsistency between safety assessment models. 
In light of Nuseibeh’s definition of software requirements inconsistency, inconsistency 
between safety assessment models is defined in this thesis as any situation in which two 
relevant descriptions in safety assessment models do not obey some relationship that is 
prescribed to hold between them. The description can be a modelled subject, a modelled 
attribute, or a modelled relationship at different abstraction levels. 
5.2.2 Typology of Safety Model Consistency 
In this section, a typology of safety model consistency is proposed in order to facilitate the 
understanding of consistency issue among safety assessment models. This typology provides 
an overview of the types of consistency to be considered in safety reviews. Our primary 
concern is whether the system safety characteristics represented by safety assessment models 
are consistent with the real world situation. Figure 32 illustrates the structure of the typology. 
 
Figure 32 Typology of Safety Model Consistency 
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Depending on the nature and subject with which a safety assessment model is consistent or 
inconsistent, the consistency of safety assessment models can be divided into three groups:  
• Factual consistency (C1) 
• Intra-model consistency (C2) 
• Cross-model consistency (C3) 
Figure 33 illustrates the nature of and the relationships between the three types of 
consistency problems (denoted by the wide lines with arrows). Each type of model 
consistency is further described in later sections.  
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Figure 33 Consistency of Safety Assessment Models 
As illustrated in Figure 33, the safety modelling methods that are used to deal with real world 
problems are presented as meta-models at the top level, e.g. the meta-model MMa. Different 
safety techniques may have different modelling constructs, but the generic concepts in safety 
assessment models may be represented by a unified core data meta-model, such as 
CoreDMM presented in Chapter 3. It can be used as a bridge to communicate some common 
safety assessment models based on different techniques. Thus in Figure 33, only one block is 
presented at the safety modelling constructs level. A meta-model generally provides a view 
of a generic problem in reality, however not directly associated with concrete problem 
entities or instances. The safety assessment model instances developed on the basis of a 
safety modelling technique are presented as model instances in the middle level. For 
example, the model instance Model-MMa-1 is a concrete instantiation of the meta-model 
MMa. The problems or subjects under study, which are the subjects being modelled, are 
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depicted in the bottom level. The model instances provide a view of a problem from a certain 
point of view, e.g. the model instance of Model-MMa-1is a view of the problem Px from the 
viewpoint VP
-a.1 If MMa represents the safety assessment CoreDMM, Model-MMa-1 could 
be a concrete fault tree for a braking system of a car design. In this case, Px can be the ‘safety 
of the braking system of a car design’. Model-MMa-2 could be an FMEA of the braking 
system. In Figure 33, C1 denotes the factual consistency; C2 denotes the intra-model 
consistency; and C3 denotes the cross-model consistency. 
In this thesis, our focus of study is not the consistency in relation to meta-models of safety 
analysis, which is sometimes named and classified as syntactical consistency and semantic 
consistency in software engineering literature [72, 191], but the consistency issues within the 
model instance level and between the instance level and the real world.  
5.2.3 Factual Consistency 
Factual consistency implies that there are no contradictions between the content of a safety 
assessment model and the logic or facts that exist in reality. It is represented in Figure 33 as 
C1. This is the central concern of model validity. Note that, asserting factual consistency of a 
model does not mean that there is no difference between the model and the real world 
problem domain, because abstraction and simplification during modelling are permitted and 
necessary to accommodate specific modelling purposes. In this thesis, the abstraction and 
simplification of models from reality that are accepted and undertaken by modellers are not 
treated as a factual inconsistency. Usually, factual consistency is difficult to observe and 
determine. We may not have sufficient understanding of both the model and the real problem 
represented by the model to confirm it. Field tests and operations, as the ideal way to check 
factual consistency, are usually not practical or are too costly and too late for the purposes of 
validating a model produced as part of a pre-operational safety case. 
In some particular cases, if there are relationships or facts that are apparently and intuitively 
true (some component conditions are mutually exclusive or some relationships are 
impossible in reality), we can examine factual consistency partially, regarding the accepted 
relationships and facts, either manually or with tool support against the model directly. For 
example, if a component is in a ‘failed’ state, then it cannot also be in a ‘working’ state at the 
same time. A vehicle cannot be ‘moving forward’ and ‘moving backward’ at the same time. 
Some other intuitive factual relationships are based on methods. For example, circular logic 
between failure events is not permitted in fault tree construction. The check of circular logic 
is provided as a function in the FaultTree+ software by Isograph [105]. These factual 
relationships are self-evident and intuitive to humans, but not obvious for machines unless 
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clearly defined. If human reviews have picked up such relationships in safety assessment 
models during review, the factual consistency of safety assessment models can be checked to 
some extent.  
Above all, human review of safety assessment models is the primary means of checking 
factual consistency in the models directly. Domain knowledge and experience about the 
modelling subject under study and the axiomatic logic and facts on which the analysis is 
based and compliant with are the grounds for expected consistency relationships of possible 
checking.  
Of course, the factual consistency of a safety assessment model could perhaps be recast as a 
problem of cross model consistency between safety assessment models and a domain model. 
However, this would breed another question as to the consistency of the domain model of the 
world. 
5.2.4 Intra-Model Consistency  
Intra-model consistency focuses on the consistency of information within one safety 
assessment model. It is represented in Figure 33 as C2. It is also sometimes referred to as 
self-consistency or internal consistency of a safety assessment model (e.g. internal semantic 
and syntactic consistency within fault tree models [135]). For example, within a FMEA 
worksheet, the same failure effect should be classified with the same severity level; within a 
specific fault tree, a repeated event should be depicted with the same name and identifier to 
avoid confusion. The examples imply that there are two major subtypes: 
• Internal referential consistency  
• Internal logical consistency.  
As is known to any modeller, “naming can be one of the most difficult parts of modelling” 
[81]. Internal referential consistency is associated with the usage of object names in a model. 
It captures the requirements on consistent relationships between three aspects of an element 
of a model instance. The name of an element of a model instance, the meaning from 
interpreting the representation of the element of a model instance, and the entity being 
represented by the element of a model instance should all be consistent with each other 
within a single model instance.  
Internal referential inconsistency can have two forms: One-Name-Multiple-Referents, 
Multiple-Names-One-Referent. One ‘name’ in a model instance should address one entity in 
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reality, but not other entities at the same time. For example, consider a model element named 
as ‘Braking System’, representing a braking system in the design schema. If there are cases 
that both ‘front braking system’ and ‘rear braking system’ are named as ‘Braking System’ in 
the model, we cannot interpret the name of the element in the model correctly with respect to 
the corresponding real world entities. If one entity in reality is represented in the model with 
two names, we may interpret the two names as two real entities so that the model is 
inconsistent with the real situation. For example, a motor failure is named as ‘Motor failed’ 
and ‘Motor failure’ as two different basic events in a fault tree, then the fault tree might 
produce optimistic results through misinterpreting one event as two different events. Internal 
referential consistency should be checked by human reviewers manually. Some tools can 
provide some assistance for the situation of One-Name-Multiple-Referents, by listing 
relevant information on the ‘same’ model element according to the element name. For 
example, RAM Commander [12] by ALD can list the events connected with a repeated event 
in a fault tree for reviews by users.  
From a case study of inconsistency between safety analyses results conducted in 2010 [194], 
it is observed that different wording and phrasing in safety analysis results is an important 
factor that hinders effective understanding during the consistency analysis of various safety 
analysis results. The referential inconsistency not only exists within one safety assessment 
model, but also exists between different models. 
Internal logical consistency concerns whether two logical causal relationships presented in a 
safety assessment model are in agreement with each other. If internal logical inconsistency is 
identified, we cannot necessarily conclude which model is wrong in terms of representing the 
‘real’ logic relations. But we can identify that at least one of the models under analysis is 
incorrectly defined due to the differences exhibited by these inconsistent logical situations. 
For example, in an aircraft FHA, if there are two failure conditions that have the same end 
effects at the aircraft level, then these two failure conditions should have been assigned with 
the same severity classification11. If that is not the case, the severity classification of one of 
the two failure conditions must be incorrect. If the internal logical consistency relations are 
clearly defined, tools can perform mechanical checks on a model if the naming problems had 
been sorted out.  
                                                          
11
 According to MISSA project partners, SARAA, a safety and reliability analysis database adopted by Airbus, can 
perform some of these checks, for the consistent usage of failure condition severity classification. 
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5.2.5 Cross-Model Consistency 
This type of consistency concerns the relationships that should hold among two or more 
safety assessment models or their elements. It is represented in Figure 33 as C3. Model 
instances may vary from each other in many different ways due to many factors. Three 
principle factors resulting differences between models are: Viewpoint differences, Knowledge 
differences, Representation differences. Prior to the examination of the differences of 
knowledge on the system in question, the viewpoint differences and the representation 
differences between safety assessment models must be resolved. 
Considering the domain context of safety assessment modelling that we introduced in 
Chapter 3, the differences between safety assessment models that are caused by inconsistent 
knowledge of a problem are of our particular interest during the evaluation of models. 
However, inconsistency across models caused by different knowledge or understanding is 
usually masked by and mixed with differences brought about by the viewpoint factor and the 
representation factor. Because of different viewpoints, the scope of model elements could be 
different, as can the abstraction level of model elements and the modelling constructs 
selected. These differences are allowable, but sometimes it may severely impede the 
identification of inconsistent understanding. In terms of representation, if safety assessment 
models were constructed based on different meta-models, or the model elements were named 
freely without prescribed naming conventions, the models would be different in ‘appearance’ 
naturally, even though humans can understand whether they are consistent in meaning. 
Despite the difficulties presented, however, the consistency between various models with 
respect to the content of the models (that represents our understanding of the problem 
domain) must be appropriately evaluated for the usage of models as an integral body of 
evidence in a safety case. 
The degree of cross-model consistency may be demonstrated through the examination of 
models in terms of their compliance with pre-defined relationships. The relationships that 
hold between model elements in two safety assessment models are termed ‘consistency 
relationships’ in this thesis. They should be derived from engineering practice and 
experience, elicited by human experts in a transparent form. In this regard, cross-model 
consistency is similar to factual consistency and intra-model consistency. The foundation of 
evaluating all three types of consistency is the domain knowledge of expected ‘consistency 
relationships’. Our understanding of the inconsistency between safety assessment models 
cannot exceed our knowledge of identified consistency relationships. 
 137 
 
Similar to intra-model consistency, cross-model consistency, if achieved, cannot assure the 
factual consistency of models against reality. However, if cross-model inconsistency 
situations are identified, the factual consistency of the models would be undermined unless 
adequate explanation of the causes of inconsistencies can be offered. 
From the discussion so far, we learn that model consistency is a complex issue. Human 
intervention must be part of the examination process, at least in support of the formulation of 
consistency relationships and the identification and resolving of naming inconsistencies. In 
practice, consistency is an open-ended issue that depends on the relationships we expect to 
hold for models. The common practice is to claim consistency according to the outcome of 
inconsistency analysis. There is little guidance on potential checking mechanisms and no 
explicit method for the inconsistency analysis of safety assessment models. Section 5.3 will 
describe some norms regarding consistency relationships summarised from engineering 
practice. Section 5.4 will describe our approach to address the wicked issue of cross-model 
consistency. 
5.3 Consistency Relationships 
5.3.1 Common Features 
The consistency relationships between models usually exist as tacit knowledge in the 
engineering processes. In practice, the consistency between safety assessment models is 
usually expressed and explained in natural language. The recognition of consistency 
relationships is an important foundation of identifying inconsistency between safety 
assessment models. Regarding the consistency issue that exists between two safety 
assessment models, there are some common features of the consistency relationships to be 
specified. 
• The subjects of the expected consistency relationships must be the same type of 
modelling concepts that are shared by the two model instances. The subjects of 
consistency relationships are the data elements in two safety assessment models that are 
to be examined for judgments on whether a defined relationship holds or not. For 
example, we can compare an object of failure condition with another object of failure 
condition; but we cannot compare an object of failure condition with an object of system 
element.  
• The subjects of the expected consistency relationships must be the elements of safety 
assessment models that depict our understanding or prediction of behaviour in the 
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problem domain being modelled, rather than the model elements depicting our 
knowledge or understanding about the models themselves or the modelling processes. 
For example, the assumptions or limitations of one model can differ from the 
assumptions or limitations of another model, but this is not a case of ‘inconsistency’ if all 
the assumptions and limitations are allowable statements needed for the modelling 
purpose of each model. Considering the safety assessment CoreDMM described in 
Chapter 3, the subjects of potential expected consistency relationships should be defined 
around the substance elements and the construction elements of the model instances of 
CoreDMM. 
• The expected consistency relationships may be either similarities between data elements 
of two safety assessment models, or differences between data elements of two safety 
assessment models. For example, an expected consistency relationship can be ‘Model A 
has less order-one MCSs than Model B does’. But some differences between models 
need not be viewed as inconsistency, e.g. ‘the FMEA worksheets from different analysis 
groups can be of different data columns’. 
• The expected consistency relationships can be very diverse. They may relate to the 
coverage or occurrence of a certain type of model elements, or the existence of a 
specified relation between two model elements. The complexity of consistency 
relationships can be different. Some can be examined directly; some need extra 
information to supplement the data directly available in the models; some need pre-
processing of model data to enable comparison. Some consistency relationships are only 
expected to be true under certain pre-conditions. 
The violation of the desired consistency relationships may be dischargeable. The consistency 
relationships are ideal relations that are potentially true according to the knowledge of the 
problem domain and the models. For example, we may naively expect that the failure effects 
of identical redundant pumps will be the same in a given safety assessment model. However, 
there may be good reasons as to why they are not. Even though it is claimed that they are 
desired relationships, some cases of the violation of the relationships are permitted or can be 
discharged if reasonable explanation of the cases of inconsistency can be supplied. The 
interpretation and justification of identified violation cases of the desired relationships should 
be conducted in later stages of inconsistency analysis. 
Violations of expected consistency relationships may indicate that models are inconsistent in 
terms of a desired relation between two comparable models. However, if there is no violation 
of a set of predefined consistency relationships, we cannot claim that model consistency has 
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been fully achieved. Because the predefined set of expected consistency relationships may be 
incomplete or insufficient, we can only evaluate and claim the level of consistency between 
models within the scope of identified consistency relationships after analysis.  
5.3.2 Types of Consistency Relationships  
Through discussion with safety experts in the MISSA project, we find that consistency 
relationships between models in engineering practice can be characterised into four groups 
(adapted from [194]).  
• Identity-Based Consistency Relationships: most of the relationships that we claimed 
would hold between safety analyses are of this type. It means that the observation and 
description for one thing from a same viewpoint should not have gaps and contradictions. 
For example, the failure modes of a valve in one safety analysis should be consistent with 
the failure modes of the same valve presented in another safety analysis. 
• Analogy-Based Consistency Relationships: some of the consistency relationships are 
based on the similarities between the two subjects or relationships. It is common 
engineering practice to evaluate analysis according to experience and knowledge of a 
similar counterpart. For example, similar components in a system may have similar 
safety features presented in safety analysis; new systems may bear some similar features 
of a similar historical system. This consistency relationship is less strict in terms of 
compliance due to that the differences of the similar parts may discharge some of the 
inconsistencies identified. 
• Correlation-Based Consistency Relationships: some of the practical consistency 
checking is based on the heuristics of some correlations between analysis data elements 
by analysts or reviewers. The inconsistencies found against this type of consistency 
relationships must be further examined or it would be hard to determine whether the 
inconsistencies indicate inadequate or flawed safety analysis. For example, we may 
define a consistency relationship that ‘with detailed design information and concrete 
safety requirements, the system safety should be at least as good as we analyzed at the 
earlier stage’ or ‘the severity of a failure condition is proportional to the speed of a 
system or the redundancy configuration of the system’. In [133], a study of inconsistency 
between incremental safety analysis is performed according to this type of consistency 
relationships. 
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• Agreement-Based Consistency Relationships: there are requirements and assumptions 
in one safety analysis, which address the information to be provided or confirmed by 
another piece of safety analysis. For example, if there is an assumption associated with a 
fault tree FTx concerning the independence between Component X1 and Component X2, 
this assumption could be discharged (or challenged) by a related common mode analysis 
(CMA). The actual commitment of the agreement should be checked before both of the 
analysis results are signed off.  
During safety reviews, the consistency relationships being checked are important because 
they are the grounds for the search for inconsistencies and they should be considered when 
the associated inconsistencies are evaluated and treated. Some of them are domain-specific, 
context-specific, or instance-specific. We may heavily rely on human expertise to implement 
the checking of the defined consistency relationships for models. 
5.3.3 Consistency Related to Conditions  
Consistency relationships related to conditions have been adopted to assist the review of 
safety analysis in practice. An example of inconsistency FMEA and FTA is reported in [57]. 
Far from the ideal situation, some failure modes identified in an FMEA that contributed to 
the undesired top event in a fault tree were not shown in the fault tree; whereas, some 
component failures that would contribute to a high-level undesired event in the fault tree 
were not identified in the FMEA result of the corresponding system. The findings directly 
reveal the incompleteness of the FTA and the FMEA performed. This kind of cross-check 
between the conditions addressed by FTA and FMEA has also been recommended in the 
NASA Fault Tree Handbook [150].  
From engineering practice, we found that three prominent concerns about the validity of 
most qualitative safety assessment results are the completeness of the conditions identified, 
the correct identification of causes and effects of conditions and the correct classification of 
conditions in terms of their severity. Correspondingly, there are three types of consistency 
relationships related to the ‘conditions’ of a system under safety analysis. 
The first type of consistency relationship related to conditions in safety assessment models is 
about the completeness of the identified of conditions in models. For example, a basic event 
in a fault tree should be visible within an FMEA at a corresponding abstraction level. A 
failure mode of a component in one FMEA should be addressed in another FMEA if 
comparable FMEA analyses are available.  
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The second type of consistency relationship related to conditions in safety assessment models 
concerns missing or flawed logical relationships between conditions. For example, a failure 
mode in an FMEA that led to a catastrophic failure of a system is not addressed by the fault 
tree of that same catastrophic failure of the system. 
The third type of consistency relationship related to conditions in safety assessment models is 
about the consistent classification of conditions in terms of their severity or occurrence 
frequency. One condition addressed by two models should be classified with the same 
severity or occurrence level according to a common classification scheme. This is usually 
related to the risk analysis part of safety assessment models.  
It sounds simple to examine consistency related to conditions. But it is not so simple due to 
the following two reasons: a) the level of detail involved in different causal analyses may 
differ, preventing a straightforward comparison of conditions in two models; b) the 
conditions considered in different causal or consequence analyses may have varied focuses. 
For example, one model may focus only on electromagnetic effects, whereas another focuses 
on hydraulic failures. Equally, one model may focus exclusively on the cause of a single ‘top 
event’, whereas another may be addressing multiple outcomes. The abstraction level of 
conditions and the scope of conditions should be considered during the identification and 
diagnosis of inconsistency between conditions in two models. 
5.3.4 Consistency Related to MCSs  
MCSs are the minimal combinations of basic events that can cause the top event of a fault 
tree. It is an important type of analysis result originated from qualitative FTA. It is widely 
accepted that lots of information can be implied by the set of MCSs contributing to an 
undesired event [137, 150, 200], such as whether there are unexpected single-point failures 
or whether the design intent of failure control has been fulfilled [137]. The MCSs are the 
essential relationships between logical combinations of conditions and the top level event. 
Two fault trees with the same set of MCSs are in fact same in nature even if the tree 
structures of the two fault trees are presented differently (e.g. have different intermediate 
events or different logical relationships). Therefore, for two fault trees with the similar level 
of detail, comparing the set of MCSs is a reasonable way to determine whether two fault 
trees are consistent in their causal logical structures. The MCSs can be viewed as a converted 
form of causal structural relationships in fault trees that is obtained from the more 
complicated hierarchical causal relationships in the graphical tree.  
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In recent years, formal methods have been employed within system safety analysis (as 
reviewed in Section 2.4.2). However the validation of these formal safety assessment models 
is still in its infancy (refer to Section 2.6.2 for more details). Some attempts have been set on 
comparing modelling outputs from two safety assessment models based on formal languages, 
such as [133]. However, as explained in Section 2.4.3, these models are constructed on the 
basis of results of hazard identification or FMEA. In nature, they are bottom-up consequence 
analysis with analysis results provided in the format of MCSs. A cross check of these models 
with other top-down safety analysis results may disclose some hidden inconsistency between 
models as with the comparison of an FMEA and a fault tree. In this regard, MCSs, as a 
shared form of modelling substance results, can play an important role in the examination of 
the consistency of a fault tree and a safety assessment model based on a formal language. 
Consistency relationships related to MCSs are a more complicated form of the second type of 
the consistency relationships related to conditions. They are more difficult and complex to 
define and examine, because the conditions addressed by two safety assessment models must 
have some overlapping and the correspondences between conditions of two safety 
assessment models must be specified beforehand in order to enable the comparison of MCSs. 
Consider a case of consistency relationships between two fault trees. Because FTA is very 
flexible, the definition of the top event could help to scope the conditions included in the 
analysis, we need to confirm the relationships between top events in two trees carefully to 
decide whether or not the MCSs of the two trees need to be consistent. Even if the undesired 
top event was the same in models, if the components of MCSs of the two trees were not be at 
the same level of detail, we need to sort out the corresponding relationships between 
conditions in two models before the consistency relationships between MCSs can be 
analyzed. 
Despite these difficulties, it is still possible to examine cross-model consistency on the basis 
of MCSs, which may reveal inconsistent causal relations between conditions that cannot be 
observed by comparing other modelling elements. 
5.4 Cross-Model Inconsistency Analysis 
In this section, an overview and illustration is provided of a cross-model inconsistency 
analysis method for safety assessment models. The cross-model inconsistency analysis is 
walked through with two exemplar safety assessment models of a simple hypothetical 
system. A case study of the inconsistency analysis method is presented in Appendix C.4 for 
evaluation. 
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5.4.1 Method Overview 
The method utilises the ‘mismatch’ mechanism of human mind in logical thinking [61]. As 
humans, when we come across scenarios that are contradictory or inconsistent with our 
patterns of expectation, we will feel uncomfortable. De Bono states that this mechanism is 
important for preventing us from making mistakes [62]. From a different perspective, we 
take advantage of this mechanism to serve for the purpose of identification of inconsistencies 
that may undermine our confidence in safety assessment models.  
Comparison is the core activity involved in the cross-model inconsistency analysis method. 
As an activity of putting things together and observing differences and similarities between 
individuals, comparison is the heart of many mental processes, but usually an implicit and 
spontaneous step. In the software engineering domain, comparison has been adopted to test 
model transformation and model composition [125] and to support inconsistency 
management [187]. For the consistency issue between safety assessment models, we also 
need to capture and transfer the implicit mental comparison process conducted by human 
experts in engineering reviews into explicit steps with a clear description of mechanisms and 
outputs.  
The cross-model inconsistency analysis method consists of six concrete phases:  
Phase 1: Selecting models to be compared. 
Phase 2: Elaborating consistency relationships that are required to hold.  
Phase 3: Implementing model comparison. 
Phase 4: Interpreting comparison results. 
Phase 5: Evaluating the inconsistency analysis.  
Phase 6: Citing and justifying inconsistency analysis results. 
A collection of safety assessment models, which is referenced as a set of evidence items in a 
safety case, can be examined through this inconsistency analysis process, which is beneficial 
to build up confidence in the trustworthiness of evidence items. Figure 34 presents a model 
of information elements contained in the inconsistency analysis process. The information 
model is depicted in UML as a model at the M1 level in the OMG meta-modelling structure.  
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Figure 34 Information Model of Inconsistency Analysis 
InconsistencyAnalysis is the container class that packages up all data elements in an 
inconsistency analysis. ScopeDescription and ModelReference are classes that are used for 
capturing the output data from Phase 1 of the analysis. ScopeDescription describes the scope 
of model elements that are addressed in an inconsistency analysis; ModelReference 
documents the references to the artefacts of the models under inconsistency analysis (e.g. 
references to SafetyAssessmentArtefact in CoreDMM presented in Chapter 3). 
ConsistencyRelationDescription documents the defined consistency relationships to be 
examined in the inconsistency analysis. CorrespondingPair contains the relationships 
between elements of two models under analysis, either defined by a user (composed of 
UserDefinedCorrespondanceModel) or derived through an algorithm (composed of 
DerivedCorrespondanceModel) according to a defined consistency relationship. Through 
observation on the CorrespondingPairs, the model element pairs that violate the defined 
consistency relationship can be identified and recorded as ViolationSituation. Users may 
provide ‘Explanation’ for ViolationSituations. The ViolationSituations without proper 
reasons are presented as the substantial inconsistency analysis results –
IdentifiedInconsistency.  
The relationships between the analysis phases and the output information are depicted in 
Figure 35. The flowchart on the left side illustrates the analysis method; the grey boxes 
illustrate the information elements obtained when the corresponding analysis phase finishes. 
The data in the top four grey boxes have corresponding parts in the information model in 
Figure 34. The two grey information boxes near the bottom are presented with dashed lines. 
Those two pieces of information are generated in the analysis process, but the documentation 
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of the evaluation of the inconsistency analysis and the documentation of confidence 
arguments that use the inconsistency analysis results, are not included in the information 
model (as Figure 34 presented) of the inconsistency analysis. (Instead, we describe how the 
evaluation results and justification can be presented within the context of a safety case in 
Chapter 6.) 
 
Figure 35 Six Phases of Cross-Model Inconsistency Analysis 
Section 5.4.3 ~ Section 5.4.8 expand on the details of each phase of the inconsistency 
analysis and explain how the information elements in Figure 34 are obtained during the 
analysis. Section 5.4.2 introduces the exemplar models that are used as example subjects 
under inconsistency analysis that are employed for illustrating the analysis phases in Section 
5.4.3 ~ Section 5.4.8. 
5.4.2 Exemplar Models for a Running Example 
This section presents the description of two simple models of a hypothetical system that are 
adopted for the in-line illustration of the inconsistency analysis phases. The hypothetical 
system Sx consists of three components, ha, hb, and hc. The hypothetical system functions by 
passing an input flow through the three components and provides an output flow. Figure 36 
describes the hypothetical system structure.  
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Figure 36 A Hypothetical System Sx 
Assume that there is always a correct input to the system. We have constructed two models 
to understand the causes that may lead to the failure of the system – “no output flow 
provided”. 
The first model is a fault tree (labelled as ‘Tree1’ in the consistency analysis process). The 
manually constructed tree structure and the summary of events and MCS results of ‘Tree1’ 
are depicted in Figure 37. Conventionally, the labels of events in ‘Tree1’ in Figure 37 do not 
need to include the identification of the label ‘Tree1’ as a prefix. But, during the cross-model 
inconsistency analysis, the events presented in ‘Tree1’ are labelled as ‘Tree1.E1’, 
‘Tree1.E2’, ‘Tree1.E3’, ‘Tree1.E4’ and ‘Tree1.E5’ respectively for easy identification of the 
model that they belong to. 
  
Figure 37 A Fault Tree Model of Sx 
The second model is a failure logic model constructed with AltaRica in OCAS Cecilia 
(Section 2.4.2 and Section 3.4.2 have addressed a brief review of models and analysis 
associated with AltaRica). The graphical view of the model and the MCS outputs generated 
from OCAS Cecilia are presented in Figure 38.  
Tree1: 
Basic events: Tree1.E3, Tree1.E4, 
Tree1.E5 
Intermediate events: Tree1.E2 
Top event: Tree1.E1 
MCSs: { { Tree1.E3},{Tree1.E4, 
Tree1.E5} } 
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Figure 38 OCAS AltaRica Model and MCS Outputs 
The ‘comA’, ‘comB’ and ‘comC’ in Figure 38 are the AltaRica nodes that model the 
components, ha, hb, and hc in Sx respectively.  The input and the output of Sx are modelled by 
another two nodes, ‘sysSinput’ and ‘sysSoutput’ in Figure 38. Each of the five nodes in the 
OCAS model is defined in AltaRica, which are codes in the similar shape as the node 
example in Figure 18. The screenshot of the definition of the AltaRica node ‘comA’ in 
OCAS is shown in Figure 39. During the inconsistency analysis, we will not use the source 
AltaRica codes of the model, so other source codes of the model are not presented in this 
section. Instead, we use the MCS outputs generated in the AltaRica modelling environment 
during the inconsistency analysis. To provide an easy understanding of the MCS modelling 
results of the AltaRica model (presented in the lower section of Figure 38), an equivalent 
fault tree (labelled as ‘Tree3’) of the results of MCS analysis of the AltaRica model, in the 
conventional fault tree view, is formulated, as shown in Figure 40. 
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Figure 39 AltaRica Definition of Node ‘comA’ in OCAS 
  
Figure 40 Equivalent Fault Tree of OCAS MCS Outputs  
In Figure 40, the failure events modelled in the AltaRica model are relabelled in the same 
style of events in ‘Tree1’. For example, a failure event ‘comC.cFM1’ of the node ‘comC’ is 
labelled as ‘Tree3.E2’. 
Tree3: 
Basic events: Tree3.E2, 
Tree3.E3, Tree3.E4, Tree3.E5 
Top event: Tree3.E1 
MCSs: { {Tree3.E2}, 
{Tree3.E3, Tree3.E4}, 
{Tree3.E4, Tree3.E5} } 
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5.4.3 Phase 1: Selecting Models 
The starting point of the comparison process is to have two model instances identified as the 
subjects of the inconsistency analysis. The model instances may be selected from the outputs 
of planned safety assessment activities, or historical analyses, or specially-designed parallel 
analysis, but should not be selected randomly. The models under comparison should have 
inherent relationships between information elements of the two model instances, such as 
similar subjects being modelled, similar purposes, similar modelling scopes, or similar types 
of modelling results. Two safety assessment model instances with no aspects in common are 
not proper subjects for concern about consistency.  
The model-selection decision process is presented in Figure 41. At the beginning of this 
phase, we need to determine the model (Ma) whose validity is of concern first. Once Ma is 
chosen, we can select another model (Mb) from the models generated in the same system 
development and operation process or the models of similar systems. We should know the 
modelling method that is adopted by each model (we may obtain it from the ‘Method’ data 
element of CoreDMM presented in Chapter 3); we should also know the domain subject and 
concerns of the models (we may obtain them from the SubjectofStudy data element and the 
Scope data element of CoreDMM). There are three decision points to help us to exclude 
irrelevant models that are not suitable for the comparison-based inconsistency analysis. At 
the end of this phase, two models (Ma and Mb) that are potentially suitable for comparison 
should be chosen for the next phase of the inconsistency analysis. The essential requirements 
of comparable models are that Ma and Mb have common system elements or substance 
elements or construction elements. However, if the essential requirements are satisfied, the 
two models selected in this phase still may quit the inconsistency analysis if no proper 
consistency relationships are identified in the next analysis phase.   
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Figure 41 Phase One Flowchart 
The selection of the two comparable models, Ma and Mb, can be recorded using the 
ModelReference shown in Figure 34. Furthermore, the scope of the model elements (from Ma 
and Mb) to be addressed in the inconsistency analysis can be recorded using the 
ScopeDescription shown in Figure 34, if the inconsistency analysis only addresses some 
parts of Ma and Mb. The correspondences between model elements defined and derived in 
model comparison in Phase 3 are within the boundary of ScopeDescription. 
Running Example of Phase 1: 
Consider the safety analyses of the hypothetical system Sx (as presented in Section 5.4.2). We 
select the AltaRica model as Ma and the fault tree model as Mb. The information collected at 
the end of Phase one is depicted in Table 7. 
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ModelReference Ma: an AltaRica model of Sx, with an equivalent fault tree - Tree3 
Mb: a fault tree of Sx - Tree1 
ScopeDescription The overlapping system elements include: Sx, ha, hb and hc. 
The overlapping concern is ‘Sx fails to provide the output flow’ 
The shared type of substance results is: a set of MCSs. 
The common construction elements include: the condition of ha, the 
condition of hb, the condition of hc, the condition of Sx. A condition 
means a ‘failure’ shown in the MCSs in Ma and means a ‘basic event’ 
in Mb. 
Table 7 Phase One Output in the Running Example 
5.4.4 Phase 2: Elaborating Consistency Relationships  
Once we have selected the two models for examination, we need to clarify the consistency 
relationships that are desired between two models instances and the set of elements in the 
two models that should exhibit these relationships. This step requires human experts, on the 
basis of their understanding of the features of model instances and the relationships between 
model instances, to elicit the concrete consistency goals that they may adopt during an 
informal review of the model instances. Figure 42 shows the process of Phase 2. The elicited 
consistency relationships between Ma and Mb can be recorded using the 
ConsistencyRelationDescription shown in Figure 34. 
Are there 
any expected consistency 
relationships between Ma 
and Mb?
no
yes
Describe consistency 
relationships
STOP
Inconsistency 
Analysis
START Phase 2
STOP Phase 2
 START Phase 3
Record consistency 
relationships
 
Figure 42 Phase Two Flowchart 
The statements on the relationships that are to hold between two comparable safety 
assessment models are also called as consistency checking rules [69, 153]. The domain 
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experts who nominate the desired relationships should have knowledge and experience of 
safety and/or the system under study. The consistency relationships suggested by different 
experts should be reviewed for their reasonableness and accepted by safety analysts. The 
consistency relationships can be dictated either at the level of elements of model instances, or 
at the level of elements of meta-models. For example, if two fault trees for a catastrophic 
aircraft failure condition are being selected for inconsistency analysis, a human expert may 
want to examine whether the two trees are consistent in terms of the coverage of contributing 
conditions to the undesired top-level failure condition. If one failure event is presented in one 
tree, but not in the other, the analyst may claim that an inconsistency was identified. This 
phase can only be performed by a human. Some common types of consistency relationships 
are explained in Section 5.3.  
Two comparable models can have a number of associated consistency relationships. 
Considering the typical subtypes of the substance results in CoreDMM (presented in Chapter 
3), we may have the following expected consistency relationships for two safety assessment 
models (shown in Table 8). They are not meant to be an exhaustive list, but as examples for 
potential relationships.  
Examples of Consistency Relationships (ExCRs) 
Consistency Relationship Motivation 
ExCR1: The cardinality of the smallest 
cutset in the MCS of Ma is the same as 
the cardinality of the smallest cutset in 
the MCS of Mb. 
The concern here is whether the two models 
indicate a differing level of failure redundancy in 
the failures required for a top event. 
ExCR2: Each condition in Ma has a 
corresponding condition in Mb that 
represents the same condition in reality. 
The concern is the relative completeness of the 
conditions included in one model to those included 
in another. 
ExCR3: Each MCS in Ma has a 
corresponding MCS in Mb that 
contributes to the same undesired top 
event. 
Unlike the first example (ExCR1), which only 
considered the degree of redundancy, the concern 
here is whether the similar logical combination of 
conditions can be found in both models. 
Table 8 Examples of Consistency Relationships 
The exemplar consistency relationships are all associated with ‘condition’s, which are the 
core elements that are expressed by almost every kind of qualitative safety assessment 
models. 
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Running Example of Phase 2: 
Based on the knowledge of the two models presented in Section 5.4.2, we decide to examine 
the two consistency relationships in this running example - ExCR2 and ExCR3 in Table 8.  
A concrete definition of the consistency relationships between the selected Ma and Mb is 
presented below.  
Let Ca be a set of ‘failures’ shown in the MCSs in Ma within inconsistency analysis scope; in 
our case, Ca ={ Tree3.E2, Tree3.E3, Tree3.E4, Tree3.E5}. 
Let Cb be a set of ‘basic events’ in Mb within inconsistency analysis scope; in our case, Cb = 
{ Tree1.E3, Tree1.E4, Tree1.E5}. 
Let MCSa be a set of minimal cut sets in Ma within inconsistency analysis scope; in our case, 
MCSa = { { Tree3.E2},{ Tree3.E3, Tree3.E4},{ Tree3.E4, Tree3.E5} }. 
Let MCSb be a set of minimal cut sets in Mb within inconsistency analysis scope; in our case, 
MCSb = { { Tree1.E3},{ Tree1.E4, Tree1.E5} }. 
Let Rtype(x,y) be a correspondence relation between two model elements of a same type, from 
Ma and Mb respectively, depicting that they can be used for the representation of a same 
problem domain object. For example, Rcon(condition1, condition1’) means condition1 in Ma 
can be viewed as synonymous of condition1’ in Mb. For x∈ Ca and y∈ Cb, Rcon(x,y)⊂ Ca × Cb 
is defined by users according to their understanding of the two models, depicting the 
correspondence relation between conditions in Ma and Mb; for x∈ MCSa and y∈ MCSb, 
Rmcs(x,y) ⊂ MCSa × MCSb is defined by users or inferred according to Rcon(x,y), depicting 
correspondence relations between MCSs in Ma and Mb.  
Table 9 presents the final definition of the consistency relationships provided in Table 8. The 
definition of ExCR1 is presented for a complete illustration of Table 8, but it is not examined 
in the running example of inconsistency analysis. Only ExCR2 and ExCR3 are examined in 
the running example. 
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Table 9 Elicited Consistency Relationships of the Running Example 
A set of conditions defined above (e.g. Ca , Cb ) corresponds to an instance of HazardSet in 
CoreDMM; a member of a set of conditions (e.g. Tree3.E2, Tree1.E3) corresponds to an 
instance of condition in CoreDMM; a set of MCSs defined above (e.g. MCSa ,  MCSb ) 
corresponds to an instance of MCSSet in CoreDMM; a MCS member of a set of MCSs (e.g. 
{Tree3.E2}, {Tree1.E4, Tree1.E5}) corresponds to an instance of MCS in CoreDMM. 
5.4.5 Phase 3: Implementing Model Comparison 
If the aspects of two model instances to be examined for inconsistency are clearly defined, 
the comparison can be implemented by human experts directly or with some machine support 
in terms of data retrieval. Some of the comparison activities are simple and easy to 
implement. For example, if the failure rate of a specific failure mode in one model instance is 
expected to be higher than the failure rate of a failure mode in another model instance, it is 
easy to establish whether the expected relationship is true or false. However, some 
comparison tasks are more complicated. For example, if we want to compare whether the 
minimal cut sets of an undesired event in a fault tree and the minimal cut sets for the same 
undesired event generated in another model with formal language constructs are consistent, 
the implementation will involve multiple steps, considering the number of minimal cut sets 
and the varied data formats in the two model instances. The complexity of implementation is 
related to the nature of the consistency relationships and the data elements to be compared.  
As we have discussed in Section 5.2.4, naming is a common problem we encounter while 
evaluating models at the instance level. A common naming convention in the construction of 
fault trees is recommended to reduce the inconsistency in fault trees and ease understanding 
of the referent being addressed [137, 150, 207]. However, it is almost impossible to force and 
ensure a same name is always used for the same thing in two different safety models in 
reality. A challenge of cross-model inconsistency analysis at the implementation stage is to 
ExCR1:  ( ∀mcsx∈ MCSa, ∃mcsax∈ MCSa | # mcsax ≤ # mcsx ) and (∀mcsy∈ 
MCSb, ∃mcsby∈ MCSb | # mcsby ≤ # mcsy ) and (# mcsax =# mcsby) 
ExCR2:  ( ∀x∈ Ca, ∃y∈ Cb | Rcon(x,y) ) and ( ∀y∈ Cb, ∃x∈ Ca | Rcon(x,y) )  
ExCR3:  ( ∀x∈ MCSa, ∃y∈ MCSb | Rmcs(x,y) ) or ( ∀y∈ MCSb, ∃x∈ MCSa | 
Rmcs(x,y)), given Rcon(x,y) ⊂ Ca × Cb 
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resolve the different expressions or names of the same instance or object in the real world, 
either the name of a condition or the name of a system element. 
To work around the naming problems, users are required to specify correspondences 
between the same types of model elements being compared in order to enable further 
examination of the compliance or violation of the consistency relationships expected. This is 
very different from most consistency studies in the MDE domain, in which a unified naming 
convention is often adopted and the name-referent consistency between models is assumed. 
At the implementation phase of model inconsistency analysis, the correspondence between 
elements of models under comparison is an important concept. In ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010 [10], 
a correspondence is a relation between Architecture Description elements and can be used to 
express consistency, traceability, composition, etc. Similarly, a correspondence in 
inconsistency analysis defines a relation between elements of two safety assessment models, 
which is defined by users or derived on the basis of relationships between different types of 
model elements according to expected consistency relationships. The type of 
correspondences needed is governed by the consistency relationships elaborated in Phase 2. 
During the process of defining correspondences between two models, the user may identify 
model elements without proper correspondences. This may indicate violations of certain 
consistency relationships. For example, an identity-based consistency relationship -‘the 
failure modes of Element Xa in Ma should be of the same number and type as the failure 
modes of the corresponding element Xb in Mb’ – is violated if we cannot find corresponding 
failure modes for Xa in Ma from the list of failure modes of Xb in Mb. The derived 
correspondences are the correspondences inferred on the basis of user-defined ones, e.g. 
correspondences between MCSs inferred according to the correspondences between 
conditions set by users. After that, the user can examine the reasonableness of derived 
correspondences. The user may observe some derived correspondences that are against the 
content of expected consistency relationships. These derived correspondences will be 
identified as violation situations, which are treated as identified inconsistencies if no 
reasonable explanation is provided.  
Tool support at the implementation phase of model comparison can be helpful for increasing 
the analysis efficiency, especially when the models under comparison are in large scale. The 
machine support can be desired for the following two tasks: the correspondence definition 
and the violation identification. But it can be difficult to design a common automated tool for 
all potential model comparison due to the variety of model data formats and desired 
consistency relationships.  
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Figure 43 shows the details of key implementation steps of Phase 3.  
 
Figure 43 Phase Three Flowchart 
The correspondence relationships between the overlapping elements in Ma and Mb, which are 
a set of CorrespondancePair in Figure 34, form the UserDefinedCorrespondanceModel and 
DerivedCorrespondanceModel in Figure 34. In addition, the situations that expected 
consistency relationships are violated can be recorded using the ViolationSituation shown in 
Figure 34. 
Running Example of Phase 3: 
This part of the running example illustrates how the examination of consistency relationships 
is performed. We present the results of user-defined and derived correspondences between 
model elements of Ma and Mb and the pseudo-codes of two algorithms that support violation 
identification for ExCR2 and ExCR3. 
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The first step of this phase is skipped in this running example. If needed, the CoreDMM 
presented in Chapter 3 can be adopted as the common language construct to resolve the 
differences between the modelling constructs of Ma and Mb. As described in the ‘scope 
description’ in Phase 1, a condition, in CoreDMM terms, means a ‘failure’ shown in the 
MCSs in Ma and means a ‘basic event’ in Mb. Some construction elements, such as the ‘flow’ 
or ‘state’ of a node in AltaRica model do not have corresponding concepts that can be 
mapped into CoreDMM and we do not use them during this inconsistency analysis.  
Specific consistency relationships that are associated with only one specific model 
construction element in each model under comparison may be examined directly, e.g. 
‘Failure event Tree3.E3 has a unique corresponding part in Tree1’. Other consistency 
relationships may require user definition of correspondence between model elements for 
identifying violations of the consistency relationships. In this example, ExCR2 requires 
setting correspondences between ‘condition’s of Ma and Mb; ExCR3 requires deriving 
correspondence between ‘MCS’s of Ma and Mb on the basis of correspondences between 
‘condition’s. With the defined or derived correspondences, we examine the violation of 
ExCR2 and ExCR3 manually or with tool support.  
The correspondence pairs we set between conditions of Ma and Mb for ExCR2 are depicted in 
Table 10. It is apparent from the table that each ‘condition’ in Ma has a corresponding 
‘condition’ in Mb. We can conclude that no violation of ExCR2 between Ma and Mb is found 
through the examination of the defined correspondences in Table 10.  
Defined Correspondences between ‘Condition’s of Ma and Mb 
Rcon(x,y),  x∈ Ca, y∈ Cb 
‘Condition’ in Ma  
(x∈ Ca) 
  ‘Condition’ in Mb  
 (y∈ Cb) 
Tree3.E2:comC.cFm1 corresponds to Tree1.E3:Block hc fails 
Tree3.E3:comA.aFM1 corresponds to Tree1.E4:Block ha fails 
Tree3.E5:comA.aFM2 corresponds to Tree1.E4:Block ha fails 
Tree3.E4:comB.bFM1 corresponds to Tree1.E5:Block hb fails 
 
Table 10 Example Correspondences between ‘Condition’s in the Running Example 
If the models under comparison are large in scale, we can perform the violation identification 
with tool support based on a algorithm for checking ExCR2 with the user-defined 
correspondences (as shown in Table 11). 
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Function CheckExCR2 as Boolean
// Ca is the set of conditions under inconsistency analysis in ModelA
// Cb is the set of conditions under inconsistency analysis in ModelB
//Rcon is a set of relations between members of Ca and members of Cb
violation=
For each x in Ca
//find corresponding element in Cb for x
tempRx=GetRcon(x,y)
if tempRx = 
violation =violation  {(x, /)}
// the slash symbol represents that 
//no corresponding element is identified
else if tempRx.Gety   Cb
violation =violation  {(x, tempRx.Gety)}
endif
next x;
For each y in Cb
//similar to finding correspondence item in Ca for y 
tempRy=GetRcon(x,y)
if tempRy = 
violation =violation  {(/, y)}
else if tempRy.Getx   Ca
violation =violation  { (tempRy.Getx, y)}
endif
next y
if violation=
return true //no ExCR2 violation found
else 
return false // ExCR2 violation situations identified
endif
End function
 
Table 11 Example Algorithm for Checking ExCR2  
 
 
 
 159 
 
For examination of ExCR3, we need to have derived correspondences between ‘MCS’s of 
Ma and Mb based on the correspondences between ‘conditions’ of two models defined in 
Table 10. The derived correspondence pairs we infer for MCSs in Ma and Mb are illustrated 
in Table 12. 
 
Derived Correspondences between ‘MCS’s of Ma and Mb 
Rmcs(x,y),   x∈MCSa, y∈MCSb, given Rcon(x,y) 
MCSa  of Ma  
(x∈MCSa) 
 MCSab *  MCSb of Mb  
(y∈MCSb) 
{Tree3.E2} transformed into {Tree1.E3} corresponds to {Tree1.E3} 
{Tree3.E3, 
Tree3.E4} 
transformed into {Tree1.E4,  
Tree1.E5} 
corresponds to  
{Tree1.E4, Tree1.E5} 
{Tree3.E5, 
Tree3.E4} 
transformed into {Tree1.E4, 
Tree1.E5} 
corresponds to 
* : MCSab is an intermediate MCS set used for deriving correspondences between MCSs. It is 
generated by substituting the conditions in each MCS of Trees3 with the ‘condition’s in Ma  
according to Rcon(x,y) defined in Table 10. 
 
Table 12 Example Correspondences between ‘MCS’s in the Running Example  
We substitute each condition in every MCS of Ma with a corresponding condition in Mb as 
specified in Table 10. Then the intermediate MCS set (which has the same content of the 
MCS set of Ma) with transformed equivalent conditions in Mb can be examined against 
MCSs of Mb. The correspondences of ExCR3 between the intermediate MCS set and the 
MCSs of Mb are viewed as the correspondences depicting the relationships between MCSs 
between Ma and Mb.  
It is obvious from Table 12 that each ‘MCS in Ma has a corresponding ‘MCS in Mb. We can 
conclude that no violation of ExCR3 between Ma and Mb is found through the examination 
of the derived correspondences in Table 12. 
We can also perform the violation identification for ExCR3 with tool support. The algorithm 
for checking ExCR3 with the user-defined correspondences is presented in Table 13. 
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Function CheckExCR3 as Boolean
// MCSa is the set of minimal cutsets of ModelA
// MCSb is the set of minimal cutsets of ModelB
//Rcon is a set of relations between members of Ca and members of Cb
//assuming that no one-to-n relations from a member of Ca to a member of Cb in Rcon 
//a n-to-one relation from a member of Ca to a member of Cb is allowed
violation= 
derivedR=
For each mcsa in MCSa
//get a member mcs from a set of MCSs
mcsab= 
for each c in mcsa
//get each member condition of a mcs and substitute it 
//with the corresponding member in Rcon 
tempR= GetRcon(c,y)
if tempR.Gety  mcsab then mcsab = mcsab  { tempR.Gety }
next c
if mcsab   MCSb
violation =violation  {mcsa}
else
derivedR= derivedR  {(mcsa,mcsab)}
endif
next mcsa
if violation=
return true //no ExCR3 violation found
else 
return false // ExCR3 violation situations identified
endif
End function
 
Table 13 Example Algorithm for Checking ExCR3  
After defining correspondences and implementing the checking (with algorithms), we can 
find that both ExCR2 and ExCR3 have not been violated. 
If we got another fault tree ‘Tree4’ as Mb instead of ‘Tree1’. The events of ‘Tree1’ are the 
same set as ‘Tree1’, but the MCSs are {{Tree4.E3}, {Tree4.E4}, {Tree4.E5}}, then 
‘violations’ would be reported for two MCSs of Ma. 
In this example, we have the same number of system elements and conditions in Ma and Mb. 
But the Phase 3 of the inconsistency analysis method is generic in terms of considering 
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(in)consistent models with different numbers of model elements. In that case, the user may 
exclude irrelevant model elements for model comparison in the Scope Description of Phase 
1, or the user may need to define and derive more sophisticated correspondences between 
models elements of different details. For example, a system element in Ma corresponds to 
two system elements in Mb due to more detailed design; or a condition in Ma corresponds to 
two or more conditions in Mb due to more detailed description of failure causes. The 
inconsistency analysis method does not cover the details in potentially more sophisticated 
correspondences definition and inference, which are planned as future work in Section 8.2.2. 
5.4.6 Phase 4: Interpreting Comparison Results 
This phase of the analysis is intended to query whether there is a reasonable explanation for 
the violation situations identified in the comparison process and to understand whether the 
identified violation situations imply flaws in the models under comparison. The result from a 
comparison activity for consistency checking is not only a simple Boolean value of a 
proposition – e.g. ‘the two models are consistent’ or ‘the two models are inconsistent’. The 
comparison result should include a proposition on consistency and the associated consistency 
relationships and, moreover, the indication of which elements in model instances violates the 
anticipated consistency relationships, if any. Without the details of the consistency 
relationships and the violation scenarios, the comparison results may not be considered in a 
proper context. The violation situations identified in the inconsistency analysis might be 
discharged by considering the claimed metadata or the claimed validity context of model 
instances. Or the inconsistencies identified may require further examination and update of the 
system safety analyses.  
Figure 44 shows the interpretation process of Phase 4. The reason provided for the existence 
of a violation situation can be recorded using the Explanation shown in Figure 34. 
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Figure 44 Phase Four Flowchart 
Running Example of Phase 4: 
At this point, we need to claim consistency or inconsistency according to the findings from 
the previous phase. In our example, no violation has been reported. We can claim that the 
two example models are consistent in terms of consistency relationships ExCR2 and ExCR3. 
Otherwise, we need to go through each of the violation situations and examine what is the 
reason of ‘violating’ the consistency relationships. This must be carried out through 
reviewing and investigating the two models with consideration of the system description.  
For example, in Tree1 (Mb), if the ‘AND’ gate that connects Tree1.E4 and Tree1.E5 with 
Tree1.E2 was misrepresented with an ‘OR’ gate (which is a common mistake in tool-
supported traditional FTA), the MCSs of Tree1 will change into {{Tree1.E3}, {Tree1.E4}, 
{Tree1.E5}}. Two MCSs in Tree3 (Ma), {Tree3.E3, Tree3.E4} and {Tree3.E4, Tree3.E5}, 
would be reported as violations due to no corresponding MCS in the misrepresented fault 
tree results. In this case, the reported violations reflect that inconsistent logical relationships 
have been presented in Ma and Mb. We would suggest revising the incorrect model and it 
should not be used as evidence for any safety claims.  
Another example, in Tree1 (Mb), if there was another basic event Tree1.E6 (relating to a 
human error that leads to Tree1.E1) presented next to Tree1.E3 under the same ‘OR’ gate 
below the top event, then we would find that there was no corresponding condition of 
Tree1.E6 in Ma. In this case, Tree1.E6 in Mb would be reported as a violation situation. 
However, we may find a declared assumption of not considering any human errors in Ma. If 
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so, we can tolerate the reported violation, provide an explanation, and treat it as an 
acceptable violation situation rather than an inconsistency. 
5.4.7 Phase 5: Evaluating the Inconsistency Analysis 
This phase of analysis aims to have a comprehensive review of the outputs of previous steps 
in order to determine whether the comparison activity has been carried out properly. Each 
step of the process has some domain inputs. If these inputs are improper or incorrect, the 
steps followed will be founded on a flawed basis and the comparison results will be naturally 
defective. Basically, the comparability of model instances, the coverage and reasonableness 
of the consistency relationships, the reasonableness of the extra intermediate information 
introduced in the implementation phase are re-examined. This step serves as a review that 
double-checks the integrity of the inconsistency analysis process and its products. This step 
can be informally performed by expert reviews, but the activity should be appropriately 
documented.  
Running Example of Phase 5: 
The task of this phase is to review the data generated from each of the previous phases and 
ensure that the illustrated inconsistency analysis has been carried out in a proper manner. The 
factors we have reviewed include:  
• Whether two models chosen were comparable and whether the consistency relationships 
are clear and reasonable. 
• Whether the user-defined correspondences are correct, e.g. we checked that no n-to-n 
correspondence relationship exists in the defined correspondences. 
• Whether the checking algorithms for violation detection are correct. 
• Whether the explanation of the analysis results is reasonable. 
5.4.8 Phase 6: Citing and Justifying Analysis Results 
The comparison results can provide us with some basis of claiming consistency between 
safety assessment models. For models serving as evidence for the same claim or the same 
primary safety argument, the comparison results from the inconsistency analysis can be 
adopted as items of evidence in the confidence argument associated with that primary safety 
argument. Model consistency confirmed by comparison activities can be used as supporting 
evidence for a consistency claim; whereas inconsistency identified can be used as challenges 
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against a model consistency claim (Chapter 6 presents generic argument structures 
employing inconsistency analysis results as evidence.). For a compelling safety case, the 
inconsistencies between safety assessment models that are to be used as items of evidence in 
that safety case should be rigorously identified and systematically justified.  
Running Example of Phase 6: 
As explained in Section 5.4.7, the inconsistency analysis results can be used as evidence in 
confidence arguments. In this demonstrating example, the inconsistency analysis results are 
supporting evidence for the trustworthiness claim of the model that is used as evidence in a 
primary safety argument. We do not provide exemplar arguments in this section. An example 
argument related to inconsistency analysis will be constructed basing on the content of 
Chapter 6. A case study on model adequacy argument construction is presented in Appendix 
C.5.  
5.4.9 Summary of the Inconsistency Analysis Method 
The overall inconsistency analysis method is described as a standalone analysis activity. But 
the method we outlined above may be used in other ways, such as embedded steps as part of 
another safety review or safety analysis. Additionally, we may repeat all or some steps of the 
cross-model inconsistency analysis process several times to keep the inconsistency analysis 
results updated. Safety assessment models are generated periodically and will evolve with 
system design. They may also be revised due to inconsistencies identified. Therefore, the 
overall inquiry of inconsistency, in theory, only stops when we are sufficiently confident in 
the consistency between models based on the rigour of the inconsistency analysis. 
5.5 Practicality and Capability Analysis 
The idea of comparing models and detecting inconsistency between models is not new. But 
for a long time, the comparison of safety assessment models has been carried out in practice 
only as an implicit informal process. The example consistency relationships and 
corresponding checking presented aim to illustrate the potential power and difficulties 
encountered during rigorous inconsistency analysis. The method presented is more structured 
for dealing with large-scale safety assessment models. 
Existing consistency checking practice usually does not involve two models explicitly – the 
content of a model is compared with some knowledge or information we got from other 
resources (such as a failure mode data base or past operation experience). Unlike the existing 
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practice, the cross-model inconsistency analysis presented in this chapter focuses on the 
similarity and differences between models, and allows for identifying inconsistency between 
processed substance results such as MCS if there is not enough domain knowledge to check 
the reasonability of MCS directly.  
The principal benefits obtained from performing consistency analysis based upon user-
defined correspondences and consistency relationships are scalability and rigour.  Although 
some effort may be required to set up the consistency checks, once established they can be 
applied to models of any scale.  Purely manual review can struggle to identify anomalies 
when safety assessment models become large and complex.  In addition, it is easier to 
examine the explicitly-stated correspondences and rules, than it is to justify an unstructured 
manual review (see Chapter 6).  Also, once established the rules can be dogmatically and 
systematically applied (for example with tool support) without fear of ‘slip’ or omission that 
may occur in expert reviews and can undermine the effectiveness of manual analysis 
processes. 
We need to stress that human decision and knowledge is crucial during inconsistency 
analysis. Firstly, we need to decide the comparability and consistency relationships between 
models. Secondly, real world semantics are not understandable by computer unless explicitly 
specified links were established by human to resolve the differences of language constructs 
and referential names. Finally, the interpretation of inconsistency analysis findings must be 
performed manually by human in order to taking into account information on models 
depicted in natural language. 
Any inconsistency analysis cannot disclose all potential flawed points in models. Firstly, if 
two models have the same erroneous view regarding an aspect of a system, they may still 
exhibit a ‘consistent view’ of that aspect of a system according to the representation of the 
models. Secondly, it is impossible to provide a complete set of consistency relationships 
between two models. Hence, we cannot claim absolute cross-model consistency on the basis 
of the results of cross-model inconsistency analysis. 
The power of cross-model inconsistency analysis of safety assessment is limited in terms of 
its support to the identification of the causes of inconsistency. The analysis results may 
indicate that one of the models could be wrong about a certain model element, but there will 
not be clues for answering such questions as which one is the flawed one, or which model is 
inconsistent with the reality, unless we know with certainty that which model can be deemed 
as a ‘correct’ model before implementing the comparison.   
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5.6 Summary 
This chapter presents the definition of inconsistency between safety assessment models and a 
typology of safety assessment model consistency. This provides an expanded view of the 
consistency issue that can affect the evaluation of the trustworthiness of safety assessment 
models. This chapter also defines the characteristics of potential user-defined consistency 
relationships that describe the agreement that is expected between models. These can be used 
as heuristics for structuring good engineering practice for consistency checking and as a 
catalyst for more rigorous reviews. More importantly, a structured inconsistency analysis 
method is proposed and demonstrated with an example walkthrough of the analysis process. 
The method clarifies and decomposes previously implicit inconsistency investigation 
activities into six concrete phases. Although there are recognised limitations to the method 
presented, it provides benefits in terms of stimulating transparent, rigorous and repeatable 
scrutiny of the consistency checking between safety assessment models.  
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6 Using and Justifying Safety Assessment 
Evidence 
6.1 Introduction 
As the common basis of evidence elaborated the discussion in Section 4.2.3 indicated, the 
source information of evidence is neutral by itself; it is the argumentation context in which 
evidence participates that endows the source information with a role of being supporting 
evidence, counter-evidence or contextual data. In this chapter, we consider how we use 
evidence in argument construction and how confidence in safety cases can be improved with 
a more rigorous argumentation process and more structured justification of safety assessment 
evidence. 
By nature, a safety case is not born to be strong and compelling and to be accepted without 
doubts. A typical safety case will contain positive arguments and supporting evidence and it 
is a developer’s ultimate goal to have a positive safety case for their developed product. 
However, it does not mean that we can only think positively, or admit only positive things, or 
present only positive points in arguments. A safety case is not composed by structured 
positive arguments and associated evidence for demonstrating system safety characteristics 
alone, especially during the early stages of evolution and when we have a rich source of 
information during argument construction. Firstly, it is necessary to include extra information 
to demonstrate our confidence in the arguments and evidence presented. Therefore, a safety 
case should also contain the justification or backing of existing structured positive arguments 
and evidence. Secondly, it is also necessary to include extra information to demonstrate why 
we justifiably disregard negative, or alternative, information for our positive arguments. It is 
commonplace that one item of source information might differ from or disagree with another 
item of source information. We should not neglect any relevant items of information that do 
not meet our positive argumentation need and we should record how those items of 
information are considered and why they are discharged or not selected over those items of 
evidence that are presented. Incorporating how negative arguments and evidence are resolved 
in a safety case is vital for achieving a compelling and defensible safety case. However 
existing argument construction practice has typically left counter-evidence probing activities 
until the review stage of a safety case lifecycle. In order to exploit various potential sources 
of evidence within argument construction, an expanded safety case construction process is 
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presented in this chapter in order to incorporate the active consideration of counter-evidence 
into the development process of safety case arguments. 
It is important to consider systematically how to justify the adequacy of supporting evidence 
employed within a safety case, especially for a very common form of evidence – namely, 
safety assessment models.  As we have explained in Chapter 2, validating safety assessment 
models as ‘complete’ and ‘correct’ representations of the real world is difficult. Hence, our 
aim of presenting model adequacy arguments is not to ‘validate’ a model, or to demonstrate 
the correctness of the use of a safety assessment model, but instead, to establish confidence 
in that they are sufficient for their usage in a particular context as evidence. However, the 
existing standards and guidance do not provide sufficient recommendations explicitly on how 
to evaluate various safety assessment models and how to justify whether they provide 
adequate evidential support for domain claims in particular argumentation contexts. During 
MISSA project meetings, Mr Jean-Pierre Heckman, a safety expert from EADS APSYS, 
formerly from Airbus (France), detailed that there are some good codes of practice on model 
validation and review by safety practitioners, but they are often informally implemented and 
passed on by people. It is necessary to formulate methodical solutions to guide the 
justification of safety assessment evidence based on engineering practice and the 
characteristics of various models. An argument pattern for justification of the adequacy of 
safety assessment models is presented in this chapter. 
In addition, in Chapter 5, it is shown that using multiple evidence items can be problematic – 
an evidence item may disagree with real world or another evidence item. The rigorous 
inconsistency analysis introduced in Chapter 5 provides a means of identifying further 
supporting evidence or counter evidence for the justification of adequacy of safety 
assessment models. The role of inconsistency analysis results is shown in the pattern for the 
justification of safety assessment evidence. In this chapter, two further argument patterns are 
also presented for the generic justification in the presence of counter evidence and the 
generic justification of the adequacy of inconsistency analysis itself.  
6.2 Role of Evidence in Safety Cases 
As described in Section 4.4, relationships between evidence and argument are not simple and 
singular. A piece of information can serve as supporting evidence for a claim, as counter 
evidence against a claim, or as contextual data for goal decomposition. In addition, the 
elements in an argument that may be linked with an item of evidence are varied, and not 
limited only to domain safety claims. For example, an item of evidence can support the 
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warrant that authorises the inference between two claims; or an item of evidence can attack 
the trustworthiness of an item of evidence for a domain claim. 
In GSN the source data of evidence is cited or referenced by solutions or contexts; whereas 
the role of evidence is carried by the asserted relationships between an item of evidence and 
other argument elements. In this section, the argument links between evidence and argument 
elements are revisited for a clear explanation of the roles that evidence can play in safety 
cases. 
It is explained in Section 4.5.3 that an item of evidence can associate with other argument 
elements in ARM via three subtypes of argument relationships: AssertedEvidence, 
AssertedCounterEvidence, AssertedContext. 
The three roles of evidence in safety cases are Supporting-Evidence, Context and Counter-
Evidence (as explained in Figure 45). Each item of evidence has its data part (the content of 
the source information of evidence) and its proposition part. The data part can be cited as 
context of argument reasoning elements (e.g. goal, strategy in GSN terms). The proposition 
part can be cited as supporting evidence for argument reasoning elements and asserted 
relationship elements (e.g. SupportedBy in GSN terms), or as counter evidence against 
argument reasoning elements or asserted relationship elements. 
 
Figure 45 Illustration of Roles of Evidence 
 The evidential role of a piece of information is not constant: 
• The same item of information is capable of serving two different evidential roles in a 
safety case, e.g. a hazard log can provide the context of a strategy and the supporting 
evidence for a goal at the same time within the same safety case. 
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• The same item of information can be used as supporting evidence for a claim in one 
safety case, but serve as counter evidence for another claim in another safety case, even 
if they both utilise the same evidence result assertion.  
• The role of an item of evidence may evolve or change with further justification, further 
information becoming available, or as the system design changes being made. For 
example, a potential item of counter evidence for a claim in a primary safety argument, if 
sufficiently rebutted, may become context to other claims in the confidence argument 
associated with the primary safety argument.  
6.3 Consideration of Counter Evidence 
As described in Section 2.7.4, DS 00-56 [149] requires that counter evidence should be 
searched, documented, analysed and referenced by relevant safety claims. However, existing 
practice has typically only considered the role of counter evidence during the evaluation or 
review of safety cases, rather than actively taking it into account at the argument construction 
stage.  
Greenwell et al [86] have defined some typical fallacies in safety cases, as presented in 
Figure 46. ‘Ignoring Available Counter-Evidence’ is clearly presented as a sub-category of 
fallacies existing in safety arguments. However, it is improper to put ‘Arguing from 
Ignorance’ under the type of ‘Unsupported Assertions’ because ignoring counter evidence is 
not in the category of ‘Unsupported Assertions’ and ‘Ignoring Available Counter-Evidence’ 
is one way of ‘Arguing from Ignorance’.  
To be clearer, it is helpful to differentiate two aspects of using evidence in safety 
arguments12: acknowledging the existence of evidence (either supporting evidence or counter 
evidence) and addressing evidence properly in relevant arguments. Failures to acknowledge 
relevant evidence information lead to the fallacy of ‘Arguing from Ignorance’; whereas 
failures to address relevant supporting evidence or counter evidence lead to the fallacy of 
‘Omission of Key Evidence’. To avoid ‘Arguing from Ignorance’, we should perform a 
sufficiently-rigorous search for both supporting evidence and counter evidence even though 
the search ultimately returns no results. To avoid ‘Omission of Key Evidence’, we should 
consider both the negative and positive evidence available for a claim with further 
justification. 
                                                          
12
 We have not yet considered the contextual role of evidence here. Ignoring or omitting relevant contextual 
information will make the argument unclear and difficult to evaluate. But that is not the main focus of the thesis. 
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Circular Reasoning 
Circular Argument 
Circular Definition 
Diversionary Arguments 
Irrelevant Premise 
Verbose Argument 
Fallacious Appeals 
Appeal to Common Practice 
Appeal to Improper/Anonymous 
Authority 
Appeal to Money 
Appeal to Novelty 
Association Fallacy 
Genetic Fallacy 
Mathematical Fallacies 
Faith in Probability 
Gambler’s Fallacy 
Insufficient Sample Size 
Pseudo-Precision 
Unrepresentative Sample 
Unsupported Assertions 
Arguing from Ignorance 
Unjustified Comparison 
Unjustified Distinction 
Anecdotal Arguments 
Correlation Implies Causation 
Damning the Alternatives 
Destroying the Exception 
Destroying the Rule 
False Dichotomy 
Omission of Key Evidence 
Omission of Key Evidence 
Fallacious Composition 
Fallacious Division 
Ignoring Available Counter-
Evidence 
Oversimplification 
Linguistic Fallacies 
Ambiguity 
Equivocation 
Suppressed Quantification 
Vacuous Explanation 
Vagueness 
 
 
Figure 46 The Safety Argument Fallacy Taxonomy (from [86]) 
Concerning the insufficient attention paid to counter evidence in existing argument 
development processes, it is necessary to consider how counter evidence should be integrated 
into the traditional positive argument construction process. We find that counter evidence is 
associated with a primary safety argument in four ways.  
Firstly, the primary argument may be challenged by counter evidence in the inference links 
between two domain claims, if we have evidence to falsify the rationale or warrant for an 
inference relation between two claims or to demonstrate the insufficiency of support, even if 
all lower level domain claims were true.  
Secondly, a domain safety claim can be challenged by an item of counter evidence if the 
evidence result assertion disagrees with the domain claim and demonstrates that the domain 
claim is a false proposition. In this situation the counter evidence is a challenge to the other 
items of supporting evidence for that domain safety claim as well, because they are 
inconsistent regarding the conclusion on the Boolean value of a domain claim.  
Thirdly, the items of evidence presented in the primary safety argument may be challenged 
by counter evidence in terms of their trustworthiness.  
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Lastly, the appropriateness of the usage of items of evidence may be questioned. This 
challenge affects the validity of the argument links between items of evidence and domain 
safety claims being supported. This is different from the challenge towards the inference 
links purely from the argument structure point of view. The asserted evidence relationship 
considers both the relevance and fitness of the evidence result assertion towards a domain 
claim.  
The first way of challenging primary safety arguments focuses on the validity of the 
argument structure. The other three ways of challenging focus on that whether the Boolean 
value of a domain claim has been demonstrated sufficiently to be true with sufficient 
confidence. All four kinds of challenges ought to be addressed in a confidence argument 
rather than in a primary safety argument.  
Govier recognises the existence and function of counterconsiderations [85], which are the 
negatively relevant points towards a conclusion within arguments. In a natural language 
argument, these counterconsiderations are usually introduced with signposts such as 
‘although’, ‘though’, ‘even though’ or ‘despite the fact that’. Counterconsiderations depict 
challenging or weakening effects on conclusions. They are represented by Govier as wavy 
lines between premises and a conclusion [85] (as shown in Figure 47).  
 
Figure 47 Counter Consideration Representation 
During the articulation of an argument, we must acknowledge and present these negative 
points even though they do not support our claims. Actually, if we could reason that the 
supporting points for a claim outweigh the negative points or the negative points are 
reasonably discharged, the presence of counterconsiderations in an argument would make 
the argument more defensible. Considering counter evidence is part of the 
counterconsiderations that we can apply in safety case development to avoid some of the 
safety argument fallacies that Greenwell identified. 
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6.4 Presentation of Counter Evidence  
Counter evidence has received some consideration in the literature on safety case practice. 
For example, Spriggs explains how to consider counter evidence in safety case development 
in [188]. He also states that the lack or absence of counter evidence recognised through 
proactive campaigns can support a Goal in safety cases. GSN does not contain specific 
symbols that describe counter evidence or the potential negative role of the source 
information of evidence. Some researchers have suggested extensions to managing counter 
evidence. Cockram [54] proposes a negation symbol on the Solution symbol in GSN (as 
shown in Figure 48 (a) ) and Johnson [108] adopts a cross symbol to indicate the refuting 
role of a Solution in GSN instead (as shown in Figure 48 (b) ).  
Goal 1-2
All safety requirements 
have been verified by 
testing
Solution 1-2
Verification test 
reports including 
test failures
G9: Probability of random 
stochastic failure < 10
-5
per 
service hour 
CE1: Excessive 
multipath at RIMS 
level jeopardizes 
continuity
(a)                                                                   (b)
 
Figure 48 Representation of Counter Evidence ( (a) from[54] and (b) from [108] ) 
However, as we have stated in Chapter 4, it is the relationship between a claim and the 
source data being adopted as an item of evidence that carries the evidential force of ‘support’ 
or ‘challenge’. Therefore, the Solution symbol is not the right subject to expand or change to 
represent counter evidence. Instead, we will indicate items of counter evidence in safety 
cases by adapting the symbol of SupportedBy relationship in GSN. Figure 49 illustrates a 
dashed line with a filled arrow that is used to present the challenge posed by a piece of 
counter evidence of a goal in goal structures. This visually denotes the AssertedChallenge 
and AssertedCounterEvidence relationships between argument elements, as specified in 
ARM [156]. 
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Figure 49 Representation of Counter Evidence Relationship 
It is worth noting that for a signed-off13 and accepted safety case, the counter evidence 
relationships in the safety case, usually, should be sufficiently discharged. Discharging an 
item of counter evidence means that the concerns raised by that item of counter evidence 
have themselves been rebutted (rejected), undermined (i.e. shown to be irrelevant) or 
resolved. Identified (potential) counter evidence, has an attacking role during intermediate 
stages of safety case development, but serves as ‘evidence’ of rigorous thinking in safety 
case construction for the safety case presented to an assessor. If it is presented as unresolved 
counter evidence, the presence of counter evidence relationships in a safety case submitted 
for review could reflect that there are potentially unsupported safety goals and the confidence 
in safety demonstrated can be undermined.  
6.5 Safety Case Processes 
In order to use evidence properly and to its best potential in developing safety cases, we need 
to first have a general view of the processes associated with existing safety case 
development. This section presents a review of supporting processes of safety case 
development and describes a widely-used argument construction method. 
6.5.1 Existing Processes 
In the 1990s, graphical argumentation notations emerged in the development of safety cases, 
which bring about more clarity to the presentation of structured arguments. In addition, the 
                                                          
13
 A ‘signed-off’ safety case means an approved safety case that has passed through scrutiny by experts on behalf of 
the developer’s organisation or certain authorities.  
 
  WeakenedBy 
rendered as a dashed line with a solid arrowhead, 
allows challenge or attacking relationships to be 
documented.  Challenge or attacking relationships 
declare that there is an attack against a claim or 
link posed by claims or counter evidence items in 
the argument.  Permitted WeakenedBy 
connections are: goal-to-goal, link-to-goal, goal-to-
solution, link-to-solution. 
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introduction of structured argumentation processes enforces the explicitness of previously 
implicit information elements in safety case construction, such as hidden context, supporting 
rationale of inferences, or assumptions. The six-step method [117] of goal structure 
construction is a typical structured argument development process. 
Along with structured safety case construction, there are other processes defined in support 
of safety case management in a system safety lifecycle, e.g. a process for safety case change 
management [120], a process for safety case reuse with safety case patterns [116], a process 
for argument review [112], or a safety case life cycle with safety case submission and 
acceptance [152].  
An enhanced safety-case lifecycle is presented in [87] to revise imperfect safety cases with 
failure evidence from the system operational phase. Sets of critical questions have been 
proposed as safety argument schemes for challenging typical safety arguments to help the 
review and evaluation of safety cases [215]. However, both of these approaches are ‘after-
the-event’ methods, which may lead to late modification and reworking in a project lifecycle.  
Although there are many processes related to safety cases, as described above, the 
construction process is the essential one in the safety case domain, in which the robustness of 
a safety case is rooted. However, the rigour of this process has not been exploited 
sufficiently in existing practice, partially because the role of counter-evidence is not properly 
addressed as it should be. With regard to processes orientated around evidence employment, 
the issue of counter evidence is also insufficiently considered. For example, the evidence 
selection and justification process in [96], pays insufficient attention to the items of evidence 
that have evidence result assertions that refute the truth of a domain claim, which might bring 
the ‘Ignoring Available Counter-Evidence’ fallacy into safety cases. Instead, collecting 
relevant counter evidence in parallel to the selection of supporting evidence during 
construction of safety cases provides an opportunity for defending evidence selection in a 
rigorous manner. 
Therefore, it is necessary to have a more active way to take account of 
counterconsiderations, especially counter evidence in safety argumentation. 
6.5.2 Six-Step GSN Method 
Kelly proposes a six-step method [117] of safety case construction in GSN (for a detailed 
description of the method, the reader is referred to [89]). The method is systematic, 
especially in providing assistance to constructing arguments positively. The steps of the 
method [117] are presented in Figure 50.  
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Figure 50 Six Steps of Argument Construction in GSN (from [117]) 
Step 1 - Identify the goals to be supported;  
Step 2 - Define the basis on which goals are stated; 
Step 3 - Identify the strategy used to support the goals; 
Step 4 - Define the basis on which the strategy is stated; 
Step 5 - Elaborate the strategy (and proceed to identify new goals – back to 
Step 1); 
Step 6 - Identify the basic solution. 
These steps can be repeated as many times as is necessary to produce a complete argument 
where all of the goals in the argument have been supported. This method supports structured 
safety case construction and enforces elicitation of unstated rationales or context for a clear 
and understandable argument. However, assurance of the strength of the arguments produced 
is not considered. Weaver expanded the six-step method through including the use of SALs 
(Safety Assurance Levels) in Step 2, Step 4 and Step 6 [204] to take into account assurance 
of structured argument elements. Hawkins et al have performed HAZOP-style deviational 
analysis on the six steps of the GSN method to consider assurance deficits in argument 
construction [98]. Although their work brings more thought during argument construction, 
no new steps are introduced to the process to increase the rigour of potential argumentation 
and the issue of counter-evidence is not directly addressed.   
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Counter evidence may be in existence already (whether we are aware of it or not) at the point 
of citing evidence in safety cases and the total set of obtainable evidence should be carefully 
examined and considered while we are choosing items of evidence for a claim and justifying 
their adequacy of being supporting evidence. 
In the next section, an expanded argument construction process based on the six-step method 
is defined in order to incorporate both assurance of positive argument elements and counter 
evidence (from various relevant information sources) comprehensively during safety case 
development. 
6.6 Expanded Structured Argument Construction  
6.6.1 Overall Expanded Process 
From the discussion in Section 6.4, we set two objectives for an expanded GSN argument 
construction process: a) Clear integration of the construction of confidence arguments with 
the construction of a primary safety argument; b) Clear integration of the construction of 
pure positive arguments with the consideration of negative positive arguments that put 
forward positive arguments from an opposite viewpoint with sufficient consideration of 
opposing points. 
The generic six-step method can be applied to either confidence argument construction or 
primary safety argument construction. The nature of both types of arguments is the same, but 
the role or function of the arguments differs. The function of confidence arguments is to 
assure the soundness of a primary safety argument. 
The negative positive arguments intend to argue from an opposite viewpoint. In informal 
argumentation, e.g. essay writing or tribunal presentation, arguing from two sides is common 
practice. When an issue is identified as a topic to argue about, both reasoning sides of the 
issue, supporting and challenging, should be explored and considered.  This entails more 
transparency of why one side outweighs another and makes the argument more balanced, 
convincing and defensible. The six-step process does not contradict the performance of two-
sided argumentation, but it had not highlighted the importance of arguing from the negative 
side explicitly. 
Figure 51 outlines the expanded process of structured argument construction in GSN. The 
expanded steps in the development of safety cases in GSN are: 
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Step E1: Justify the basis of goals 
Step E2: Identify the alternative basis on which goals are stated 
Step E3: Justify the unsuitability of the alternative basis of goals 
Step E4: Justify the basis of the strategy 
Step E5: Identify the alternative basis on which the strategy can be stated 
Step E6: Justify the unsuitability of the alternative basis of a strategy 
Step E7: Justify the adequacy of solutions 
Step E8: Identify counter evidence 
Step E9: Justify the discharge of counter evidence 
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Figure 51 Overall Expanded Process of Structured Argument Construction in GSN 
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As Figure 51 indicates, the six core steps still serve as the main frame of argument 
construction, but are enriched with more explicit consideration of assurance of the strength of 
a primary safety argument. The expanded steps are presented in shaded blocks in Figure 51. 
For example, while identifying solutions (Step 6), we should consider the justification of the 
adequacy of selected solutions (E7); in the meantime, we should also search for potential 
counter evidence (E8) and consider its effects on the goal to be supported (E9).  
Due to the common nature of argumentation, some expanded steps are, in fact, embedded 
whole and additional argumentation processes in their own right. Those steps -Step E1, E3, 
E4, E6, E7 and E9- are depicted with rounded-corner rectangles rather than clouds in Figure 
50.  
The overall expanded steps can be grouped into three categories: 
• For providing backing of defined argument elements related to positive arguments – E1, 
E4 and E7;  
• For recognising existence of alternative information source or counter evidence that are 
relevant to defined argument elements – E2, E5 and E8; 
• For presenting how the alternative information, usually negative, is discharged from 
affecting the positive arguments – E3, E6 and E9.   
In the following sections, each of the expanded steps is described with more details. 
6.6.2 Step E1: Justify Basis of Goals 
This step expands Step 2 of the six-step GSN method. The objective of this step is to provide 
explicit explanation of the basis of identified goals if necessary. As described in the GSN 
community standard, Step 2 is used for ensuring the reader has an “adequate and correct 
understanding of the context” [89] surrounding the goals identified. Most items of contextual 
information are obtained from various sources in system lifecycle as artefacts of safety 
activities.  In some cases, we may need to provide further reasons for their suitability.  
Figure 52 from the GSN standard [89] depicts an example of contextual information of a 
safety claim. In this example, we may need to justify that the system implementation 
activities described in Ref Y (C1 in Figure 52) are the right versions in use for the system 
under study. We may also need to justify that the safety principles from Ref Z (C3 in Figure 
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52) are fit for use for the system under study due to historical good practice. We may not 
worry about C2 in Figure 52 because it can be viewed as a factual description. 
 
Figure 52 Example of Basis of a Goal (from [89]) 
In reality, it may be impractical to address every subtle detail in the goal definition and 
contextualization process. But it is valuable to explicitly present justification when we think 
further explanation is helpful for a clearer understanding of the basis of the identified goal. 
6.6.3 Step E2: Identify Alternative Basis of Goals Stated 
This step expands Step 1 of the GSN method and operates in parallel to Step 2 of the GSN 
method. This step aims to encourage the user to explore alternative basis that may 
contextualize identified goals. Different from Step 2, Step E2 focuses on active search from 
potential contextual information and critical thinking, especially if there exist two or more 
information items that are all capable of providing the same kind of necessary context for an 
identified goal.  
For example, returning to the example presented in Figure 52, if there is another reference 
guideline or document (let us call this Ref AX) in the same industry domain (or in similar 
system development lifecycle) that defines more safety principles than Ref Z does, we need 
to acknowledge the existence of this document and record it for further analysis in Step E3.  
6.6.4 Step E3: Justify Unsuitability of Alternative Basis of Goals 
This step expands Step E2 and prompts explicit explanation of why the alternative basis of 
identified goals is not suitable for the argument. This step, as a result, justifies the suitability 
of the defined basis (obtained in Step 2) of goals from another perspective, which is in 
contrast to the justification presented in Step E1.  Step E2 and Step E3 are not exactly 
thinking from a negative perspective, but they are a form of active thinking which contributes 
 182 
 
to confidence establishment in our decision making process. Following the example for Step 
E2, the reason for unsuitability of the safety principles presented in Ref AX as the basis of 
Goal G2 should be elicited. 
Sometimes, the reasoning of Step E1 and Step E3 occurs simultaneously (with E2 providing 
necessary contextual information for E3). It is feasible to merge E1, E2 and E3 if the user 
would like to have a more succinct view of the confidence argument associated with the three 
steps. However, for a transparent and clear incorporation of two-sided arguments, we insist 
on depicting them separately in the expanded process. The same thought is applied to the 
separation of E4, E5 and E6 and the separation of E7, E8 and E9 respectively.  
6.6.5 Step E4: Justify Basis of Strategy 
This step expands Step 4 of the GSN method. The objective of this step is to prompt explicit 
explanation of the basis of an identified strategy if necessary. Step 4 is used for ensuring a 
reader understand the basis of an identified strategy and helping the assessment of the 
reasonableness of the strategy. A flawed basis of a strategy may result in decomposing 
arguments into flawed sub-goals which may make the inferences between sub-goals and a 
higher-level goal invalid or insufficient.  
The basis of a strategy may include three types of contextual information: a) Context 
elements which provide the details of a term used in the strategy description (e.g. the 
identified hazards); b) Assumptions made while adopting a strategy (e.g. the divide-and-
conquer strategy works with the assumption that the safety of sub-system components 
considered individually can fully represent the safety of a composed system if the interaction 
between subsystem elements is not shown as a sub-goal); c) Justifications needed for 
adopting a strategy (e.g. product X is suitable to be developed according to standard X, the 
customization or selection of requirements from standard X is adequate). They all link with a 
Strategy by an asserted InContextOf relationship.  
Figure 53 presents an example of contextual information used as a basis of a safety strategy 
(adapted from [89]). In the example, the basis of Strategy S1 in Figure 53 is Context C4. We 
may need to justify that the ‘Hazard Log HLx’ (shown as cited document in Context C4 in 
Figure 53) is a sufficiently comprehensive and adequate documentation of system operational 
hazards. In addition, we may be uncertain about whether we have defined the proper basis of 
S1. We may ask ourselves that “Has HLx been reviewed for its completeness?” or “Has a 
specific critical hazard been addressed by HLx?”. The answers to these questions can help 
establish greater confidence in the appropriateness of the defined basis of a strategy. 
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Figure 53 Example of Basis of a Strategy (adapted from [89]) 
Similar to Step E1, it may be impractical to deal with all of the subtle detail in our strategy 
definition and contextualization process in real practice. In some cases, the strategy or the 
contextual basis of a strategy is evident by itself, and then this step can be skipped.  In some 
other cases, especially when a complicated item of evidence is cited in the defined contextual 
basis of a strategy, this step is important and should not be neglected.  
In the original GSN method, the justification of the strategies can be considered as a part of 
Step 4 [117]. However, presenting it as a separate step will make it clearer that there might 
be significant further argumentation needed after Step 3 and Step 4.  
6.6.6 Step E5: Identify Alternative Basis of Strategy Stated 
This step expands Step 3 of the GSN method and operates in parallel with Step 4 of the GSN 
method. The objective of this step is to stimulate the user to explore possible different basis 
that may contextualize an identified strategy. Different from Step 4, Step E5 places emphasis 
on active inquiry of potential contextual information, especially if there exist two or more 
information items that are all capable of providing the same kind of necessary context for an 
identified strategy, but maybe with different or even inconsistent concrete content. 
For example, in the example presented in Figure 53, if there is another hazard log HLy that 
documents various hazards of CCC Whatford Plant, we need to recognise the existence of 
this document and record it for further analysis in Step E6.  
It is not our intention to identify alternative strategies in this step. The issues related to 
strategies in argument construction are discussed further in Section 6.6.11. Typical strategies 
for goal decomposition from good practice may have been documented in safety case 
patterns. However, the instantiation of the basis of some strategies may be problematic due to 
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the contextual data being used. The basis of a strategy could have considerable impact on the 
adequacy of specific sub-goals generated. 
6.6.7 Step E6: Justify Unsuitability of Alternative Basis of Strategy 
This step expands Step E5 and prompts an explicit explanation of why the alternative basis of 
an identified strategy is not suitable for the argument. In this step, the suitability of the 
defined basis (obtained in Step 4) of a strategy is justified from another perspective, which is 
in contrast to the justification presented in Step E4. Step E5 and Step E6 are not exactly 
thinking in an opposing way, but they represent the efforts we have invested in having a 
more cautious consideration of possibilities in order to obtain more confidence in the 
subsequent elaboration of the defined strategy. Following the example for Step E5, the 
reason for unsuitability of the operational hazards presented in HLy as the basis of a strategy 
should be provided.  
6.6.8 Step E7: Justify Adequacy of Solutions 
Safety arguments without evidence are ungrounded; but evidence without justification is 
unconvincing. Therefore, it is demanding and challenging to justify the adequacy of safety 
evidence in safety cases.  
This step expands Step 6 of the GSN method, which defines a direct reference to evidence 
data sources and indicates that the data is asserted evidence for an identified goal. It is 
concerned with providing sufficient confidence in the appropriateness and trustworthiness of 
the identified solutions. Previously, the justification of the adequacy of evidence was not 
explicitly separated as an argumentation step and the associated goals and evidence were 
presented together with argument and evidence for domain safety goals. However, as 
described in Section 2.7.5, it is stated in recent work [97] that the separation of primary 
safety argument and evidence and confidence arguments enables greater clarity than the 
traditional single argument structure. Adding this explicit step naturally suits this purpose of 
distinguishing the two types of arguments. Furthermore, this step signifies the importance of 
evidence justification in a way that users cannot overlook. 
Depending on the complexity of the information that is contained in an item of evidence, the 
justification of the adequacy of a solution could itself be another complex argumentation 
process. The content associated with this step can be packaged as an argument module [119] 
to ease the management of argument elements and for the sake of a clearer view of its role in 
the overall confidence argument associated with a primary safety argument. The argument 
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information needed in this step might be obtained from the evaluation of items of safety 
evidence, e.g. human expert reviews, or particular tests or comparison analysis of items of 
evidence, such as the inconsistency analysis described in Chapter 5. A generic safety case 
pattern on model adequacy justification is presented in Section 6.9.  
As described in Section 6.5.1, some steps are embedded argumentation processes by 
themselves (all rectangular blocks with rounded corners in Figure 51). We can illustrate a 
typical example in this step. For example, assume that a fault tree model was adopted as 
supporting evidence for a goal. While justifying its adequacy of providing support to the 
goal, we may use the expert review report of that fault tree model, in which the coverage of 
conditions of the fault tree is checked and claimed as good enough. However, we may also 
identify some negative evidence, such as an omitted condition through inconsistency analysis 
between that fault tree and a relevant FMEA. In this case, both items of evidence - the review 
report and the inconsistency analysis result - should be addressed in the justification of the 
adequacy of the fault tree. 
6.6.9 Step E8: Identify Counter Evidence 
This step expands Step 6 of the GSN method. This step aims at leading active and rigorous 
exploration of potential items of counter evidence that may challenge the fulfilment of the 
identified goal. In fact, we can carry out this step simultaneously with Step 6 of the GSN 
method. Both of the steps need to work from the available knowledge and information 
sources that we have access to. Knowledge and data are always valuable assets in a system 
project lifecycle. Neglecting or ignoring relevant information for any argument elements 
(either supporting or challenging items) may lead to a partial or even biased view of the 
system and its critical features. This is a significant concern in the safety domain, in which 
any relevant analysis, test, or operational data items are precious and should be considered 
and exploited sufficiently. Examining carefully various development information and safety 
artefacts is a critical task both for identifying adequate supporting evidence and for 
recognising relevant counter evidence. 
Step E8 may have a wider scope of searching than the information span that can be used in 
Step 6.  Within Step 6, we primarily explore relevant knowledge and data from the safety 
artefacts of a system under study; whereas within Step E8, the counter evidence for a 
solution may come from analysis artefacts of similar systems, operational records of similar 
systems, or accidents reports and recommended remedies and practice in a specific domain. 
The range of accessible information and, more importantly, the knowledge and experience of 
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the person who carries out the task of counter evidence identification, are critical for the 
rigour of the outcome of Step E8.  
It is possible that we may not identify any counter evidence. In this case, we should still 
document the efforts of searching for counter evidence, which documentation can itself be 
used as supporting evidence of the absence of counter evidence for a goal. Evidence of the 
absence of negative points is necessary; but the absence of relevant evidence, due to 
negligence or ignorance, is undesirable and should be avoided.   
The evidence result assertion of an item of supporting evidence identified in Step 6 must fit 
the goal to be supported strictly in terms of the relevance of its subject, the supportive force, 
and the acceptable context. In contrast, while searching for items of counter evidence, we 
may not be so strict with the evidence result assertion of an information item. An item of 
evidence must be marked out as counter evidence if any of its evidence assertions (result or 
descriptive) disagree with the goal identified.  
Step E8 is an important step to explicitly bring in the counter considerations into safety 
arguments, which will entail a two-sided intermediate safety argument. But the ultimate view 
of the top level goal is dependent on further analysis and justification of both the supporting 
evidence and the counter evidence, or even further design and implementation changes that 
are needed to resolve the impact imposed by the identified counter evidence. 
As we know that a safety case is a living document. Although the identification of counter 
evidence is presented in the expanded process only as a step in argument construction, it does 
not mean that it is merely considered during argument construction or it is performed once-
for-all for each safety goals. Similar thinking processes should be embedded in the whole 
safety case lifecycle and be stressed by each safety management system of safety-critical 
systems. 
6.6.10 Step E9: Justify Discharge of Counter Evidence 
Expanding Step E8, this step emphasises the provision of explicit explanation as to why the 
counter evidence identified does not refute the fulfilment of a goal in the end. In such 
situation, counter evidence is no longer used as a challenger, but instead, it is presented as 
contextual information in the justification. The justification is actually also supporting 
evidence for a rigorous and robust safety argumentation process. This step is an idealized 
resolution of identified counter evidence. The step does not imply that it will necessarily be 
possible to discharge all items of counter evidence. 
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Counter evidence identified may be discharged for many different reasons.  
• If the counter evidence is shown irrelevant to our safety goals 
• If the system is improved regarding the issues raised by the counter evidence 
• If the counter evidence is flawed and the flaw in it disables its attacking capability 
• If the counter evidence is from unreliable sources 
It is impossible to list out all potential reasons for discharging an item of counter evidence 
from its negative role. But, the consensus is that they can only be discharged with sufficient 
and sound justification and it is not guaranteed that every item of counter evidence identified 
can be discharged from its negative role. If an item of information remains as counter 
evidence in a safety case, we need to admit this fact. It denotes that there are residual, 
unresolved counter considerations in the safety case, which can undermine our confidence in 
certain aspects of the system safety.  
It is important to separate Step E7, Step E8 and Step E9. Because counter-evidence for a 
domain safety claim is only one way of attacking argument; in E7, the justification may need 
to consider more kinds of counter evidence for the relationship between a solution and a 
goal. So the issues addressed by E7 and E9 may overlap, but are not exactly identical, it is 
better to think with separated steps and, if needed, refer to an argument module for the reused 
parts of the justifications. 
6.6.11 Rethinking of Strategy 
There is only one step in the GSN method that has not been expanded – Step 5 Elaborate 
strategy. In this section, we rethink the function and nature of a strategy and explain what 
should be further considered in Step 3 and Step 5 of the original GSN method beyond the 
defined expanded steps. 
 A strategy “describes the nature of the inference that exists between a goal and its 
supporting goal(s)” [89]. A strategy “adds further detail to” or “describes the approach 
adopted” in a goal decomposition [117].  
So the nature of a strategy is a kind of narrative description that explains goal decomposition 
or an inference step. It is not a claim that depicts a True/False statement. It is also not a 
warrant (in Toulmin’s model) that can ‘authorise’ the inference. But from the description 
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provided by a strategy, a user can understand more easily why a set of sub-goals are 
presented to support a higher-level goal.  
Through adopting a strategy, goals are decomposed into more concrete and tractable ones to 
be addressed in engineering practice. Actually, a strategy will shape the direction and nature 
of the supporting goals of a higher-level goal during argument development. But the solution 
space of a higher-level goal can be cut down due to the use of a strategy as well. Adoption of 
different strategies for a higher-level goal may lead to different sets of evidence items. If we 
have two parallel strategies (e.g. Figure 54), sometimes, we can identify that they can lead to 
different types of evidence items (e.g. G3 may be addressed by an inspection report or a state 
machine analysis report; G5 may be addressed by the adoption of a specified design measure 
as the standard required).   
 
Figure 54 An Example of Parallel Strategies (from [89]) 
Therefore, we have more issues to be considered in Step 3 and Step 5 of the original GSN 
method. 
Step 3- identify strategy to support goals14 . At this step, we may need to consider potential 
strategies for a goal, rather than simply adopting the first strategy to be identified. It is worth 
noting that more than one strategy may exist and they can be used individually or in 
                                                          
14
 The strategy does not support goals by itself, but it supports goal decomposition and provides the viewpoint of the 
decomposition and introduces the contextual basis of goal decomposition. 
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combination. Some of them may lead to sub-goals that can be supported by the same set of 
evidence items; whereas some of them may lead to sub-goals to be supported by different 
types of evidence. The selection of a strategy may be based on common practice, standard 
requirements, or the features of the system in question (can developed with typical strategies 
listed). However, we should acknowledge that the solution space associated with one strategy 
may be different from the space associated with another strategy and be aware of the risk of 
omission of some potential viewpoints of a higher-level safety goal caused by the strategy-
adoption decision. (One interesting point is that if there is a case that different strategies lead 
to sub-goals that contradict each other, it indicates that the definition or understanding of the 
higher level safety goal is insufficient, ambiguous, or inconsistent.)  
Step 5 – Elaborate strategy. Elaborating a strategy involves putting forward lower-level goal 
statements appropriately according to the contextual basis of a strategy. This step involves 
the elicitation of all relevant sub-goals of a higher-level goal based on the defined strategy. 
At this step, we should also consider or trigger the justification of the inference from the 
collection of sub-goals to a higher-level goal. Due to that the main focus of the thesis is 
evidence in a safety case; we have not presented an explicit expanded step to Step 5 of the 
GSN method for the justification of inferences. Moreover, the location of the potential 
expanded justification step is difficult. The justification of the inference should be done for a 
small branch of argument (which involves Step 1, 3 and 5) rather than for each single 
SupportedBy relationship, because the asserted inference is in fact a many-to-one relationship 
formed from the composition of all SupporteBy relationships for a given goal.  
6.6.12 Practicality Analysis 
Two primary factors inherent in the expanded process may make the application of the 
process challenging. First, the user may be unfamiliar with alternative information sources or 
consideration of counter evidence. Without sufficient knowledge, experience and available 
relevant information sources, it would be difficult to implement those expanded steps for 
assurance. For example, the relevant source information of potential evidence (for and 
against a claim) may scatter around the system development process, which makes the 
implementation of Step E8 difficult and inconvenient. This, in turn, presents us with a 
demand for a well-organized evidence inventory or repository. In a well-informed evidence 
inventory, the evidential content of an item of source information, such as its evidence result 
assertions (as defined in the model of evidence in Chapter 4), should be clarified as clearly as 
possible in order to help the identification of relevant counter evidence.  
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Secondly, the user of the expanded process may be ‘frightened’ by the demands of 
constructing two-sided arguments and supplying substantial justification simultaneously. 
However, as long as the two-sided thinking is performed in the construction process, we can 
appeal to ‘modular arguments’ [119] for addressing some lines of arguments in a light way 
first with a placeholder (which is an empty argument module) and to have them developed in 
detail later if necessary.  
6.6.13 Relations with Confidence Argument  
As described in Section 2.7.5, Hawkins et al [97] define a confidence argument as the 
argument that justifies the sufficiency of a safety argument that documents argument and 
evidence adopted for establishing a domain safety claim. However, the confidence argument 
in [97] has not covered negative positive arguments for confidence introduced in the 
expanded process. It should be noticed that the overall confidence in a safety case can be 
established on two bases: the mitigated and controlled uncertainty of a positive argument (as 
the focus of [97]) and the mitigated and controlled uncertainty of potential attacks to the 
positive safety argument.   
Taking into account the opposing side of the argument construction in the expanded process, 
we can refine the product-branch of our framework of confidence in safety cases (see Section 
4.6.1).  
As illustrated by Figure 55, confidence based on justified argument elements can be divided 
into two types – confidence established on the adequacy of the adopted arguments and 
confidence established on justified unsuitability of alternatives. Similarly, confidence based 
on justified evidence can also be divided into two types - confidence established on the 
adequacy of supporting evidence and confidence established on justified unsuitability or 
discharge of counter evidence. Confidence based on the adequacy of supporting evidence can 
be further broken down according to two important evidential properties of argument 
elements – trustworthiness and appropriateness (according to the evidential properties 
presented within EviM in Chapter 4). 
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Figure 55 Refined Product-Branch of the Framework of Confidence in Safety Cases 
In this way, we have incorporated both information contributing to confidence establishment 
and threatening confidence establishment into one unified structure. The overall confidence 
framework, which integrates Figure 55 and Figure 31, is presented in Figure 56. 
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Figure 56 Overall Framework of Confidence in Safety Cases
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As discussed in Section 4.4.1, Toulmin introduced ‘backing’ as an important element in 
arguments. The importance of backing is prominent - “the soundness of our claims to 
knowledge turns on the adequacy of the arguments by which we back them” [198]. The 
confidence framework we propose, in nature is the foundation of backing of the strength of a 
primary safety argument. But the general backing function of the confidence framework 
should not be confused with the ‘backing’ element in Toulmin’s argument model. The 
confidence framework covers richer ‘ingredients’ than Toulmin’s ‘backing’. In particular, it 
includes three parts: 
• positive backing for structured safety case elements (corresponding to Toulmin’s ‘Data’ 
and ‘Warrant’ elements) 
• negative positive backing of safety case elements 
• backing of backing (the recursive feature of backing15) 
6.6.14 Relationship to Assurance Claim Points 
Assurance Claim Points (ACPs) were originally introduced for referencing associated 
confidence argument within a graphically presented argument [97]. However, in fact, the 
concept of ACP does not need to be constrained within the graphical view of a safety 
argument. The limitation of thinking ACP within notations lies in two situations. ACPs are 
attached to what has been presented, and it is difficult to use them as a point of reference as 
to what has not been presented. Secondly, if all the asserted relationships for one claim need 
to be considered as a whole, e.g. coverage, sufficiency, where no strategy is used there is no 
proper place in the graphical argument for us to attach an ACP symbol. 
This section clarifies and expands the ACP concept by analyzing the asserted evidence 
relationships and asserted counterevidence relationships associated with a safety claim. 
Otherwise, the negative-side of confidence arguments could not be addressed properly. 
As depicted in Section 6.3, there are three ways in which counter evidence is associated with 
the argument-evidence interface. Figure 57 illustrates the three situations. 
                                                          
15
 We should be cautious about the use of backing arguments. They should not be asked without end that will stop 
the primary argument from progressing. 
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Cx 
Ex CE1
CE2
Cx – a domain safety claim
Ex - an item of supporting evidence for Cx
CE1 - an item of counter evidence for Cx
CE2 - an item of counter evidence for the appropriateness of Ex
CE3 - an item of counter evidence for the trustworthiness of Ex
Cx 
Ex CE3
Cx 
Ex 
(a)                                                        (b)                                                              (c)
 
Figure 57 Counter Evidence for Argument-Evidence Interface 
If we still use ACP to address the evidential relationships associated with Cx, the above three 
situations can all be addressed in one argument structure, as illustrated by Figure 58. In the 
figure, CE1 is addressed at the same point as CE3 is addressed during justification of the 
trustworthiness of Ex. The reason for this combination is that CE1, actually, is a member of 
the set of potential CE3. CE1, as an item of counter evidence to Cx, should have had an 
inconsistent evidence result assertion from the assertions of Ex. CE1, by itself, can challenge 
the trustworthiness of Ex. Certainly, if CE1 could not be discharged with proper reasons, it 
should be kept in the primary argument as presented in Figure 57 (a). 
 
 
Figure 58 Expansion of ACP Concept 
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Therefore, with the expanded safety case construction process, we can still use ACP to 
annotate the evidence relationships to be assured, but more factors that may affect our 
confidence in the evidence relationships will need to be addressed than shown in [97].  
6.6.15 Confirmation Bias in Arguments 
Confirmation bias is “the tendency to test one's beliefs or conjectures by seeking evidence 
that might confirm or verify them and to ignore evidence that might disconfirm or refute 
them” [3]. It may exist in many situations, e.g. research studies, daily decision making, or 
system safety analysis.  
Govier addresses potential confirmation bias in argumentation [84]. As she stated, we should 
not make judgements with double standards for things we agree with and things we do not 
agree with. It is valuable to acknowledge the existence of confirmation and be aware of its 
effects. More importantly, we need to find way to combat or alleviate any potential bias. 
Taking into account counter considerations is one of the ways to alleviate confirmation bias.  
The explicit negative thinking points in the expanded process, e.g. Step E8, drive the user to 
search for opposing information during argument construction. The safety case generated 
from the process should include both reasoned support for claims and reasoned refutation for 
attacks (or alternative basis) to claims, which should make it more compelling and 
defensible. One-sided safety arguments are more likely to be vulnerable and open to attack. 
It is well understood that safety cases are not intended to prove safety [190] but to 
communicate and encourage active and critical thinking [91, 114], which is also the essential 
requirements for performing any safety activities for the development of safety-critical 
systems. Thinking from the opposing perspective is one way to alleviate potential 
confirmation bias in safety cases.  
6.7 Argument Pattern Essentials 
Prior to presenting the argument patterns that have been developed to accompany the 
expanded process presented in Section 6.6, this section presents a brief overview of the 
concept and approach of using Safety Case Patterns to express generic argument structures. 
6.7.1 Pattern Overview 
A pattern describes a recurrent problem and the core of a reusable solution to that problem 
[20]. The core of a pattern is the expression of a relation between a certain context, a problem 
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and a solution [20]. Safety Case Patterns were first introduced in [116]. They are abstract 
representations of the structure of a generalised safety argument associated with just one 
aspect of the overall argument structure. Safety case patterns, sometimes referred as 
argument templates [39] or generic arguments [188], provide a mechanism for capturing and 
reusing common arguments within safety cases. Extensions to the Goal Structuring Notation 
(GSN) support the representation of safety case patterns [89]. Using safety case patterns can 
have the following advantages [115]: 
• to provide inspiration or a starting point for new safety argument developments 
• to help in planning and scoping safety cases 
• to help those with little safety case experience 
• to help improve argument completeness 
• to help speed up safety case development 
• to provide a benchmark when reviewing a safety case. 
However, it is worth noting that safety case patterns are not silver bullets. They are only 
partial generic solutions and they are not intended to provide a reusable model of a safety 
argument for a complete safety case. 
A series of safety case patterns have been developed for generic construction of safety cases, 
such as the ALARP pattern, Diverse Argument Pattern and Safety Margin Pattern in [117]. 
In addition, there are also collections of interrelated safety case patterns for specific topics, 
such as patterns for the use of COTS (Commercial-Off-The-Shelf) components in safety 
applications [214], or patterns for arguing software safety in a system lifecycle [204]. 
Recently, safety case patterns have also been developed for Model-based development 
approach [27] or safety assessment justification [196] and have been practiced with more 
case studies [95].  
6.7.2 Pattern Documentation and Generation 
A typical safety case pattern is documented with the following headings [117]:  
Pattern Name — a label by which people will identify this pattern; it communicates the key 
principle or central argument being presented by a safety argument pattern. 
Intent — a statement that explains what this pattern is trying to achieve. 
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Motivation — a description about why the pattern was constructed. 
Applicability (Necessary Context) — a section to record the necessary application context 
of a pattern, including assumptions and principles that help avoiding misuse of the pattern.  
Structure — a graphical representation of the structure of a pattern with clear labels using 
GSN pattern extensions. 
Participants — a description of each of the elements (contextual information, strategies, 
goals)of the goal structure pattern presented in the ‘Structure’ Section. 
Collaborations — descriptions on how the different elements of a pattern work together to 
achieve the desired effect of the pattern. 
Consequences —   a declaration of work remaining after having applied or carried out an 
argument pattern with references to the elements of the pattern. 
Implementation —   a section that mainly communicates how to instantiate a pattern and 
potential traps and supports of applying a specific pattern. 
Related Patterns —  brief references of other patterns that are interrelated with a defined 
pattern.  
This documentation style is adopted for recording the argument patterns proposed in this 
thesis. 
Patterns are commonly observed and extracted from good practice. It is always desirable to 
mine existing practice or analysis to improve and upgrade existing patterns. However, it is 
not possible if we don’t have enough experience or the experiences are not well-documented. 
Inspired by the Make/Buy/Mine/Commission Analysis [53] for helping organisations to 
make conscious choice on how to introduce software assets, we recognize that safety 
argument patterns can be developed in one of three ways: 1) they can be mined from 
existing examples of mature (reviewed and accepted) safety case practice; 2) they can be 
bought in from standards and guidance; 3) new patterns can be made from systematic and 
critical thinking and evaluation of various safety assessment processes and products 
(required, desired and currently practiced). 
In our case, there is insufficient detailed guidance from existing standards to ‘buy’ a solution 
and, unfortunately, insufficient experience (of explicit model justification within safety 
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cases) to ‘mine’ a pattern. Therefore, our approach has been primarily to ‘make’ patterns and 
iterate for improvements, following community use and feedback. 
The following sections (Section6.8, Section 6.9 Section 6.10) will introduce three new 
argument patterns that address the structural issues during the argumentation according to the 
expanded process. 
• Two-Sidedness Argument Pattern – this pattern shows how counter considerations can be 
represented; it is applicable to in both primary safety arguments and confidence 
arguments; it may be adopted in Step E1, E3, E4, E6, E7, or E9 of the expanded process. 
• Safety Assessment Model Adequacy Argument pattern – this pattern shows how models 
are justified; it specifically corresponds to Step E7, for justifying the adequacy of safety 
assessment models as supporting evidence. 
• Cross-Model Inconsistency Analysis Adequacy Argument Pattern – this pattern shows 
how we justify the adequacy of the results of inconsistency analysis (as described in 
Chapter 5) between safety assessment models (part of the embedded argumentation 
inside Step E7 for backing up the use of inconsistency analysis results). 
6.8 Two-Sidedness Argument Pattern 
The argument having counter evidence considered may appear in different ways. For 
example, as shown in Figure 59, Spriggs [188] presents a generic argument structure that 
considers the absence of counter evidence for claims. In this example, the definition of 
argument decomposition strategies is influenced by the fact of absence of counter evidence. 
On the other hand, if counter evidence is found and discharged, the associated may appear in 
a different shape. Figure 60 (also from [188]) is another example that depicts no adverse 
impact from counter evidence.  
 
Figure 59  A Generic Argument with Absence of Counter Evidence (from [188]) 
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Figure 60 An Argument with Presence of Counter Evidence (from [188]) 
We generalize the consideration of counter evidence in safety case construction as a generic 
two-sidedness argument structure. This pattern is intended for a wider use of counter 
considerations in our thinking and arguing practice, and even in other safety activities. The 
pattern is designed for presenting supporting and opposing points in both primary safety 
arguments and confidence arguments. The pattern should be considered for all the expanded 
steps presented in Section 6.6.1. 
The two-sidedness argument pattern is depicted in Figure 61. For a more detailed description, 
readers are suggested to refer Appendix A.1.  
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Figure 61 Two-Sidedness Argument Pattern 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a)Two-sided safety argument 
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(b) Two-sided confidence argument 
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As Figure 61 illustrates, counter evidence {CE1…..CEn}16, if identified for a domain safety 
claim, should be presented in the primary safety argument structure (a). If one or more items 
of information have been identified as counter evidence for {Gx}, they should be presented 
with the WeakenedBy symbol introduced in Section 6.4. While both ‘support’ and 
‘challenge’ are provided for a goal, the strength of the primary argument is uncertain until 
we carefully examine these asserted relationships both as a whole and as individuals. It is 
valuable to cultivate a habit of considering both evidence for and against a claim. 
On the other hand, the confidence in all the evidential relationships presented in Figure 61 (a) 
can be separately presented in Figure 61 (b). The overall confidence needs to be established 
on the justification of all asserted relationships – every SupportedBy and every WeakenedBy 
together. Each item of supporting evidence should be justified for its trustworthiness and 
appropriateness of providing support. If there is no counter evidence presented in a primary 
safety argument, the GC4 should be chosen rather than GC5 or GC6. If there are any items of 
counter evidence presented, they should be addressed in CC1. Furthermore, the ideal result is 
that GC5 – ‘Counter evidence identified is discharged from refuting {Gx}’ – is developed for 
all items of counter evidence; whereas if there were unresolved items of counter evidence, 
GC6 – ‘Residual attack from counter evidence is tolerable’ – should be developed.   
In Figure 61 (b), what we want to highlight is to consider the overall adequacy of presented 
evidential relationships in combination. Certainly, each asserted relationship plays a role in 
it. But a local view of each asserted relationship individually is deficient for examining the 
sufficiency attribute of overall evidencing efforts and results. It is difficult to graphically 
represent the adequacy of a collection of asserted relationships, but it must be considered 
carefully in the instantiation of the pattern.  
This pattern is applicable to a wider situation, rather than to a fragmented primary safety 
argument only. It can be adopted and reused if there is a need to take into account of counter 
or alternative considerations into an argument construction process. 
                                                          
16
 In all patterns, texts in { } are placeholders for objects to be instantiated while applying the argument patterns. For 
example, {CE1….CEn} means a set of counter evidence items from 1 to n; {SE1…..SEm} means a set of supporting 
evidence items from 1 to m; {Gx} means a desired safety goal to be justified. 
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6.9 Model Adequacy Argument Pattern  
6.9.1 Synopsis View 
Safety assessment models can play all three types of roles in safety cases - Supporting-
Evidence, Counter-Evidence, and Context, as described in Section 6.2. In this section, we 
assume that a safety assessment model SAMx is adopted as an item of supporting evidence in 
a primary safety argument. Starting with this assumption, we aim to justify that SAMx is 
adequate for its usage as supporting evidence, specifically related to the Step E7 in Section 
6.6.8.  Nevertheless, the factors considered in the model adequacy argument pattern can also 
be adopted for justifying the adequacy of safety assessment models when they are in the 
other two roles. 
Through communication with researchers, industrial safety analysts, reviewers, and 
certification professionals, it is acknowledged that many factors should be considered in the 
justification of safety assessment models. However, the factors are not always explicitly and 
systematically presented, considered, and documented. It is also acknowledged that, before 
commencing modelling, there should be pre-justification of the choice of modelling 
techniques. Some factors to be addressed in justification of a safety assessment model 
include [196]: 
• The modelling technique adopted (and/or the tool adopted) is fit for the safety assessment 
task. 
• The representation is adequate (e.g. safety requirement representation, failure mode 
representation, failure logic representation). 
• The assumptions made during modelling are acceptable. 
• The input data used is appropriate for its usage. 
• Accidental modelling errors are sufficiently identified and eliminated. 
• The modeller is competent to do the modelling. 
• There is sufficient understanding of the entity being modelled. 
• The modelling tool is properly configured for the model. 
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The model adequacy argument pattern proposed in this section integrates these factors in a 
structured way in support of the implementation of Step E7 in the expanded argument 
construction process. 
A typical use of safety assessment models as evidence in a primary safety argument is 
presented in Figure 62. The evidence result assertion of SAMx is omitted in this figure. But 
as described in Figure 29 in Section 4.5.5, the connection between the source data of an item 
of evidence with an argument lies in evidence result assertions, the propositional content of 
the evidence item. The solution node in the graphical view of an argument provides only the 
reference to the original artefact of SAMx. 
 
Figure 62 Use of Model SAMx as Supporting-Evidence 
As engineering experience indicates, model adequacy is influenced and exhibited by a 
variety of factors. To depict these factors in a clear and organized way, we have divided the 
overall pattern into three parts. Figure 63 provides us a synopsis view of the context and 
relationships of the different parts of the argument pattern, which are associated with the 
adequacy of safety assessment models.  
 
Figure 63 Synopsis View of Model Adequacy Argument Pattern 
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6.9.2 Main View - Post Modelling Justification 
The justification and use of a safety model is achieved in two stages – the pre-modelling 
justification of the methodology selected (and tool adopted if there is one) and the post-
modelling justification of the adequate use of the model as evidence.  
Figure 64 illustrates the main view of the model adequacy argument pattern.  It is developed 
as a generic confidence argument linked with the exemplar primary safety argument 
presented in Figure 62. Appendix A.2 Part (a) presents more detailed description of the Post-
Modelling Justification of Model Adequacy Argument Pattern. 
The post-modelling justification blocks shown in Figure 64 are concerned with justification 
from the perspective of both the enactment (i.e. the specific execution instance of the 
modelling process) and the outcome of this modelling process (a specific safety assessment 
model that has been produced for a target system with the selected method and tool). Four 
different types of model-relevant information should be considered – the model building 
blocks or modelling construction elements, the assumed context of safety assessment models, 
the substantial results generated from safety assessment models, and the absence of 
unjustified inconsistency between comparable models. The lower level blocks in Figure 64 
are not orthogonal. The justification of model building blocks can be used to support the 
justification of safety modelling substance results. The block of inconsistency justification 
can be used to support the other three depending on the nature of the consistency 
relationships applied. Furthermore, although we do not describe justification during 
modelling, the in-line annotation of the modelling decisions and rationale during analysis is 
essential for the post-modelling justification. 
There are two parts of the adequacy argument pattern that are simplified in the main view:  
• the pre-modelling justification as a modular context block (it is presented as a separate 
argument module in Figure 66); 
• the decomposition of GM11 in - a sub-goal that is related to the model consistency of 
{SAMx} (it is refined with further details in a separate view in Figure 65). 
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Figure 64 Main View - Model Adequacy Argument Pattern 
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6.9.3 Branch View - Model Consistency Justification  
Figure 65 illustrates the generic argument structure of model adequacy justification based on 
the model consistency claimed, which is a refined part of the goal G11 in Figure 64. For a 
detailed description of the Model Consistency Justification of Model Adequacy Argument 
Pattern, readers should refer to Appendix A.2 Part (b). The goal G11 in the main view of the 
adequacy argument pattern is decomposed according to the typology of model consistency 
defined in Section 5.2.2. The cross-model inconsistency analysis suggested in Chapter 5 is 
addressed as a generic solution node in this part of the adequacy argument pattern. 
Similarly, since we present a reference to cross-model inconsistency analysis results by 
Solution 11.S1, we may need to provide further backing for the adequacy of inconsistency 
analysis. This is the topic of Section 6.10. 
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Figure 65 Branch View - Model Consistency Argument Pattern 
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6.9.4 Contextual Module of Pre-Modelling Justification 
Figure 66 illustrates the generic argument structure of pre-modelling justification. The pre-
modelling justification needs to consider the capability and feasibility of the selected 
technological elements in modelling – commonly the modelling method and the modelling 
tool. For example, it is necessary to consider if the expressive power of the modelling 
methodology is sufficient for the modelling intent (e.g. the important aspects of components 
behaviour can be represented; the important classes of inter-component interactions and 
dependencies can be represented). It is also necessary to check whether the analytic 
capability of the modelling methodology is sufficient for the modelling intent (e.g. resolution 
level of the calculation of failure rates, inference of failure effects), and whether the 
underlying assumptions of the methodology are acceptable for the system being modelled in 
terms of its modelling purpose. The resources needed by the modelling methodology need to 
be considered (e.g. assessing as to whether required data is available; or the tool support 
available is appropriate for the modelling requirement; or whether there exist sufficient 
modellers with the required knowledge and experience for the adoption of the methodology). 
Documenting the reasoning process behind the selection of modelling methodology (and or 
tool) can provide useful backing to the adequacy of safety assessment evidence adopted in a 
primary safety argument. 
Appendix A.2 Part (c) presents more detailed description of the Pre-Modelling Justification 
Module of Model Adequacy Argument Pattern. 
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Figure 66 Argument Pattern of Pre-Modelling Justification 
6.9.5 Pattern Features 
Some significant features of the model adequacy argument pattern (as presented in Section 
6.9.1~ Section 6.9.4) include: 
• It is in line with the confidence framework presented in Section 6.6.12.  
o It is developed particularly for confidence argument construction;  
o It makes clear the distinction between confidence arguments and a primary 
safety argument;  
o It addresses justification from both the modelling process perspective and the 
modelling product perspective. 
• Counter consideration has been accounted for and included in the pattern, e.g. the 
decomposition of different types of model consistency in Figure 65. 
• The source data of key contexts is in line with the safety assessment CoreDMM (as 
depicted in Chapter 3), e.g. CM2, CM7, CM8, CM9 can be obtained from SAM artefacts, 
as required by CoreDMM. 
• The dual effects of inconsistency analysis are shown in Figure 65. It has potential impact 
on both the trustworthiness of evidence information and the appropriateness of the 
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evidence relation. Whether both of these aspects (GM2 or GM3) are addressed depends 
on the specific consistency relationships defined and the inconsistencies identified. Each 
individual inconsistency identified should be considered comprehensively for both GM2 
and GM3.  
• It demonstrates how the results of the inconsistency analysis described in Chapter 5 can 
and should be integrated into a confidence argument, e.g. the Solution 11-S1 in Figure 
65. 
6.9.6 Role of Evidence Assertion 
The relationship of evidence assertions with the model adequacy argument pattern is 
depicted in this section. Even though no generic evidence assertions are presented in the 
model adequacy argument pattern, the pattern does indicate the importance of eliciting 
evidence assertions in order to provide assistance to using evidence properly and 
understanding the adequacy of evidence items more easily. 
From discussion with domain experts, we acknowledge that there are various types of model 
review or ‘validation’ activities that are planned and performed on different types of models 
with varied scales in real practice in a system lifecycle. It seems that the top goal GM1 in the 
model adequacy argument pattern can be decomposed according to these model evaluation 
activities, which may bring about a much simplified generic argument structure. However, 
thinking of the diverse model evaluation scenarios in reality, it is found that the generic sub-
goal decomposition based on model evaluation activities is of little use for clarifying the 
specific points that should be consider in the evaluation of safety assessment models, but 
only a requirement as a repetitive summarization of existing evaluation work. 
For example, if a human expert review report of SAMx (in short, ReportX) was used for 
supporting the confidence in the adequacy of SAMx directly, we could not see through the 
solution referenced in an argument of why the review report is an adequate item of 
supporting evidence. We may ask questions, such as: 
• What has been reviewed as recorded in ReportX?  
• The competency of the modeller, or each construction elements of SAMx?  
• Does the conclusion recorded in ReportX totally agree with and support the goal of 
‘sufficient confidence in the adequacy of SAMx’?  
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• Is the review rigorous enough? Does it cover multiple efforts in analyzing and examining 
SAMx in different ways and from different perspective?  
If evidence assertions are unstated and un-clarified, the evidential power of ReportX cannot 
be fully displayed. In the worse case, a weak and insufficient review may provide us an 
unaware partial view or illusion that we have sufficient confidence. However, the real case 
may be that the review covers only the competency of modellers and makes our confidence 
fully based on this belief. That is far from what is needed for the justification of complicated 
safety assessment models. To avoid such potential hazards to our confidence argument, 
explicit evidence result assertions can enable us link an item of evidence item, e.g. ReportX, 
with one or more sub-goals in the model adequacy argument pattern, which is significantly 
helpful for clarifying what kind of confidence sources have been considered and whether 
they have been addressed and demonstrated by an item of evidence.  
In addition, many of the sub-goals in the model adequacy argument pattern may need 
evidence descriptive assertions as supporting evidence. For example, to address the goal 
concerning modeller competency, descriptive assertions regarding the modeller and 
modelling technique can be used as support.  It is also impossible to be clear and explicit 
without evidence descriptive assertions, especially when an item of evidence is rich in 
content and/or complicated in nature.   
As shown in Section 4.6.1, Section 6.6.12 and the model adequacy argument pattern, 
confidence in safety cases originates from a variety of sources. Unless we have had a good 
understanding of the factors influencing our confidence in the use of a model, the confidence 
in the model results cannot be systematically established. Linking a top or higher-level goal 
in an argument directly with the reference to an item of evidence, cannot provide us clear 
view and understanding of the argument, if in absence of the help from evidence assertions. 
Obviously, reliance on digging out evidence assertions buried in the original evidence 
artefacts until safety case review stage is undesirable. Evidence assertions should be elicited 
during argument construction or even before the argument construction if the typical usage of 
items of evidence is known from experience.  
6.9.7 Undeveloped Goals 
There are still many undeveloped goals in the model adequacy argument pattern. This section 
provides instructions for some of them, and is intended to shed some light on how to address 
these goals in further supporting arguments. 
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GM4: a goal regarding the competency of modellers. This is a goal that worth more emphasis 
and weight than other process-related goals, e.g. GM5, GM6. In context of model 
justification, the knowledge and experience of the modeller about the system in question and 
the modelling technique are key factors to be evaluated for this goal. There are also good 
reference materials that may assist the development of this goal. For example, a generic 
argument structure is presented in [188], which depicts how ‘{Staff} has pertinent 
Knowledge’ can be further decomposed into six sub-goals. There is a systematic 
‘competence scheme’ defined in [104], which helps the break-down of personnel 
competency into sub-aspects. 
GM7: a goal addressing many details of construction elements in a model. The development 
can be based on the meta-model of a specific modelling technique. The various decisions 
made during a modelling process should be considered carefully. An example of partial 
detailed development of this goal is provided in Appendix C.5. 
GM8: a goal addressing details of substance elements of a model. It may be supported by the 
evaluation and analysis of the reasonableness of substantial modelling outputs that to be used 
in evidence result assertions. For example, the MCSs of a fault tree model should be 
evaluated for their reasonableness, as suggested by [137, 150]. 
GM10: a goal addressing contextual model elements that are often neglected. The main 
contextual data, such as assumptions of a model, limitations of a model, data sources of a 
model, are defined in CoreDMM in Chapter 3. The validity context of a model should be as 
explicit as possible. We need to examine the sufficiency of declared context to ensure that we 
have sufficiently clear understanding of the validity envelope of a model.  
GM12: a goal addressing that the declared validity context remains acceptable in the 
argumentation context. That is to say, for example, the assumptions made by a model are still 
considered acceptable when the model is used to support a domain safety goal.  It is 
necessary to check that the context of the model is compatible with the context assumed of 
the domain claim being supported by that model. 
6.10 Cross-Model Inconsistency Analysis 
Adequacy Pattern 
In this section, the justification of the adequacy of cross-model inconsistency analysis is 
presented in a structured way. As illustrated in Figure 67, four aspects need to be addressed 
in the justification process. 
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• The coverage and reasonableness of defined consistency relationships 
• The correctness of user-defined correspondences between models elements (if they exist) 
• The correctness and implementation of algorithms associated with defined consistency 
relationships 
• The reasonableness of the explanation of identified violations of consistency 
relationships. 
This pattern can be used in the Phase 6 of the cross-model inconsistency analysis method (as 
depicted in Section 5.4.7). It can also be adopted in presenting ‘backing of backing’ in Step 
E7 (as depicted in Section 6.6.8) for justifying the adequacy of evidence for the adequacy of 
an item evidence for a domain claim.  
 
Figure 67 Cross-Model Inconsistency Analysis Adequacy Argument Pattern 
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The context data needed in this pattern, e.g. CJ-C2, CJ-C3, CJ-C4, CJ-C5, is in line with the 
data recorded on the basis of the information model of cross-model inconsistency analysis 
presented in Chapter 5.   
6.11 Special Concerns 
The concerns and the patterns presented are intended to be inspirational and informative. 
According to the study in [196], we also need to be careful with the formulation and adoption 
of safety case patterns: 
• Patterns should not be inappropriately selected and dogmatically applied. 
• There is no exemption from critical thinking and thinking about the ‘lower-level’ details 
of safety arguments. 
• Rigorous safety case review should not be overlooked because of the adoption of 
patterns. 
Nevertheless, we believe that the high level structure of the justification of the validity of 
safety assessment models presented in previous sections will help shape a holistic view of 
factors influencing model validity. It can also influence the evidence acquisition requirement 
from the beginning of modelling, the data management and collection in the modelling 
process, and the subsequent evaluation of modelling artefacts in terms of their fitness for 
purposes. 
6.12 Summary 
In this chapter, we present an expanded safety case construction process and three safety case 
patterns. Through the expanded process, we are able to deal with positive argument and 
negative positive argument separately with distinctive steps; meanwhile, they are integrated/ 
organised within one coherent process, allowing clear elaboration of the relationships 
between elements in a primary safety argument and elements in associated confidence 
arguments. The three argument patterns have addressed comprehensively the confidence 
issues associated safety assessment models in an argumentation context. Importantly, the 
model adequacy argument pattern has used the outputs of previous chapters are as a basis of 
argument structuring: data elements within CoreDMM in Chapter 3 as Context and Solution 
in safety argument and confidence argument; data elements (evidential properties) within 
EviM in Chapter 4 for decomposition of goals in confidence argument; data elements from 
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cross-model inconsistency analysis in Chapter 5 in confidence argument. In addition, the 
application of EvidenceAssertion of EviM has been demonstrated in the case study of model 
adequacy argument construction in Appendix C.5.  
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7 Evaluation 
7.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 1, the following thesis proposition was stated: 
The use of a structured approach to the integration and justification of safety 
assessment evidence within safety cases facilitates the identification and 
potential resolution of issues which may otherwise reduce confidence in safety 
justification practice. 
The proposition is supported in the subsequent chapters through: 
• Structured information based on clarified concepts of safety assessment evidence and 
model consistency 
o The development of a safety assessment core data meta-model, a model of 
evidence that interfaces evidence items and safety arguments, and an 
information model of cross-model inconsistency analysis  
• Structured processes driven by active thinking and rigorous exploration 
o The elaboration of a cross-model inconsistency analysis method 
o The formulation of an expanded argument construction process 
• Structured guidance synthesized from dialectical argumentation and model evaluation 
practice 
o The development of argument patterns that presents reusable argument 
structures 
Within the time-span of the doctoral program, the evaluation of the thesis proposition has 
considered two main concerns, namely, the efficacy of the overall approach and the 
practicality of the approach. The efficacy part intends to demonstrate the declared capability 
of the approach to achieve the intended better integration and justification of safety 
assessment models; the practicality part aims to identify potential difficulties engaged in the 
application of the approach for establishing increased confidence in safety cases. 
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Section 7.2 describes the means of evaluation that have been applied in this thesis. Section 
7.3 explains how each research output is evaluated. Section 7.4 discusses further evaluation 
to be conducted.  
7.2 Means of Evaluation 
Different means of evaluation were employed during different phases of this doctoral study, 
with consideration of the features of the research outputs being assessed and the available 
resources. The means of evaluation adopted in the thesis include the following: 
• Simple running examples 
• Comparison with existing work 
• Formalisation with tool support 
• Case studies 
• Peer review 
The following subsections describe each of these forms of evaluation. Section7.3 presents the 
results of these forms of evaluation. 
7.2.1 Running Examples  
This is a simple form of evaluation at an early stage of a study that provides inline 
explanation and illustration of the ideas, concepts, models, or methods newly introduced in 
the thesis to facilitate understanding and to quickly demonstrate how they are used in typical 
application contexts. This is a weak form of evaluation, but it is useful for providing initial 
thoughts on the efficacy of a new concept or process. Running examples are presented in the 
thesis as much as possible in support of quick understanding and succinct illustration of 
ideas.  
7.2.2 Comparison with Existing Work 
Comparison with existing research and practice provides some context to judge the progress 
or improvements achieved through the research. It is a fundamental research step to 
acknowledging the existing work in academia and in industry that is relevant to the problem 
domain under study and identifying their strengths, disadvantages and deficiencies. This 
form of evaluation is adopted for demonstrating the reasonableness of conceptual outputs and 
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the benefits of methodical outputs. It can also explicate the intended application areas of 
research outputs and how they fit into the current domain practice. 
7.2.3 Formalisation with Tool Support 
The evaluation of conceptual outputs of research work, such as meta-models that capture 
concepts or information elements and relationships between them, is difficult. The 
formalisation of meta-models in a tool environment is one initial step of examining the 
coverage, the expressive-sufficiency and the self-consistency of the model definitions. 
Widely-used model editors, such as Eclipse Modelling Framework (EMF) [189], can support 
the examination of the expression sufficiency of defined meta-models in context of a meta-
meta-modelling language (e.g. Ecore [189]) and provides tool support for future attempts of 
more complicated model manipulation and potential mechanisation of some model analysis 
steps. EMF has been adopted for the three information models presented in the thesis. 
7.2.4 Case Studies 
A case study is an application of the defined approach using more detailed examples with a 
relatively real context. Compared to the simple running examples, case studies are a stronger 
means of evaluation for investigating the efficacy because of the real and concrete 
application context employed. Besides that, more issues potentially related to the practicality 
of a proposed approach may be identified during more extensive exercises in case studies 
with an application setting.  However, it is not always feasible to obtain a significant sample 
of case studies for each kind of research outputs. In the thesis, a case study is adopted for the 
evaluation of structured processes (cross-model inconsistency analysis and expanded 
argument construction) and structured argument patterns. 
A Braking System Control Unit (BSCU) of an aircraft Wheel Braking System (WBS) taken 
from ARP 4761 [181] is adopted as the example system under study. The system architecture 
is depicted in Figure 68. The BSCU is a computer used for handling braking commands and 
producing control signals to the brakes at wheels in order to decelerate the aircraft on the 
ground. 
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Figure 68 Example System Architecture 
We have two safety assessment models associated with this system at the PSSA stage (as 
described in the safety assessment process shown in Section 2.5.1). 
Model I:  Wheel Brake System taken from MISSA FLM Handbook [131]  
Coded as OCAS.4761.WBS. 
Model II:  Brake System Control Unit FTA taken from ARP 4761Appendix L [181] 
Coded as FT.4761.IB. 
Model I is a failure logic model expressed in AltaRica that is developed on the basis of the 
prototype wheel braking system as described in [181]. Comprehensive model descriptions of 
the ARP Wheel Braking System Failure Logic Modelling example are presented in [132]. 
Model II is a manually-constructed fault tree model taken from SAE ARP 4761 Appendix L 
[181]. 
In the case study, we apply the inconsistency analysis method defined in Chapter 5 to 
investigate the inconsistency between the two exemplar safety assessment models. We also 
evaluate the expanded argument construction process and the proposed argument patterns 
through the development of example arguments on the basis of the example models and the 
inconsistency analysis performed.  
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7.2.5 Peer Review 
Peer review is a common means of evaluation of research work. The exposition of research 
output to experts and practitioners in the safety domain can provide useful feedback to the 
efficacy and practicality of an approach. Some of the research outputs in the thesis have been 
communicated with and reviewed by the research and engineering community in the 
following ways: 
• Presentation of the research results at regular project meetings for the EC funded MISSA 
(More Integrated Systems Safety Assessment) project and feedback on work presented in 
project deliverables. 
• MISSA dissemination workshops to industry with presentation of materials by the 
author.  
• Peer-reviewed papers published at international conferences in the safety domain. 
7.3 Evaluation of Research 
7.3.1 Evaluation of Elaborated Concepts 
The three core concepts underlying the research presented in this thesis are Evidence, 
Inconsistency and Confidence. Despite the wide use of these concepts in safety engineering 
practice, they are not clearly defined and elaborated in the context of safety cases. The 
elaboration of these concepts is evaluated primarily by providing running examples and 
comparison with existing work.  
Evidence is the core subject under study in this thesis. In particular, our focus is on a 
common type of evidence – safety assessment models. Running examples of the 
representation of evidence and the elicitation of evidence assertions are provided in Chapter 
4. The establishment of the definition of evidence in a safety case is grounded on the 
comparison and analysis of existing conceptualisation of evidence in philosophy, law, 
evidence-based medicine and safety case guidance, as described in Section 4.2. 
Model inconsistency is one of the issues that may damage our confidence in the 
trustworthiness of evidence and the appropriateness of asserted evidence relationships. 
Running examples of different types of model inconsistency are provided in Section 5.2. The 
inconsistency defined in this thesis is formulated on the basis of discussions of the concepts 
of inconsistency in other domains and the diverse use of the term of inconsistency in system 
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safety, as shown in Section 5.2.1. The typology of model inconsistency is also established 
partially on the basis of a peer-reviewed conference paper [194]. 
Increased confidence is the ultimate objective to be achieved through the application of the 
approach presented in this thesis. The conceptual framework of confidence in safety cases is 
established on the basis of the analysis of existing work on confidence associated with safety 
cases (as described in Section 2.7.5). An exemplar use of the product-branch of the 
framework is depicted in the model adequacy argument pattern in Section 6.9. Further 
extensive peer review is expected for the evaluation of the overall confidence framework.  
7.3.2 Evaluation of Information Models 
Three information models are developed for capturing the core data and features of the 
elaborated concepts: a core data meta-model of safety assessment artefacts, a model of 
evidence interfacing arguments and the source data of evidence items, and an information 
model organising the interrelated data that is needed and emerges during cross-model 
inconsistency analysis. Running examples and comparison with existing safety meta-models 
are also employed in the evaluation of the core data meta-model. 
The diagrammatic views and the specification scripts of the three information models are 
presented in Appendix B. The classes and associations defined in EMF conform to the 
information structures presented in the main thesis chapters. The Ecore version of the 
information models form the basis of structured documentation of the elaborated concepts in 
a unified format, which not only facilitates communication of the concepts in implementation 
but also indicates the feasibility of future tool support. 
The expressive power of CoreDMM is illustrated with running examples in Section 3.4.2. 
The core data meta-model is compared with three typical existing domain meta-models in 
Section 3.4.3, for the illustration of its designed features in support of model evaluation and 
justification. This model has also been reviewed and presented at an international conference 
[193].  
In addition, as described in Section 6.9 and Section 6.10, the contextual information required 
by the model adequacy argument pattern and the inconsistency analysis justification matches 
the information elements that can be provided by the three information models. It also 
provides a partial indication that the conceptual coverage of the three information models 
satisfies the need of intended active evaluation and rigorous justification.  
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The model of evidence can be evaluated in comparison with the OMG SAEM. Due to the 
fact that SAEM and SACM are evolving work in progress (as Beta versions), we have briefly 
discussed the insufficiency of SAEM as our application context in Section 2.7.4. Future 
evaluation will be implemented with the update of SAEM and SACM for the distinction of 
our model of evidence from that presented in SAEM. The information model of cross-model 
inconsistency analysis is specially designed in support of the inconsistency analysis method 
in the thesis. The comparison with existing work is not suitable for evaluating this model.  
7.3.3 Evaluation of Structured Processes 
Two structured processes are defined in the thesis, one for guiding cross-model inconsistency 
analysis, another for constructing two-sided safety arguments. The two processes are 
relatively novel in the safety domain as there are no similar methods or processes in existing 
safety practice or public academic work in safety. Hence, running examples and case study 
are adopted as the major means of evaluation for these two processes. In addition, the 
inconsistency analysis method has been presented at two MISSA open workshops in 2010.  
A demonstration example for the defined cross-model inconsistency analysis method is 
presented in Section 5.5. Inline examples of each of the expanded steps in the expanded 
argument construction process are provided in Section 6.6 as an illustration of how to 
consider alternative and negative argument elements during the development of two-sided 
safety cases.  Even though the running examples are simple, they indicate the initial efficacy 
of the processes in a brief way.  
The case study is a contiguous example that integrates both the evaluation of the 
inconsistency analysis method and the evaluation of the expanded argument construction. 
Appendix C provides in detail the description of the models under study and the key results 
obtained from each phases of the inconsistency analysis and the example arguments 
constructed for justification of the adequacy of the example models.  
Case Study Details 
Model I of the case study is coded in AltaRica within OCAS Cecelia WorkShop17. The main 
graphical view of OCAS.4761.WBS is presented in Figure 69. The failure condition in this 
model under MCS analysis is ‘FC-WBS2: Inadvertent application of brakes’.  
                                                          
17
  OCAS Cecelia WorkShop is a tool environment for modelling with AltaRica developed by Dassault Aviation. 
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Figure 69 OCAS.4761.WBS in OCAS Cecilia 
Model II is a traditional fault tree. The top event is ‘BSCU commands braking in absence of 
braking inputs and causes inadvertent braking’. FT.4761.IB is presented graphically using 
OpenFTA [11], an open source tool for fault tree analysis. Figure 70 is the screenshot of the 
tree in OpenFTA. The detailed fault tree structure and the description of events of Model II 
are presented in Appendix C.3. 
The overlapping concern of safety analysis (represented by two models) is ‘Inadvertent 
braking caused by BSCU in absence of brake inputs’ (coded as FC.casestudy). 
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Figure 70 FT.4761.IB in OpenFTA  
A synopsis view of the case study on the inconsistency analysis is presented here. More 
details concerning the implementation are provided in Appendix C.4. The consistency 
relationships elaborated during the inconsistency analysis are presented in Table 14. 
 
 
 
Table 14 Consistency Relationships of the Case Study  
We set up correspondences between elements of the two models under study and examine 
whether CaCR1 and CaCR2 have been violated. After comparing the conditions and MCSs 
within the scope of inconsistency analysis, we have identified the following violations of 
defined consistency relationships: 
• six violations for CaCR1 (e.g. V1-1: The e104 in FT.4761.IB does not have a 
corresponding condition in OCAS.4761.WBS); 
• six violations for CaCR2 (e.g. V2-1: {e204, e211, e214} does not have approximate 
corresponding MCS in OCAS.4761.WBS analysis results) 
CaCR1:  Each ‘condition’ shown in Mb has a corresponding ‘condition’ in Ma.  
CaCR2:  Each MCS in Mb associated with the top event has a corresponding MCS 
in Ma that contributes to the overlapping concern (FC.casestudy). 
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Six out of the 12 violations have been identified as inconsistencies against defined 
consistency relationship CaCR1 and CaCR2, while others have been dismissed due to the 
reasons provided. For example, V1-1 is not identified as an inconsistency scenario, because 
e104 are not modelled within BSCU1 in OCAS.4761.WBS with the model assumption that 
“the power supply monitor of BSCU1 does not fail in mission”; V2-1 is identified as an 
inconsistency scenario, because the Omission of e211 in the relevant MCSs of 
OCAS.4761.WBS is not allowed. 
Based on the models and the inconsistency analysis results in this case study, we have 
illustrated how to take into account counter evidence and alternative information during 
safety case construction. The primary safety argument is developed on the basis of the safety 
goals extracted from ARP 4761 system description and safety analysis. The two models used 
in the case study are all presented as supporting evidence for a lower-level domain safety 
goal –‘No single failure of the BSCU shall lead to inadvertent braking’. Figure 71 presents 
the primary safety argument used in the case study.  
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Figure 71 Example Primary Safety Argument in the Case Study  
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The model adequacy argument for OCAS.4761.WBS has been constructed on the basis of the 
model adequacy pattern presented in Chapter 6. It is also the implementation result of the 
Step E7 of the expanded argument construction process.  Figure 72 presents an overview of 
the model adequacy argument in ASCE environment [16]. 
 
Figure 72 Example Model Adequacy Argument in ASCE 
Case Study Conclusions Regarding Inconsistency Analysis 
The case study illustrates the feasibility of applying of the processes on a realistic industrial 
example. However, it also highlights some difficulties that emerged through the application 
of the cross-model inconsistency analysis method and the expanded argument construction 
process.  
Besides the practical issues discussed in Section 5.6, the difficulties which emerged in 
application of the cross-model inconsistency analysis in the case study include: 
1) A fundamental requirement of performing inconsistency analysis between two safety 
assessment models is the sufficient understanding of the models, including the modelling 
techniques adopted and the various construction elements, substance elements, contextual 
elements of the models under analysis. Otherwise, it is neither possible to determine the 
comparison scope and the consistency relationships, nor to set up correspondences 
between model elements. 
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2) The cross-check between two models based on different modelling techniques is 
necessarily grounded on the existence of reasonable ‘correspondences’ between the 
varied modelling constructs of two modelling techniques. If no such correspondences 
exist between the concepts used in two different modelling techniques, the models based 
on different techniques are not comparable. For example, the basic events described in a 
fault tree can be associated with three different modelling concepts (flow, state, event) 
[132] in the failure logic modelling (FLM) with AltaRica language. However, for the 
comparison purpose needed in the inconsistency analysis, we only map the ‘basic event’ 
concept in a fault tree with the ‘failure event’ concept in FLM with AltaRica. 
3) The identification and definition of the scope of model elements to be examined through 
inconsistency analysis can be difficult. A common scenario in reality is that we rarely 
have two models with exactly the same modelling scope. Usually, the scope of the 
system elements being modelled or the scope of the safety concerns covered in two 
models is different. We need to rely upon the analysts to identify the overlapping model 
elements that represent similar or identical subjects in the real world. Machine support 
for this task is almost impossible, because it is impractical to expect the same naming 
convention in two separate modelling processes or to expect the selection of identical 
names for instances of model constructs in advance.  
4) Acknowledging the different abstraction levels of model elements in two models is 
important during the inconsistency analysis. Insufficient understanding of the differences 
exhibited by model elements caused by different abstraction levels will hinder the 
specification of correspondences between two models. For example, two failure modes in 
a model may be expressed as one failure mode in another model; one system element in 
one model may be modelled as two model elements in another model. Therefore, the 
correspondence relationships between elements from two models are not limited to the 
‘equivalence’ relationship (which means two elements from two models respectively can 
substitute each other without adding or losing any information or function associated 
with the original model elements). In many cases, ‘loose’ correspondences (a relationship 
that may enable one model element to work as a substitute of another model element 
approximately in one direction) are used for consistency checking purposes. For 
example, we assume FMa in Model A corresponds to FMb1 and FMb2 in Model B. Then 
we may use FMa to replace FMb1 and FMb2 for evaluating the MCS correspondences 
between Model A and Model B. But we cannot use FMb1 or FMb2 to replace FMa to 
support the analysis of MCS correspondences. 
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5) Definition of consistency relationships is crucial for the meaningfulness of the 
inconsistency analysis. Although it is defined as Phase 2 of the inconsistency analysis 
process, it interplays with Phase 1 in practice. In some cases, we identify models for 
inconsistency analysis and clarify the inconsistency analysis scope before the definition 
or selection of consistency relationships. In some other cases, we have prior knowledge 
of some generic consistency relationships, thus models can be selected and the analysis 
scope can be defined in accordance with the expected consistency relationships.  
6) It is impractical to have a complete set of potential consistency relationships between two 
models. Therefore, the evidence result assertion based on the inconsistency analysis 
results cannot support a claim of absolute consistency between two models, but only one 
of consistency within the limits of the consistency relationships identified and examined 
in the analysis (as shown in the model adequacy argument pattern in Section 6.9). 
7) In terms of concrete consistency relationships, those addressing condition coverage 
usually can be examined exhaustively in cross-model inconsistency analysis; whereas 
those addressing the logical combinations of conditions (such as MCS) are impractical to 
examine exhaustively in many cases. One reason for that is that it takes a long time to 
walk through all high-order MCS (e.g. all MCSs of a complicated model whose 
cardinality is higher than 4). Another reason for it is that if the correspondences between 
conditions are complicated (e.g. in other types such as ‘is the component of’ or ‘is the 
cause of’ rather than simple ‘equivalence’ only), the comparison of high-order MCSs can 
be difficult without tool support. 
8) Defining correspondences between elements from two models can be time-consuming 
and error-prone. It requires careful work by an analyst, even if he knows the details of 
both models very well. In most cases, the modellers of the two models under study and 
the inconsistency analyst need to work together to ensure the ‘correctness’ of the 
correspondences defined. Otherwise, there can be little confidence in the results of the 
inconsistency analysis.  
9) The implementation phase of the analysis method can be labour-intensive and needs 
precision if the models are complicated. However, we can never expect full machine 
support for the inconsistency analysis method. As we see from the case study, each phase 
of the inconsistency analysis involves human judgement. Due to the diversity of data 
formats and conceptual frames used by different safety assessment models, it is also not 
possible to have a fully automatic inconsistency analysis in reality. But to explore the 
potential of tool support for some of the checking steps is very necessary in order to 
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release human experts from repetitive search and match work to focusing on the more 
intellectual part of the inconsistency analysis.  
Interestingly, the case study of the application of the inconsistency analysis method also 
reveals some issues concerning FLM in AltaRica and FTA. For example, it is convenient to 
retrieve the associations between a ‘condition’ and a ‘system element’ in the FLM in 
AltaRica, but time-consuming for the user to define such associations manually in a 
traditional fault tree (errors may be introduced in the manual association-setting process). It 
is inappropriate to consider the correspondences between ‘failure events’ in an AltaRica 
model and the ‘basic events’ in a traditional fault tree alone; the correspondence cannot be 
done without analyzing the relationships of the ‘state’ and ‘flow’ elements in an AltaRica 
model and the ‘basic events’ of a fault tree.  
Case Study Conclusions Regarding Expanded Argument Construction 
The case study results of argument construction are presented in Appendix C.5. The results 
of the case study of inconsistency analysis are employed in the demonstration example of 
argument construction. The case study illustrates the applicability of the expanded process 
and the generic structure of argument patterns. The function of evidence assertions are also 
illustrated with examples on the basis of the analysis of lower-level supporting goals in the 
example argument in Appendix C.5.  
Besides the practical issues discussed in Section 6.6.12, the difficulties which emerged 
during the application of the expanded argument construction process in the case study 
include: 
• The work load. Incorporating counter evidence in a safety case involves significant 
efforts and is experience-based. The progress of an argument may be slow down due to 
the consideration of counter evidence. 
• The scope of search for counter evidence or alternative information. There is no clear 
boundary of potential information sources needed to be considered in those expanded 
steps. The efforts on counter considerations and rigorous justification should be 
proportionate to the risk associated with an argument element stated. However, this can 
be difficult to judge in practice.  
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7.3.4 Evaluation of Argument Patterns 
Three argument patterns addressing different level of detail in argument structures are 
defined in Chapter 6. As described in Section 6.7.2, the argument patterns developed during 
the study have primarily been constructed on the basis of analysis of the problem domain and 
inspirations from informal arguments. Extensive application in practical context and 
designed peer reviews are significantly desired in the evaluation of these argument patterns.  
Within the time-scale of the study, the following evaluation is performed for the argument 
patterns. The two-sidedness argument pattern was applied in the development of the model 
adequacy argument pattern. The model adequacy argument pattern is primarily evaluated 
through peer review during the MISSA project. The inconsistency analysis adequacy pattern 
is generated on the basis of the analyses of the inconsistency analysis method. The model 
adequacy argument pattern and the inconsistency analysis adequacy pattern have been 
exercised in a case study based on the models presented in Appendix C.2 and the results of 
inconsistency analysis presented in Appendix C.4. 
The model adequacy argument pattern has experienced more extensive peer review than have 
the other two patterns. Early forms of the model adequacy argument pattern were supplied to 
project partners in the MISSA project. The model adequacy pattern was peer reviewed by 
both research and industrial project partners in later phases of the project. There were also 
trial uses of two patterns developed in MISSA project by Mr Keval Mehta, an intern at 
Airbus (UK) for supporting the construction of primary safety arguments and model 
adequacy arguments at the SSA (System Safety Assessment) stage. The model adequacy 
pattern in the thesis is a refined version of the project work, incorporating informal feedbacks 
primarily from Airbus (UK), EADS APSYS, ONERA, and ALENIA). The key goals in the 
model adequacy pattern has also been presented as model justification concerns in a peer-
reviewed conference paper [196].  
7.4 Conducting Further Evaluation 
The research outputs in the thesis are evaluated through some forms of evaluation for their 
efficacy and practicality during the study. However, we are aware that further evaluation is 
desired, as outlined below, in order to achieve a more informative assessment of the 
effectiveness and practicality of the overall structured approach if time and resources are not 
constrained: 
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• Exposure of the structured approach to a wider community of researchers and 
practitioners for peer reviews, especially the applicability of the inconsistency analysis, 
the expanded argument construction, and the argument patterns; 
• Implementation of the structured approach with more case studies carried out in an 
industrial context, especially the inconsistency analysis method and the expanded 
argumentation process;  
• Further evaluation of the confidence conceptual framework through questionnaire-based 
peer review for examining the adequacy and sufficiency of the confidence factors that are 
presented in the framework; 
• Comparison with the first release of the OMG SACM when it becomes publicly available 
for investigating the applicability of EviM.  
7.5 Summary 
This chapter reports on the evaluation of the efficacy and practicality of a structured 
approach of integrating and justifying safety assessment models within safety cases. The 
structured approach, which is based on three types of research outputs, has been exposed to a 
number of modes of evaluation, according to the features of different types of outputs and the 
time and resources available. 
It is demonstrated by the evaluation activities that the conceptual models defined in Chapter 
3 and Chapter 4 are fit for the purpose of concept clarification and the need of integrating 
argument and evidence; the inconsistency analysis method defined in Chapter 5 is structured 
and feasible; the expanded argument construction process and the argument patterns are 
practical. In addition, we acknowledge the need for further evaluation of the effectiveness, 
benefits and practical issues of the approach in an industrial application context.  
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8 Conclusions and Future Work 
8.1 Thesis Contributions 
This thesis has defined and demonstrated a structured approach to establishing confidence in 
safety assessment evidence within safety case development. The contribution of the thesis 
lies in five principal areas: 
• Definition of three meta-models to support the definition and integration of safety 
assessment evidence with arguments  
o A safety assessment core data meta-model (CoreDMM) (presented in Chapter 
3) 
o A model of evidence (EviM) (presented in Chapter 4) 
o An information model of cross-model inconsistency analysis (presented in 
Chapter 5) 
• Definition of a conceptual framework of confidence in a safety case that captures key 
issues to be justified in structured confidence arguments (presented in Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 6) 
• Definition and evaluation of a structured cross-model inconsistency analysis method for 
rigorous scrutiny of safety assessment models (presented in Chapter 5) 
• Definition and evaluation of an expanded safety argument construction process that 
incorporates alternative and opposing information needed by a balanced and defensible 
two-sided argument (presented in Chapter 6) 
• Development and evaluation of three argument patterns in support of more systematic 
and structured justification of the adequacy of safety assessment models, which utilises 
the data elements organised by the three meta-models (presented in Chapter 6). 
8.1.1 Conclusions on Definition of Meta-Models 
As distinct from other existing meta-models in the safety domain (e.g. meta-models in [46, 
79, 212]), the safety assessment CoreDMM defined in Chapter 3 captures a comprehensive 
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set of data elements that are necessary for cross-model inconsistency analysis and confidence 
argument construction. As described in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, the data elements of 
CoreDMM have been referenced in the inconsistency analysis process and the model 
adequacy argument pattern. 
The model of evidence (EviM) defined in Chapter 4 is founded on the analysis of existing 
definitions of evidence. Rather than emphasising the diversity of multiple forms of evidence 
source data, EviM has stressed the connotation of evidence and encompassed the two types 
of evidence assertions (namely evidence result assertion and evidence descriptive assertion) 
explicitly. In addition, EviM has distinguished an item of evidence from a set of evidence 
items and has differentiated the evidential properties of EvidenceItem and the evidential 
properties of EvidenceSet, both of which should be considered in assured safety arguments.     
The information model that supports cross-model inconsistency analysis defined in Chapter 5 
has captured the information elements associated with a cross-model inconsistency analysis. 
It is functionally linked with the safety assessment CoreDMM and the model of evidence. 
The safety assessment models under cross-model inconsistency analysis can refer to 
SafetyAssessmentArtefact in CoreDMM. The data elements in the information model of 
inconsistency analysis can be used as evidence or context in confidence arguments.  
The three meta-models, working altogether, establish a foundation of managing the 
structured data elements associated with safety assessment models for their usage within 
safety cases. No previous published models or meta-models specifically tackle, or can be 
used for, this purpose in their own right. 
8.1.2 Conclusions on Conceptual Framework of Confidence 
Confidence in safety cases is a subjective issue. However, the conceptual framework of 
confidence in a safety case defined in Chapter 4 and refined in Chapter 6 explicitly presents a 
deconstructed justification of confidence within safety cases in general, and highlights more 
concrete and specific confidence issues that can be used for assisting comprehensive and 
systematic justification of confidence in a safety case. 
Unlike the existing research on confidence in safety arguments or safety cases [34, 41, 97, 
205] and quantified confidence in arguments [40, 60, 63, 134],  the conceptual framework of 
confidence in a safety case presented in this thesis has encompassed both product elements 
and process elements in safety cases as contributing factors to confidence in practice and has 
incorporated both the supportive and opposing sides of argumentation. Existing models on 
confidence in safety cases have not taken into account the residual risks that are brought 
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about by missing or omitted argument elements (potential arguments and evidence not 
presented but which can support or challenge claims in a safety case). Through addressing 
issues that arise from the explicit consideration of counter evidence in our confidence 
framework, the view of confidence has been broadened significantly. In fact, if two-sided 
argumentation is rigorously adopted in safety cases, the sufficiency and adequacy of the 
structures of some of the belief models (e.g. the Bayesian belief model in [63]) for safety 
arguments may be challenged fundamentally.  
8.1.3 Conclusions on Structured Inconsistency Analysis Method 
The cross-model inconsistency analysis defined in Chapter 5 has captured the key phases in a 
cross-model inconsistency analysis process. Each phase of the method has been elaborated 
with clear aims, inputs and outputs. The difficulties and pitfalls that may arise during the 
application of this method have been explored and discussed on the basis of a running 
example and a case study. The method provides a means of facilitating rigorous 
identification of cross-model inconsistency, motivating explicit structured documentation of 
inconsistency analyses and supporting justification of the adequacy of safety assessment 
models as evidence. 
From the experience we obtained from MISSA project partners, we know that inconsistency 
analysis performed on different safety assessment models is usually an informal engineering 
activity. Compared with existing practice, the structured inconsistency analysis method helps 
conduct cross-model inconsistency analysis between safety assessment models in a more 
systematic manner and highlights the confidence and justification concerns associated with 
the inconsistency analysis itself.  
The method can be adopted within, or outside of, the context of a safety case. The 
consistency of diverse evidence items (in particular, qualitative safety assessment models 
presented as evidence or context in a safety case) can be examined more rigorously with this 
method. Existing literature on evidence in safety cases has not addressed the inconsistency 
issue between evidence items with a structured method before. This structured method can 
prompt a more active consideration and exploration of inconsistency between evidence items 
used within a safety case. 
 236 
 
8.1.4 Conclusions on Expanded Safety Argument Construction 
Process  
The expanded safety argument construction process is an improvement of the existing Six-
Step GSN method [117]. Common safety case development practice typically focuses on 
positive safety arguments and supporting evidence, as shown by many publicly accessible 
safety cases and safety case patterns (e.g. [73, 117, 126]). Counter evidence or counter 
considerations, as discussed in Section 6.3 and Section 6.5, have been considered but usually 
at the safety case review stage (late in a safety case lifecycle), rather than been addressed as a 
necessary issue of explicit concern during safety case development. In this thesis, the original 
Six-Step method has been expanded with nine extra steps. Three of them (Step E2, Step E5 
and Step E8 in Figure 51 in Chapter 6) specifically consider counter or alternative 
information relevant to a safety argument; the other six (Step E1, Step E3, Step E4, Step E6, 
Step E7 and Step E9 in Figure 51 in Chapter 6) focus on providing justification of argument 
elements addressed in a safety case. In addition, two steps of the original Six-Step method 
have been enforced along with the expanded process (namely, consideration of alternative 
strategies at Step 3 and justification of inferences at Step 5). As a result, the expanded 
process has significantly extended the scope of issues being explicitly addressed in the 
development safety cases.  
With the expanded steps, the two-sided argumentation and the confidence argument 
construction are coherently and methodically integrated within traditional safety case 
development practice. The expanded argument construction process also helps us to avoid 
potential fallacies (e.g. omission of key evidence) or potential biases (one-sided argument) in 
safety arguments. In short, the expanded argument construction process instils more rigour 
into to existing guidance on structured argument construction and can help the development 
of more balanced and defensible safety cases than those established through existing safety 
case practice. 
8.1.5 Conclusions on Argument Patterns 
Three argument patterns accompanying the expanded argument construction have been 
presented in Chapter 6. The Two-Sidedness Argument Pattern consists of two parts (as 
presented in Section 6.8). The two-sided safety argument structure can be used for citing 
both supporting evidence and counter evidence in a primary safety argument. The two-sided 
confidence argument structure can be used for justifying the confidence in the primary safety 
argument; it is established on the presence of supporting evidence and the resolution of 
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counter evidence (either absence, or discharge, or tolerance, of items of counter evidence). 
This is a novel pattern that stresses the consideration and justification of counter evidence in 
a safety case and provides a way of describing positive claims associated with items of 
counter evidence in a confidence argument.  
The Model Adequacy Argument Pattern comprises three parts. The post-modelling part (as 
presented in Section 6.9.2) has addressed the details of both the enactment and the output of 
a safety assessment modelling process in the model adequacy argument structure. The model 
consistency part (as presented in Section 6.9.3) addresses the decomposition of confidence in 
model consistency on the basis of inconsistency classification and cross-model inconsistency 
analysis as defined in Chapter 5. The structure of this part itself is an extension and exemplar 
use of the two-sidedness argument pattern. The pre-modelling part addresses the justification 
of the modelling method and the modelling tool adopted in safety assessment as the context 
of the post-modelling part. Importantly, justification concerns regarding the confidence 
associated with the use of safety assessment models (qualitative models only) as evidence 
within a safety case has been addressed in more detail than ever before in this three-part 
argument pattern. The more concrete but still generic sub-goals presented in this argument 
pattern can facilitate active thinking during model construction and justification and drive 
more rigorous model annotation and documentation during safety assessment modelling.  
The Cross-Model Inconsistency Adequacy Argument Pattern addresses the key concerns that 
affect the confidence in adopting inconsistency analysis results as evidence for or against a 
model adequacy claim. It provides substantial guidance and support to the last phase of the 
inconsistency analysis method defined in Chapter 5. It also deepens our understanding of the 
potential weakness and limitations of the cross-model inconsistency analysis performed.  
The three argument patterns directly utilise the structured data elements defined in the three 
meta-models and can be instantiated during the expanded argument construction process and 
the cross-model inconsistency analysis process.  
Through the evaluation of the research outputs presented in Chapter 7, it is demonstrated that 
the overall structured approach (the integration of structured information, structured 
processes and structured guidance defined in this thesis) is rigorous and practical in 
providing support for the systematic integration and justification of safety assessment models 
in order to establishing better confidence in safety assessment practice, as stated by the thesis 
proposition initially presented in Chapter 1. 
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8.2 Areas of Future work 
In addition to the contributions that the thesis has made, there are five interesting and 
promising areas that have emerged as a result of the research outputs presented in this thesis:  
• Structured expression of evidence assertions 
• More sophisticated and informative relationships of correspondence specification in 
inconsistency analysis  
• Potential (partial) mechanised tool support for inconsistency analysis 
• Analysis and justification of quantitative safety assessment models  
• Quantification of confidence establishment   
8.2.1 Structured Expression of Evidence Assertions  
In Chapter 4, evidence assertions are defined and elaborated with examples. However, both 
types of evidence assertions (evidence result assertions and evidence descriptive assertions) 
have been described by natural language in the thesis. In order to facilitate structured and 
unambiguous communication of the meaning of evidence assertions and integration of EviM 
with a domain model and to expand the applicability of evidence assertions, we could 
explore using SBVR (Semantics of Business Vocabulary and Business Rules) [157] to define 
potential vocabularies and rules that could be used in evidence assertions, similar to the 
recent efforts by the OMG on using SBVR in SAEM [158]. Evidence assertion templates in 
structured English for different evidence types may be provided and applied for better 
integration of evidence and argument. This would also be useful supplement work to the 
research in formalism in safety cases (e.g.[142, 176, 192]). 
8.2.2 Sophisticated Correspondence Specification 
The consistency relationships between two models under inconsistency analysis are 
formulated on the basis of domain knowledge. It is identified through the case study of cross-
model inconsistency analysis that the types of correspondences (a pair of data elements of 
two safety assessment models that are linked with specified relationships) that are associated 
with the defined consistency relationships can be more complicated than the simple 
‘equivalent to’ relationships. For example, a ‘condition’ may need to be associated with 
another in the corresponding model that is described as its ‘cause’ or ‘effect’ or ‘failure 
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mode’ of its parent system element. Some sophisticated correspondence relationships 
between model elements are very interesting, e.g. unidirectional correspondences, 
bidirectional correspondences, synchronized correspondences, cause-effect correspondences, 
or parent-component correspondences. Further investigation of these potential types of 
correspondences and their impact on reasoning using consistency relationships, would be 
beneficial to expand the scope of inconsistencies that can be inferred for examination. These 
sophisticated correspondences are at the model instance level, which are different from, but 
may be able to benefit from, the research on mapping languages [50] and model comparison 
[125] in the MDE domain.   
8.2.3 Mechanised Tool Support for Inconsistency Analysis 
In the thesis, the walkthrough of the inconsistency analysis method with examples is 
conducted manually. However, as reflected in the case study, it can be difficult for analysts 
to handle some of the tasks in Phase 3 (the implementation of model comparison) of the 
method if the scale of the models under analysis is large. Manually inferring and examining 
the correspondence pairs for consistency violations can be error-prone. Mechanised model 
comparison and inconsistency checking may be established on the basis of exchangeable data 
format and unified naming conventions and may relieve analysts from repetitive and 
stereotyped tasks. A mapping tool and a comparison tool in support of inconsistency analysis 
partially have been developed in MISSA project [133]. However, the tools are specialised for 
two models specified in AltaRica and a specific model consistency relationship. To examine 
inconsistency between models that are based on varied modelling constructs and documented 
according to different data formats, tool support is also very necessary, but much more 
difficult. It is worthwhile to explore the potential of introducing modern MDE techniques to 
aid some analysis steps if more work is undertaken in safety concept mapping and data 
format unification. Although it is acknowledged that completely automated model 
comparison is unachievable [166] due to the semantic issues in models, further work in this 
area may significantly improve the efficiency of inconsistency analysis and help to formulate 
and refine a Data Interchange Format of common safety assessment models at the 
implementation level of model comparison.  
8.2.4 Analysis and Justification of Quantitative Models  
The subject under study in this thesis is qualitative safety assessment models. However, the 
research outputs of the thesis can serve as the qualitative foundation of the analysis and 
justification of quantitative safety assessment models that are also important and common in 
safety assessment practice. It would be worthwhile to investigate and extend the work on 
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structured inconsistency analysis to those quantitative models. For example, it would be 
interesting to explore the quantitative consistency relationships (with numerical features) that 
may exist between two quantitative safety assessment models (e.g. the expected value range, 
gap, or change of corresponding failure rates in two models). It would also be practical to 
adapt and extend the work on structured model justification for quantitative models. For 
example, integrating existing model validation research on quantitative models and 
simulation [28, 151], we can develop an argument pattern for justifying the adequacy of 
quantitative safety assessment evidence based on the model adequacy argument pattern 
presented in this thesis. 
8.2.5 Quantification of Confidence Structures   
It is known from experience gained through our partners on the MISSA project that 
engineers can feel uncomfortable with phrases of ‘sufficient confidence’ associated with the 
argument patterns and the confidence framework defined in this thesis. Quantified 
confidence is highly desirable for wider industrial application of the work presented. 
Through the quantification of the qualitative structure of confidence, the practicality of the 
qualitative structure may be testified or improved (e.g. identification of the (types of) 
parameters that should be measured). Furthermore, the formation of quantitative confidence 
models (e.g. a Bayesian belief model associated with model inconsistency analysis) can help 
us perform machine-supported reasoning of confidence. It can also shed light on the 
mechanisms of confidence propagation between factors that can affect (positively or 
negatively) the confidence in an argument.  
In addition, as described in Section 7.4, it is also desirable to carry out further evaluation in a 
real industrial context, in order to demonstrate the potential benefits, effectiveness and 
practical issues associated with the approach defined in the thesis.  
8.3 Finale 
A little knowledge of safety-critical systems and the associated safety assessment models is a 
dangerous thing. A little acknowledgement of our limited knowledge of them is another 
dangerous thing. Confidence in safety assessment models as evidence in safety cases can be 
established explicitly and reasonably using the structured approach presented in the thesis. 
However, the establishment and demonstration of confidence in safety arguments and 
evidence may only be implemented as rigorously as reasonably practicable (ARARP), as 
permitted by time and resource constraints and in a way that is commensurate with risk 
associated with a safety case. In addition, the approach defined in this thesis can help 
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engineers better manage confidence issues, but cannot totally take away the issue of 
subjectivity (an issue at the heart of the nature of confidence in safety cases). There is 
approximately fifty years of experience in both safety analysis and safety case development 
(more in some domains than in others) and it will take a considerable time to determine if 
these established practices can usefully be shaped by the contribution of the thesis.  
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Appendix A Argument Patterns 
A.1 Two-Sidedness Argument Pattern 
Two-Sidedness Argument Pattern 
Author Linling Sun, Tim Kelly 
Created 08/07/2011 11:41:00 Last Modified 10/12/2012 23:06:00 
 
Intent This pattern provides a generic argument structure for presenting how 
counter evidence is considered and represented in a primary safety 
argument and the associated confidence argument.  
Motivation This pattern was developed: 
• To present the relationship between potential items of evidence 
(either supporting evidence or counter evidence) and a domain safety 
claim 
• To clarify the goals to be justified for the backing of sufficient 
support from supporting evidence  
• To clarify the goals to be justified for the backing of the survival of 
the domain safety claim with consideration of counter evidence 
Structure 
The structure of this pattern consists of two parts: 
(a) the primary safety argument part 
(b) the confidence argument part 
 (a) 
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Participants GS1 GS1 states a domain safety claim {Gx} to be assessed, 
which is at a level that can be supported directly by 
items of evidence. GS1 may be addressed both by 
supporting evidence and by counter evidence. 
 SolutionSE Items of supporting evidence {SE1…SEm} for {Gx}. 
The evidence result assertion of {SEx} should be 
capable of indicating that GS1 is true. There may be 
more than one items of supporting evidence.   
 SolutionCE Items of counter evidence {CE1…CEn} for {Gx}. If no 
counter evidence is identified, this node does not 
appear. The evidence result assertion of an item of 
counter evidence should be capable of challenging the 
truth value of GS1. There may be more than one item 
of counter evidence. 
 GC1 GC1 defines the overall justification objective that is 
required for establishing sufficient confidence that GS1 
is true. It takes into account both asserted evidence 
relationships and asserted counter evidence 
relationships that are associated with GS1. 
 SC1 Provided at this point to support the decomposition of 
claim GC1 on the basis of the feature of asserted 
evidence relationships and the feature of supporting 
evidence (SolutionSE).  
 SC2 Provided at this point to support the decomposition of 
claim GC1 on the basis of the consideration of counter 
evidence, e.g. whether there are no attacks from items 
of counter evidence for GS1, whether GS1 survives 
being true against the challenges from items of counter 
evidence (SolutionCE). 
 GC2 A sub-goal that supports GC1 that is focused on the 
trustworthiness of items of evidence. This goal can be 
further decomposed for each item of supporting 
evidence. It can also be addressed by considering 
various factors that affect the trustworthiness of a 
specific item of supporting evidence. For a typical form 
of supporting evidence, safety assessment models, the 
lower-level generic argument structure of the 
development of this goal is presented in GM2 of Part 
(a) of the model adequacy argument pattern. 
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 GC3 A sub-goal that supports GC1 that is focused on the 
appropriateness of the asserted relationships between 
GS1 and SolutionSE. This goal can be further 
decomposed for each asserted supporting evidence 
relationship. It can also be addressed by considering 
various factors that affect the appropriateness of 
individual asserted evidence relationships or the 
appropriateness of asserted evidence relationships as a 
collection. For a typical form of supporting evidence, 
safety assessment models, the lower-level generic 
argument structure of the development of this goal is 
presented in GM3 of Part (a) of the model adequacy 
argument pattern. 
 GC4 A sub-goal that supports GC1 from the opposing side of 
the argument. GC4 and GC5 are mutually exclusive. 
Even if no SolutionCE is shown in the primary safety 
argument, we still need evidence of absence of counter 
evidence to support Goal GC4.  
 GC5 A sub-goal that supports GC1 by discharging items of 
counter evidence with acceptable reasons. 
 GC6 This goal exists if there were identified items of counter 
evidence that were not discharged. The residual attacks 
towards {Gx} from undischarged items of counter 
evidence should be assessed. Residual attacks might be 
allowed due to trade-off decisions based on the cost, 
efforts, new issues brought by resolving some items of 
counter evidence. Tolerable attacks from counter 
evidence towards {Gx} are still attacks, but they 
undermine confidence in the overall evidencing result 
of {Gx} only in a tolerable degree.  
 GC7 A goal that states the sufficiency of efforts on counter 
evidence identification. The coverage of potential 
sources of counter evidence and the rigour of the 
counter evidence inquiry efforts should be justified to 
support this goal.  
 GC8 A goal that indicates the consideration and desired state 
of the epistemic limitation of our knowledge of counter 
evidence for {Gx}. It is a complementary goal 
generated from the opposing viewpoint of GC7.   
 CC1 A list of items of counter evidence for {Gx} identified, 
as presented in SolutionCE. SolutionCE and CC1 may 
refer to the same document. But the roles of the same 
source information are different in the two situations.  
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 CC2 A list of items of supporting evidence for {Gx} 
identified, as presented in SolutionSE. SolutionSE and 
CC2 may refer to the same document. But the roles of 
the same source information are different in the two 
situations. 
 CC3 Context of documented exploration efforts for 
identification of counter evidence for {Gx}. An 
implemented search activity should be documented 
even if no counter evidence is identified by the search 
activity.  
 SolutioExCE Solution reference to documented exploration aimed at 
the identification of counter evidence for {Gx}. CC3 
and SolutionExCE may refer to the same document, but 
for different purposes. 
Applicability This pattern is applicable to the presentation evidence for a domain 
claim and to the justification of confidence in there being sufficient 
evidential supports for the domain claim, especially when counter 
evidence is considered during the argument construction process.  
Contextual information and evidence needed in the pattern include: 
• A list of items of supporting evidence presented for {Gx} 
• A list of items of counter evidence identified for {Gx} 
• Documentation of counter evidence identification efforts 
Collaborations The pattern consists of two parts – the primary part and the confidence 
part. The confidence contains the justification of the elements in a 
primary safety argument and the further justification of elements within 
a confidence argument. Two goals (GC2, GC3) in the confidence part 
are further developed for a special type of evidence (safety assessment 
models) in Part (a) of the model adequacy argument pattern (GM2, 
GM3).  
Consequences There are a number of undeveloped goals after the application of this 
pattern, e.g. GC2, GC3, GC5, GC6, GC7 and GC8. 
Implementati
on 
Implementation of this pattern involves instantiation of the primary 
branch of the pattern first and then the confidence part. Contextual 
information should be clarified as required and the choice of GC4 or 
GC5 should be based on the results of counter evidence inquiry efforts. 
Related  
Patterns 
See Part (b) of the Model Adequacy Argument Pattern for an example 
usage. 
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A.2 Safety Assessment Model Adequacy Argument 
Pattern 
Safety Assessment Model Adequacy Argument Pattern 
Author Linling Sun, Tim Kelly 
Created 08/07/2011 11:41:00 Last Modified 10/12/2012 23:06:00 
 
Intent This pattern provides a generic argument structure for presenting how 
the adequacy of safety assessment models as supporting evidence is 
considered.  
Motivation This pattern was developed: 
• To clarify the goals to be justified for the backing of the adequacy of 
a safety assessment model as supporting evidence  
• To present the relationship between the content in pre-modelling 
justification and the content in post-modelling justification  
• To present the relationship between justification based on process 
elements of modelling and justification based on product elements of 
modelling 
• To present an example use of counter considerations as presented in 
the two-sidedness argument pattern 
• To clarify the goals to be justified for the backing of the model 
consistency with consideration of counter evidence 
Structure 
The structure of this pattern consists of three parts: 
(a) the main view of post-modelling justification 
(b) the branch view of model consistency justification 
(c) the contextual module of pre-modelling justification 
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Structure of Part (a) 
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Participants 
of Part (a) 
GM1 GS1 states a confidence claim to be assessed, which is 
specifically associated with one item of supporting 
evidence {SAMx} and a domain safety goal {Gx}. 
GM1 may be addressed by the trustworthiness of 
{SAMx} and the appropriateness of its use as evidence. 
 CM1.1 The content of {Gx} as the context of GM1 that is 
available from the associated primary safety argument. 
 CM1.2 The content of {SAMx} as the context of GM1 that is 
available from the associated primary safety argument. 
 GM2 GM2 defines a confidence claim that is associated with 
the trustworthiness of {SAMx}. It is based on the 
context of the pre-justified modelling method and 
modelling tool selected for modelling the system in 
question.  
 GM3 GM3 defines a confidence claim that is associated with 
the appropriateness of adopting {SAMx} as supporting 
evidence. It is also based on the context of the pre-
justified modelling method and modelling tool selected 
for modelling the system in question.  
 Premodelling 
Justification  
A context module that captures the justification of the 
modelling method and tool selected for modelling the 
system under study. 
 CM2 The contextual information that describes the process 
elements associated with the enactment of {SAMx} 
modelling process. Typical data items include ‘model 
version/date’, ‘modeller’, ‘modelling tool’, as shown in 
the subtypes of ‘MetaData’ in CoreDMM presented in 
Chapter 3. 
 SM1 Provided at this point to support the decomposition of 
claim GM2 according to the associated process 
elements of {SAMx} modelling.  
 SM2 Provided at this point to support the decomposition of 
claim GM2 according to the product elements of 
{SAMx} modelling. The product elements include not 
only the outcomes or processed modelling results, but 
also the decisions and assumptions adopted during 
modelling and the limitations of {SAMx}.  
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 GM4 A sub-goal that supports GM2 that is focused on the 
competency of the modeller of {SAMx}. This goal 
should be emphasized while arguing confidence on the 
basis of process elements. The relevant knowledge and 
experience of a modeller significantly affect the 
trustworthiness of {SAMx}. 
 GM5 A sub-goal that supports GM2 that is focused on the 
tool configuration of {SAMx}. It exists if a modelling 
tool was adopted in the {SAMx} modelling process. 
This goal should be examined, especially when 
implementation parameters should be set or selected for 
data processing during modelling with the tool. 
 GM6 A sub-goal that supports GM2 that is focused on the 
correct reference of {SAMx}. The latest version of 
{SAMx}, which is consistent with the current system 
design and operational situations, should be addressed 
in the primary safety argument, rather than any 
outdated versions of {SAMx}.  
 GM7 A sub-goal that supports GM2 by examining the 
construction elements of {SAMx}. Depending on the 
method selected, the types of construction elements in a 
model could vary significantly. We can address this 
goal by evaluating the generic types of construction 
elements, assuming {SAMx} is represented on the basis 
of CoreDMM proposed in Chapter 3. 
 GM8 A sub-goal that supports GM2 by examining the 
substance elements of {SAMx}. Depending on the 
method selected and application scenarios, the types of 
substance elements in a model may differ significantly. 
We can address this goal by evaluating some typical 
types of substance elements of common safety 
assessment models, assuming {SAMx} is represented 
on the basis of CoreDMM presented in Chapter 3. 
 GM9 A sub-goal that supports GM2 by examining the 
declared validity context of {SAMx}. The information 
that demonstrates that we have a clear view of the 
boundary of the capability of a model must be explicitly 
stated and justified. The fulfilment of this goal enables 
a better understanding of the potential reasoning gap 
between {SAMx} presented and the support needed by 
Goal {Gx} in the primary safety argument. 
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 GM10 A sub-goal that supports GM9. It refines the content of 
GM9. The clarity and reasonableness (including 
sufficiency) of the declared validity context of {SAMx} 
should be justified.  
 GM11 A goal that indicates the consistency of {SAMx} with 
other information sources. Depending on the concrete 
types of inconsistencies identified during various forms 
of consistency analysis, this goal may contribute to 
GM2 or GM3. It is further decomposed in the branch 
view of model consistency justification – Part (b) of 
this pattern.  
 GM12 A goal that indicates the acceptance of declared validity 
context of {SAMx} while adopting {SAMx} as 
supporting evidence for Goal {Gx}. Using {SAMx} 
beyond its capability or its validity envelope means 
inappropriateness of the asserted evidence relationship 
between {SAMx} and Goal {Gx}. This goal should be 
considered in combination with GM9. 
 CM7 The contextual information that describes the 
construction elements of {SAMx} artefact. Typical 
generic data items include ‘condition’, ‘system 
element’, ‘logical relationship between conditions’, as 
shown in the subtypes of ‘ConstructionElement’ in 
CoreDMM presented in Chapter 3. 
 CM8 The contextual information that describes the substance 
elements of {SAMx} artefact. Typical data items 
include ‘hazard set’, ‘MCS set’, ‘probability set’, as 
shown in the subtypes of ‘SubstanceElement’ in 
CoreDMM presented in Chapter 3. 
 CM9 The contextual information that describes the validity 
contextual elements of {SAMx} artefact. Typical data 
items include ‘assumption’, ‘limitation’, ‘modelling 
purpose’, ‘modelling scope’, ‘data source’, as shown in 
the subtypes of ‘ValidityContext’ in CoreDMM 
presented in Chapter 3. 
Applicability 
of Part (a) 
This part of the model adequacy argument pattern, the main view of 
post-modelling justification, is applicable to the presentation of layered 
claims for justifying the adequacy of safety assessment evidence with 
data elements obtained throughout a modelling process.  
The part (a) of the model adequacy argument pattern is decomposed 
under the situation that only one safety assessment model {SAMx} is 
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adopted as evidence for Goal {Gx}. Therefore, the sub-goals associated 
with the appropriateness of multiple items of supporting evidence are 
not included in Part (a) of this pattern. In case of the presence of 
multiple items of supporting evidence, more sub-goals related to the 
appropriateness of the overall evidencing sufficiency should be 
considered and generated in support of GM3, e.g. the independency 
between multiple items of evidence, the diversity of multiple items of 
evidence. 
Contextual information needed in Part (a) of the model adequacy 
argument pattern includes: 
• a contextual justification module of the adequacy of the selected 
modelling method and or modelling tool for {SAMx} 
• process data and product data of the {SAMx} modelling process 
This part of the pattern can be extended to be used as a reference or a 
source of inspiration for the justification of general qualitative models. 
Collaborations 
of Part (a) 
The model adequacy argument pattern Part (a) is in the context of the 
pre-modelling justification of the selected safety assessment modelling 
method and tool, Part (b). The GM11 in Part (a) of the model adequacy 
argument pattern is further developed in another separate view of the 
argument, Part (c).  
Two goals (GM2, GM3) in Part (a) of the model adequacy argument 
pattern are exemplar development of goals (GC2, GC3) in the two-
sidedness argument pattern respectively.  
Consequences There are a number of undeveloped goals after the application of Part (a) 
of the model adequacy argument pattern: GM4, GM5, GM6, GM7, 
GM8, GM10, and GM12. 
Implementati
on 
Implementation of Part (a) of the model adequacy argument pattern 
involves instantiation of a variety of confidence claims. Contextual 
information from {SAMx} artefact should be clarified as required. 
Related 
Patterns 
Safety Assessment Model Adequacy Argument Pattern - Part (b) 
Safety Assessment Model Adequacy Argument Pattern - Part (c) 
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Structure of Part (b)  
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Participants 
of Part (b) 
GM11 A goal that indicates the consistency of {SAMx} with 
other information sources. 
 SM3 Provided at this point to support the decomposition of 
claim GM11 according to the types of model 
consistency as defined in Chapter 5.  
 11.C1 Three types of model consistency for safety assessment 
models as defined in Chapter 5. 
 GM11.1 A goal that defines a confidence claim that associated 
with the consistency of the content of {SAMx} and the 
accepted logic or facts existed in reality. It is further 
decomposed into GM11.1.1, GM11.1.2, and GM11.1.3.  
 GM11.2 A goal that defines a confidence claim that associated 
with the internal consistency of the content of {SAMx} 
within itself. There should not be self-contradicted 
modelling elements within {SAMx}. It is further 
decomposed into GM11.2.1, GM11.2.2, and GM11.2.3. 
 GM11.3 A goal that defines a confidence claim that associated 
with the external consistency of the content of {SAMx} 
with the content of other models. It is further 
decomposed into GM11.4 and GM11.5. 
 GM11.4 A goal that defines cross-model consistency between 
{SAMx} and another model {ModelYi}. It is further 
decomposed into GM11.4.1 and GM11.4.2. 
 GM11.1.3 & 
GM11.2.3 & 
GM11.5 
Goals stated that the efforts on the exploration of a 
specific type of model inconsistency (counter factual, 
intra-model, or cross-model) are sufficient, which may 
need to cover various consistency relationships, 
relevant information or data available and rigorous 
scrutiny. These goals are cases for GC7 in the two-
sidedness argument pattern. 
 GM11.6 A goal that indicates the consideration and desired state 
of the epistemic limitation of our knowledge of 
inconsistency scenarios for {SAMx}. It complements 
goals on the sufficiency of exploration for 
inconsistencies, e.g. GM11.1.3, GM11.2.3, GM11.5. 
This goal is a case for GC8 in the two-sidedness 
argument pattern. 
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 GM11.1.1 & 
GM11.2.1 & 
GM11.4.1 
Goals that support GM11.1, GM11.2, GM11.4 
respectively. They indicate the absence of specific 
types of model inconsistency associated with {SAMx}. 
These goals are cases for GC4 in the two-sidedness 
argument pattern. 
 GM11.1.2 & 
GM11.2.2 & 
GM11.4.2 
Goals that support GM11.1, GM11.2, GM11.4 
respectively. They indicate the discharge of specific 
types of model inconsistency associated with {SAMx}. 
These goals are cases for GC5 in the two-sidedness 
argument pattern. 
 GM11.4.3  
 
Goals that support GM11.4. It indicates that the 
residual risk associated with identified inconsistencies 
that are not discharged is tolerable. The goals 
associated with the residual risks of indentified 
inconsistencies are omitted for GM11.1 and GM11.2. 
 11.C2 A list of models that can be used for cross-checking of 
model inconsistency between {SAMx} and them. 
 11.C3 A list of identified inconsistencies models that can be 
used for cross-checking of model inconsistency 
between {SAMx} and them. 
 11.S1 & 
11.S2 & 
11.S3 
Solutions that represent various inconsistency analysis 
results provided. They are employed as evidence for the 
absence of inconsistencies. However, if there were 
inconsistencies identified during inconsistency analysis, 
these will serve as context of other goals that present 
the identified inconsistency scenarios. 
Applicability 
of Part (b) 
This part of the model adequacy argument pattern, the branch view of 
model consistency justification, is applicable to the presentation of 
layered claims for justifying the consistency of a safety assessment 
model with other information sources on the basis of inquiring three 
types of model inconsistency.  
Contextual information and evidence needed in Part (b) of the model 
adequacy argument pattern include: 
• the classification of model consistency for safety assessment 
models 
• the models adopted for the examination of the cross-model 
inconsistency 
• various inconsistency analysis results 
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Part (b) can be separately adopted for the justification of consistency 
between multiple items of safety assessment evidence if those items of 
safety assessment evidence were assessed as comparable ones in Phase 
one of the cross-model inconsistency analyses introduced in Chapter 5.  
NB: We omit the goals addressing the residual risk of undischarged 
inconsistencies for GM11.1 and GM11.2 in Part (b) of the pattern for a 
simplified view. 
Collaborations 
of Part (b) 
Part (b) of the model adequacy argument pattern is a component of Part 
(a) - the main view of post-modelling justification.  
The blocks below GM11.3 in Part (b) serve as the application scenarios 
of the cross-model inconsistency analyses, as described in Chapter 5. 
The justification of the adequacy of Solution 11.S1 is presented in 
another argument pattern – the cross-model inconsistency analysis 
adequacy argument pattern, as described in Section D.3. 
Some of the goals in Part (b) of the model adequacy argument pattern 
are generated on the basis of the thinking styles presented in the two-
sidedness argument pattern, e.g. GM11.6 and the decompositions of 
GM11.1, GM11.2, GM11.4.  
Consequences There are a number of undeveloped goals after the application of Part (b) 
of the model adequacy argument pattern: GM11.1.3, GM11.2.3, 
GM11.5, and GM11.6. 
Implementati
on 
Implementation of Part (b) of the model adequacy argument pattern 
involves the instantiation of a series of consistency claims and 
referencing various inconsistency analysis results as evidence items. 
Related 
Patterns 
Safety Assessment Model Adequacy Argument Pattern - Part (a) 
Cross-Model Inconsistency Analysis Adequacy Argument Pattern 
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Structure of Part (c)  
MJ-C1
Technological 
elements: {Method of 
SAMx} and {Tool of 
SAMx}
MJ-G1
Sufficient confidence exists in 
the adequacy of technological 
elements adopted in {SAMx} 
modelling.
MJ-C2
Alternative modelling 
methods that can be used 
for the problem domain 
under study by {SAMx}
MJ-C3
Alternative tools that 
can be used for 
{SAMx} modelling
MJ-G2
{Method of SAMx} is 
capable of addressing 
Goal {Gx} adequately.
MJ-G3
{Tool of SAMx} adopted is 
capable of and qualified for 
{SAMx} modelling
MJ-G5
There are no more suitable 
alternative tools for 
modelling {SAMx}
MJ-G4
Alternative modelling methods 
are no more suitable than 
{Method of SAMx}
 
 
Participants 
of Part (c) 
MJ-G1 A goal that defines a confidence claim associated with 
the selection of a suitable modelling method and tool 
for safety assessment of the system under study. It is 
further decomposed in two directions – a line of 
argument justifying why the selected modelling method 
or tool is capable and fit for purpose, and why 
alternative ones are not as suitable.  
 MJ-G2 A goal that indicates the capability of a modelling 
method. Firstly, the method should be able to generate 
the type of evidence needed by Goal {Gx} in the 
primary safety argument. Secondly, the expressive 
power and processing power of the method should be 
adequate for modelling the system under study.  
 MJ-G3 A goal that indicates the capability of a modelling tool. 
This goal exists if a tool is to be (or has been) adopted 
in {SAMx} modelling. The selected tool should be 
capable of supporting the selected modelling methods; 
and it should be qualified for the intended usage 
without itself introducing defects in modelling outputs.   
 MJ-G4 A goal that indicates the unsuitability of alternative 
methods that can be used for the modelling task, by 
comparison with the selected one.  
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 MJ-G5 A goal that indicates the unsuitability of alternative 
tools that can be used for the modelling task, by 
comparison with the selected one. This goal exists if a 
tool is to be (has been) adopted in {SAMx} modelling. 
 MJ-C1 Context of the modelling method selected and the 
modelling tool adopted. It can be obtained from the 
‘MetaData’ of {SAMx} artefact. 
 MJ-C2 Context of alternative modelling methods that can be 
used for the modelling task. It may come from domain 
knowledge. 
 MJ-C3 Context of alternative modelling tools that can be used 
for the modelling task. It may come from domain 
experience. 
Applicability 
of Part (c) 
This part of the model adequacy argument pattern, the pre-modelling 
justification, is applicable to the presentation of layered claims for 
justifying the adequacy of selected modelling method and/or tool for a 
safety assessment task.   
Contextual information needed in Part (c) of the model adequacy 
argument pattern includes: 
• the selected method and tool of a safety assessment task 
• domain knowledge and experience on existing safety assessment 
modelling methods and tools  
Resources that are needed for the adequate enactment of the modelling 
process with a specific modelling method, such as data quality and 
availability and competent modellers, are not presented in Part (c) of the 
pattern, although they are usually considered during the process of 
making decisions on the choice of methods and tools adopted in a 
planned safety assessment process. Instead, those resource factors are 
considered in the post-modelling justification part of the pattern during 
confidence argument construction. 
Collaborations 
of Part (c) 
Part (c) of the model adequacy argument pattern is a part of the main 
view of post-modelling justification, Part (a).  
Consequences 
of Part (c) 
There are a number of undeveloped goals after the application of Part (c) 
of the model adequacy argument pattern: MJ-G2, MJ-G3, MJ-G4, and 
MJ-G5. 
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Implementati
on 
Implementation of Part (c) of the model adequacy argument pattern 
involves instantiation of a series of confidence claims and decision-
making context.  
Related 
Patterns 
Safety Assessment Model Adequacy Argument Pattern - Part (a) 
 
A.3 Cross-Model Inconsistency Analysis Adequacy 
Argument Pattern 
Cross-Model Inconsistency Analysis Adequacy Argument Pattern  
Author Linling Sun, Tim Kelly 
Created 08/07/2011 11:41:00 Last Modified 10/12/2012 23:06:00 
 
Intent This pattern provides a generic argument structure for presenting how 
the adequacy of cross-model inconsistency analysis as supporting 
evidence is considered.  
Motivation This pattern was developed: 
• To clarify the goals to be justified for the backing of the adequacy of 
a cross-model inconsistency analysis, performed on the basis of 
{SAMx} and {ModelYi} 
Structure 
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Participants 
 
CJ-G1 A goal that defines a confidence claim on the adequacy 
of cross-model inconsistency analysis results as 
evidence for GM11.4.1 or GM11.4.2. 
 CJ-S1 A strategy that explains that the decomposition is based 
on identified consistency relationships. 
 CJ-C1 The contextual information that describes the defined 
model consistency relationships between {SAMx} and 
{ModelYi}. (Model consistency relationships are the 
outputs of Phase 2 of the cross-model inconsistency 
analysis method depicted in Chapter 5.) 
 CJ-G1.1 A goal that defines a confidence claim on the 
consistency between {SAMx} and {ModelYi} 
concerning the consistency relationship of {CRj}. 
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 CJ-G1.2 A goal that the collection of identified consistency 
relationships is sufficient for representing cross-model 
consistency between {SAMx} and {ModelYi}. 
 CJ-G2 A goal that defines a confidence claim on the 
reasonableness of model consistency relationship {CRj} 
defined in the analysis.  
 GJ-G3 A goal that defines a confidence claim on the 
correctness of user-defined correspondences between 
the modelling elements of {SAMx} and the ones of 
{ModelYi} for checking {CRj}. This goal exists if 
{CRj} requires user-defined correspondences between 
model elements as inputs to the inconsistency analysis.  
 CJ-G4 A goal that defines a confidence claim on the 
correctness of algorithms that implement the 
consistency checking against specified {CRj}. This goal 
exists if {CRj} requires a checking algorithm to identify 
violations of the defined consistency relationship.  
 CJ-G5 A goal that defines a confidence claim on the 
reasonableness of the explanations for the discharge of 
identified violations of {CRj} as unharmful 
inconsistencies.  
 CJ-C3 The contextual information that describes the user-
defined correspondences between the modelling 
elements of {SAMx} and the ones of {ModelYi} for 
checking {CRj}. (It is generated in Phase 3 of the cross-
model inconsistency analysis method described in 
Chapter 5.)  
 CJ-C4 The contextual information that describes the 
algorithms that implement the consistency checking 
against specified {CRj}. (It is designed for some 
defined model consistency relationships and is used in 
Phase 3 of the cross-model inconsistency analysis 
method presented in Chapter 5.) 
 CJ-C5 The contextual information that presents the 
explanations for identified violations of for checking 
{CRj}. (It is considered and recorded in Phase 4 of the 
cross-model inconsistency analysis method depicted in 
Chapter 5.) 
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Applicability 
 
This pattern is applicable to the justification of the quality of the cross-
model inconsistency analysis performed according to the cross-model 
inconsistency analysis method defined in Chapter 5. It can be used in 
Phase 5 and 6 of the cross-model inconsistency analysis.  
Contextual information needed in this argument pattern includes: 
• the consistency relationships defined in the cross-model 
inconsistency analysis; 
• the user-defined correspondences between model elements for 
each {CRj}, if there are any; 
• the inconsistency checking algorithms adopted for defined 
consistency relationships between two models; 
• the explanations of identified violations of defined model 
consistency relationships. 
This pattern can also be adopted for the evaluation of an instance of 
inconsistency analysis based on the inconsistency analysis method 
introduced in Chapter 5, even if a confidence argument was not required.  
Collaborations 
 
This inconsistency analysis adequacy argument pattern provides the 
generic argument structure for the further confidence argument 
associated with the asserted evidence relationship between 11.S1 and 
GM11.4.1 or GM11.4.2 in the branch view of model adequacy argument 
pattern - Part (b).  
Consequences There are a number of undeveloped goals after the application of this 
pattern: CJ-G2, CJ-G3, CJ-G4, and CJ-G5. 
Implementati
on 
Implementation of this argument pattern involves provision of a variety 
of contextual information. 
Related 
Patterns 
Safety Assessment Model Adequacy Argument Pattern - Part (b) 
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Appendix B Structured Models in EMF 
This appendix presents the structured representation of three meta-models defined in the 
thesis. The models are represented in Eclipse Modelling Framework (EMF) [189], which is 
compliant with the Ecore meta-meta-models using the Emfatic text editor [70].  
Section B.1 presents the safety assessment Core Data Meta-Model (CoreDMM) as defined in 
Chapter 3. Figure 73 shows the graphical view of CoreDMM in EMF, which is generated 
automatically in the modelling environment from the textual specification scripts followed. 
Section B.2 presents the Evidence Model (EviM) as defined in Chapter 4. Figure 74 shows 
the Ecore diagram of EviM, followed by the textual specification. 
Section B.3 presents the Information Model of Cross-Model Inconsistency Analysis as 
defined in Chapter 5. Figure 75 shows the Ecore diagram of inconsistency information 
model, followed by the textual specification. 
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B.1 CoreDMM in EMF 
 
 
Figure 73 Safety Assessment Core Data Meta-Model in EMF 
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@namespace(uri="SAMCoreDataMM", prefix="") 
package SAMCoreDataMM; 
 
class SAMArtefactCoreData { 
   val MetaData [*] d_metadata; 
   val ValidityContext [*] d_validitycontext; 
   val SubstanceElement [*] d_substanceelements; 
   val ConstructionElement [*] d_constructionelements; 
} 
 
abstract class MetaData { 
} 
 
class SubjectOfStudy extends MetaData{ 
 attr String a_sosdescription; 
}  
 
class Modeller extends MetaData{ 
 attr String a_modellerdescription; 
}  
 
class MDate extends MetaData{ 
 attr String a_mdatedescription; 
}  
 
class Method extends MetaData{ 
 attr String a_methoddescription; 
}  
 
class Tool extends MetaData{ 
 attr String a_tooldescription; 
}  
 
abstract class ValidityContext { 
} 
 
class Purpose extends ValidityContext{ 
    attr String a_purposedescription; 
}  
 
class Scope extends ValidityContext{ 
    attr String a_scopedescription; 
}  
 
class Assumption extends ValidityContext{ 
    attr String a_assumptiondescription; 
}  
 
class Limitation extends ValidityContext{ 
    attr String a_limitationdescription; 
}  
 
class DataSource extends ValidityContext{ 
    attr String a_dsourcedescription; 
}  
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abstract class SubstanceElement { 
} 
 
class ProbabilitySet extends SubstanceElement { 
   ref Probability [*] d_probabilities; 
} 
 
class MCSSet extends SubstanceElement { 
    val MCS [*] d_mcss; 
    ref Condition [1] #mcssetassociatedwithcon conhasmcsset;  
} 
 
class HazardSet extends SubstanceElement{ 
    ref Condition [*] d_conditions; 
} 
 
class MCS extends HazardSet { 
    attr String a_mcsdescription; 
    attr int a_mcsorder; 
} 
 
abstract class ConstructionElement { 
} 
 
class Probability{ 
   attr double a_probabilityvalue;  
   ref Condition [1] # hasprobability associatedwithcondition; 
} 
 
class Condition extends ConstructionElement{ 
 attr String a_conditiondescription; 
 val Probability [1] #associatedwithcondition hasprobability; 
 ref LogicalRelationship [?] #sourcecontoLR LRtosourcecon; 
 ref LogicalRelationship [?] #targetcontoLR LRtotargetcon; 
  
 ref MCSSet [?] #conhasmcsset mcssetassociatedwithcon;  
 ref SystemElement [1] #conassociatedwithsysele 
syselehasconditions; 
} 
 
class SystemElement extends ConstructionElement{ 
 attr String a_syseledescription;  
 ref Condition [*] #syselehasconditions conassociatedwithsysele;  
 ref SystemElement [*] #composedby becomposedby; 
} 
 
class LogicalRelationship extends ConstructionElement{ 
    attr String a_logicvalueANDOR;  
    ref Condition [+] #LRtosourcecon sourcecontoLR; 
 ref Condition [1] #LRtotargetcon targetcontoLR;  
} 
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B.2 EviM in EMF  
 
 
Figure 74 Model of Evidence in EMF 
 
@namespace(uri="EvidenceM", prefix="") 
package EvidenceM; 
 
class EvidenceSet { 
   val EvidenceItem [*] d_evidenceitems; 
   val EvidenceSetProperty [*] d_evidencesetproperties; 
} 
 
class EvidenceItem { 
   val EvidenceItemProperty [1] d_evidenceitemproperty; 
   val EvidenceAssertion [*] d_evidenceassertions; 
} 
 
abstract class EvidenceItemProperty { 
} 
 
abstract class EvidenceAssertion { 
} 
 
class Trustworthiness extends EvidenceItemProperty{ 
 attr String a_trustworthinessdescription; 
}  
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class EvResultAssertion extends EvidenceAssertion{ 
 attr String a_EVresultassertion; 
}  
 
class EvDescriptiveAssertion extends EvidenceAssertion{ 
 attr String a_EVdescriptiveassertion; 
}  
 
abstract class EvidenceSetProperty { 
} 
 
class Independence extends EvidenceSetProperty{ 
 attr String a_independencedescription; 
} 
 
class Diversity extends EvidenceSetProperty{ 
 attr String a_diversitydescription; 
}  
class Consistency extends EvidenceSetProperty{ 
 attr String a_consistencydescription; 
}   
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B.3 Inconsistency Information Model in EMF  
 
 
Figure 75 Information Model of Inconsistency Analysis in EMF 
 
@namespace(uri="InconAnaInfoM", prefix="") 
package InconAnaInfoM; 
 
class InconsistencyAnalysisData { 
   val ScopeDescription [1] d_scopedescription; 
   val ModelReference [2] d_modelreferences; 
   val ConsistencyRelationDescription [+] 
d_consistencyrelationdescriptions; 
   val UserDefinedCorrespondenceModel [1] 
d_uderdefinedcorrespondancemodel; 
   val DerivedCorrespondanceModel [?] d_derivedcprrespondancemodel; 
   val IdentifiedInconsistency [+] d_identifiedinconsistencies; 
} 
 
class ScopeDescription { 
    attr String a_scopedescription; 
} 
 
class ModelReference { 
    attr String a_modelreference; 
} 
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class ConsistencyRelationDescription { 
    attr String a_consistencyrelationdescription; 
 ref IdentifiedInconsistency [1] #CRDidentifiedincon 
identifiedIncongroupbelongstoCRD ; 
 ref CorrespondingPair [*] #CRDhasCpairs CpairreferstoCRD; 
} 
 
class UserDefinedCorrespondenceModel { 
    attr String a_UDcorrespondencemodeldescription; 
    val CorrespondingPair [*] d_UDCMcorrespondingpairs; 
} 
 
class DerivedCorrespondanceModel { 
    attr String a_Dcorrespondencemodeldescription; 
    val CorrespondingPair [*] d_DCMcorrespondingpairs; 
} 
 
class IdentifiedInconsistency { 
    attr String a_UDcorrespondencemodeldescription; 
 ref ViolationSituation [*] d_violationsituations;  
 ref ConsistencyRelationDescription [1] 
#identifiedIncongroupbelongstoCRD CRDidentifiedincon; 
} 
 
class CorrespondingPair { 
    attr String a_modelAelementdescription; 
    attr String a_modelBelementdescription; 
    attr String ABcoresrelationdescirption;   
    ref ViolationSituation [?] #aCpairisaviolation 
violationrefertoaCpair; 
    ref ConsistencyRelationDescription [1] #CpairreferstoCRD 
CRDhasCpairs; 
} 
 
class ViolationSituation { 
    ref CorrespondingPair [1] #violationrefertoaCpair 
aCpairisaviolation; 
    val Explaination [?] d_violationexplaination;        
} 
 
class Explaination { 
    attr String a_violationexplaination;  
} 
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Appendix C Case Study: Braking System 
Control Unit 
In this section, we present a case study on the application of the inconsistency analysis 
method defined in Chapter 5 to investigate the inconsistency between two exemplar safety 
assessment models. We also evaluate the expanded argument construction process and the 
proposed argument patterns through the development of example arguments on the basis of 
the example models and the inconsistency analysis performed. A Braking System Control 
Unit (BSCU) of an aircraft Wheel Braking System (WBS) taken from ARP 4761[181] is 
chosen as the example system under study. We have two safety assessment models 
associated with this system at the PSSA stage (as described in Section 2.5.1).  
Model I:  Expanded Wheel Brake System taken from MISSA FLM handbook [131]  
Coded as OCAS.4761.WBS. 
Model II:  Brake System Control Unit FTA taken from ARP 4761Appendix L [181] 
Coded as FT.4761.IB. 
The system description and model descriptions are excerpts from SAE ARP 4761 Appendix 
L [181] and MISSA Failure Logic Modelling Handbook [131]. The models are used for the 
evaluation purposes, but not exactly demonstrating the safety of a system in reality, due to 
the simplification and incompleteness of the information from example models. 
C.1 System Description (from [181]) 
The primary purpose of the wheel braking system is to decelerate the aircraft on the ground 
without skidding the tires. The wheel braking system performs this function automatically 
upon landing or manually upon pilot activation. The Wheel Brake System is installed on the 
two main landing gears. Braking on the main gear wheels is used to provide safe retardation 
of the aircraft during taxiing and landing phases, and in the event of a rejected take-off. 
Braking on the ground is commanded either manually (via brake pedals) or automatically 
(autobrake) without the need for pedal application. In the NORMAL mode, the brake pedal 
position is electrically fed to a braking computer - the Braking System Control Unit (BSCU). 
This in turn produces corresponding control signals to the brakes. In addition, this computer 
monitors various signals which denote certain critical aircraft and system states, to provide 
correct brake functions and improve system fault tolerance, and generates warnings, 
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indications and maintenance information to other systems. A block diagram of the WBS and 
the proposed BSCU architecture18 is shown in Figure 76. 
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Figure 76 WBS and BSCU Architecture 
The BSCU consist of two independent systems to meet the availability requirements. BSCU 
contain a command and monitor channel to meet the integrity requirements. Each BSCU 
system generates necessary voltages in its own power supply. A power supply monitor is 
provided to detect out of specification voltage conditions. Brake pedal inputs are provided to 
the command and monitor channels which compute the necessary braking commands. The 
commands generated by each channel are compared and if they do not agree, a failure is 
reported. The results of the power supply monitor and the comparator are provided to a 
System Validity Monitor. A failure reported by either system in a BSCU will cause that 
system to disable its outputs and set the System Validity Monitor to invalid. Each BSCU 
System Validity Monitor is provided to an overall BSCU Validity Monitor. Failure of both 
System 1 and System 2 will cause the selector valve to select the Alternate Brake System.  
In normal operation, BSCU system 1 provides the brake and anti-skid commands to the 
wheel brakes. When System 1 reports a failure via its System Validity Monitor, the output of 
System 2, if valid, is switched in to provide the commands. In the event that System 2 
subsequently fails, all BSCU outputs are disabled and the BSCU Validity Monitor is set to 
invalid. 
                                                          
18
 The figure is a merged version of Figure 3.0-1-Priliminary Wheel Brake System Diagram and Figure 3.0-1-Proposed 
BSCU Architecture in [181]. 
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C.2 Model I Description (from [131]) 
This model19 is developed on the basis of the prototype wheel braking system taken from 
ARP 4761, however, with much more details considered than the fault tree analysis of the 
system in the ARP example.  
For the reason of the space needed, we cannot present all the codes of the model specified in 
AltaRica within OCAS Cecelia WorkShop20 . The main graphical view of the model is 
presented in Figure 77. The embedded graphical views of the dual-BSCU design and the 
components of a single BSCU are presented in Figure 78. 
 
Figure 77 Main View of the WBS Model (OCAS.4761.WBS) 
                                                          
19
  This model is an early version of ARP WBS system generated in Period One of MISSA project. It has been revised 
and evolved with many versions during Period Two of the project for illustration of Failure Logic Modelling. For more 
comprehensive model descriptions of ARP WBS Failure Logic Modelling examples, readers should refer to ‘Failure 
Logic Modelling: A Pragmatic Approach’ [132]. 
20
  OCAS Cecelia WorkShop is a tool environment for modelling with AltaRica developed by Dassault Aviation. 
 274 
 
 
Figure 78 Independent BSCUs and the Components of a BSCU 
The failure events21 of BSCU components considered in OCAS.4761.WBS are presented in 
Table 15. Besides that, the model of OCAS.4761.WBS has also taken into account 28 
common cause events. 
Model Component Failure Events  
Command (COM) 
 
ASprocessStuck 
ASprocessTerminated 
ProcessorError 
CMDprocessStuck 
CMDprocessTerminated 
Monitor (MON)  
 
ProcessStuck 
ProcessTerminated 
Switch 
 
StuckIn1 
SpontaneousTrip 
CircuitFailure 
Validity Monitor  
 
ProcessStuck 
ProcessTerminated 
 
Table 15 Failure Events of Components in OCAS.4761.WBS 
The definitions (in AltaRica) of the failure conditions examined in the qualitative analysis of 
OCAS.4761.WBS are presented in Table 16.  
                                                          
21
 The ‘failure event’ is an AltaRica concept that means the events that can trigger state changes of a component. 
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Failure  
Condition ID 
Failure Condition  
Specification 
Formalisation in terms of WBS  
FLM failure modes in AltaRica 
FC-WBS1 Total loss of 
braking capabilities 
 (Mode = Normal & 
  GrMtrValve.HydOut.FWD.PressureOmission & 
  ~BlMtrValve.HydOut.FWD.UnnecessaryPressure & 
  ~BlMtrValve.HydOut.FWD.TooLowPressure & 
  ~BlMtrValve.HydOut.FWD.TooHighPressure) | 
(Mode = Alternate & 
  BlMtrValve.HydOut.FWD.PressureOmission & 
  ~GrMtrValve.HydOut.FWD.UnnecessaryPressure & 
  ~GrMtrValve.HydOut.FWD.TooLowPressure & 
  ~GrMtrValve.HydOut.FWD.TooHighPressure) 
FC-WBS2 Inadvertent 
application of 
brakes 
GrMtrValve.HydOut.FWD.PressureCommission | 
BlMtrValve.HydOut.FWD.PressureCommission 
Table 16 WBS Failure Condition Definitions in OCAS.4761.WBS 
The excerpt of some qualitative analysis results of MCSs associated with FC-WBS2 is 
presented in Figure 79. 
 
 
 276 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 79 Excerpt of MCS Results of FC-WBS2 in OCAS.4761.WBS 
/* 
orders(MCS('WheelBrakes.FailureCondition.InadvertentBraking')) =  
orders product-number 
1 2 
2 68 
3 174 
total 244 
end 
*/ 
products(MCS('WheelBrakes.FailureCondition.InadvertentBraking')) 
=  
{'GreenMeterValve.JamOpen'} 
{'GreenMeterValve.SpringFailure'} 
{'BSCU.BSCU1.COM.CMDprocessStuck', 'BSCU.BSCU1.MON.ProcessStuck'} 
{'BSCU.BSCU1.COM.CMDprocessStuck', 'BSCU.Switch.StuckIn1'} 
{'BSCU.BSCU1.MON.ProcessStuck', 'Pedal1.DemandCommiss'} 
{'BSCU.BSCU1.MON.ProcessStuck', 'Pedal2.DemandCommiss'} 
{'BSCU.BSCU2.COM.CMDprocessStuck', 'BSCU.Switch.SpontaneousTrip'} 
{'BSCU.BSCU2.MON.ProcessStuck', 'Pedal1.DemandCommiss'} 
{'BSCU.BSCU2.MON.ProcessStuck', 'Pedal2.DemandCommiss'} 
{'BSCU.ValidityMonitor.ProcessStuck', 'Pedal1.DemandCommiss'} 
{'BSCU.ValidityMonitor.ProcessStuck', 'Pedal2.DemandCommiss'} 
{'BSCU.ValidityMonitor.ProcessTerminated', 
'BlueMeterValve.JamOpen'} 
{'BSCU.ValidityMonitor.ProcessTerminated', 
'BlueMeterValve.SpringFailure'} 
{'BSCU.ValidityMonitor.ProcessTerminated', 
'MechPedalPosition.Jam'} 
{'BSCU.ValidityMonitor.ProcessTerminated', 
'PedalM.DemandCommiss'} 
{'BlueMeterValve.JamOpen', 'GreenBrakesAssembly.HydOut_BWD_Leak'} 
{'BlueMeterValve.JamOpen', 'GreenMeterValve.Rupture'} 
{'BlueMeterValve.JamOpen', 'GreenPump.MechanicalFailure'} 
{'BlueMeterValve.JamOpen', 'GreenPump.Rupture'} 
{'BlueMeterValve.JamOpen', 'Pedal1.DemandCommiss'} 
{'BlueMeterValve.JamOpen', 'Pedal1.DemandLow'} 
{'BlueMeterValve.JamOpen', 'Pedal1.DemandOmiss'} 
{'BlueMeterValve.JamOpen', 'Pedal2.DemandCommiss'} 
{'BlueMeterValve.JamOpen', 'Pedal2.DemandLow'} 
{'BlueMeterValve.JamOpen', 'Pedal2.DemandOmiss'} 
{'BlueMeterValve.JamOpen', 'SelectorValve.LockFailure'} 
{'BlueMeterValve.JamOpen', 'ShutOffSelectorValve.Rupture'} 
{'BlueMeterValve.JamOpen', 
'ShutOffSelectorValve.UnlocksSpontaneously'} 
{'BlueMeterValve.SpringFailure', 
'GreenBrakesAssembly.HydOut_BWD_Leak'} 
{'BlueMeterValve.SpringFailure', 'GreenMeterValve.Rupture'} 
{'BlueMeterValve.SpringFailure', 'GreenPump.MechanicalFailure'} 
{'BlueMeterValve.SpringFailure', 'GreenPump.Rupture'} 
{'BlueMeterValve.SpringFailure', 'Pedal1.DemandCommiss'} 
{'BlueMeterValve.SpringFailure', 'Pedal1.DemandLow'} 
{'BlueMeterValve.SpringFailure', 'Pedal1.DemandOmiss'}  
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C.3 Model II Description 
A fault tree, FT.4761.IB, is constructed based on the information from Appendix L of ARP 
4761 [181]. The top event is “BSCU commands braking in absence of braking input and 
causes inadvertent braking”. The three parts of Figure 4.2.1-2 (PSSA BSCU – FTA) in ARP 
4761 is merged together as a single fault tree FT.4761.IB, as shown by the tree structure 
presented in Figure 80. The detailed description of the event labels is presented in Table 17-1 
and Table 17-2. The qualitative analysis of the fault tree is performed  in OpenFTA [11], an 
open source tool for fault tree analysis,  as a single fault tree under qualitative analysis.  
Figure 81 presents the graphical view of the BSCU fault tree in OpenFTA and the MCS 
analysis results obtained from OpenFTA. The graphical view in Figure 81 is exactly same as 
the tree shown in Figure 80. 
 
 
 278 
 
 
Figure 80 Graphical View of BSCU Fault Tree Structure (FT.4761.IB)  
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ID Description (from ARP 4761 [181]) Notes  
e1 BSCU commands braking in absence of braking input 
and causes inadvertent braking 
Top event 
e2 Single undetected BSCU failure causes inadvertent 
braking 
External event 
Probability 0. 
e4 Detectable BSCU1 failure causes bad data which is 
provided to normal system MV  
Intermediate event 
e5 Detectable BSCU2 failure causes bad data which is 
provided to normal system MV  
Intermediate event 
e101 BSCU1 P/S failure/error causes bad data which is 
provided to normal system MV 
Intermediate event 
e102 BSCU1 I/O or CPU failure/error causes bad data 
which is provided to normal system MV 
Intermediate event 
e103 BSCU1 power supply monitor stuck valid  
e104 BSCU1 power supply failure causes bad data  
e105 BSCU1  monitor channel always reports valid  Intermediate event 
e106 BSCU1 command channel I/O or CPU failure/error 
causes bad data 
Intermediate event 
e107 BSCU1 validity monitor failed valid due to hardware 
failure 
 
e108 BCSU1 monitor channel design error Undeveloped event 
Probability 0. 
e109 BSCU1 command channel CPU failure/error causes 
bad data 
Intermediate event 
e110 BSCU1 command channel I/O failure causes bad data  
e111 BSCU1 command channel CPU hardware failure 
causes bad data 
 
e112 BSCU1 CPU function design error causes bad data Undeveloped event  
Probability 0. 
e201 Switch at system 2 position Intermediate event 
e202 BSCU2 fault causes inadvertent command to normal 
braking system  
Intermediate event 
e203 Detected BSCU1 failure 
NB: this is not exactly a basic event – it is a 
intermediate event composed of e4 and the detection 
success. 
Can be developed as the 
sub tree of e4 if the 
failure rate of detecting 
BSCU1 failure is 
assumed to be 0. 
e204 Switch failed ‘stuck’ in system 2 position  
 
Table 17-1 Event Description of FT.4761.IB 
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ID Description (from ARP 4761 [181]) Notes  
e205 BSCU2 P/S failure/error causes bad data which is 
provided to normal system MV 
Intermediate event 
e206 BSCU2 I/O or CPU failure/error causes bad data 
which is provided to normal system MV  
Intermediate event 
e207 BSCU2 power supply monitor stuck valid  
e208 BSCU2 power supply failure causes bad data  
e209 BSCU2 monitor channel always reports valid Intermediate event 
e210 BSCU2 I/O or CPU failure/error causes bad data Intermediate event 
e211 BSCU2 validity monitor failed valid due to hardware 
failure 
 
e212 BCSU2 monitor channel design error Undeveloped event 
Probability 0. 
e213 BSCU2  CPU failure causes bad data Intermediate event 
e214 BSCU2 I/O failure causes bad data   
e215 BSCU2 command channel CPU hardware failure 
causes bad data 
 
e216 BSCU2 CPU function design error causes bad data Undeveloped event 
Probability 0. 
Note: Intermediate events are not used in model comparison. They are not involved in the 
model elements correspondence definition in Phase 3 of the analysis.  
 
Table 17-2 Event description of FT.4761.IB 
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Figure 81 BSCU Fault Tree (FT.4761.IB) in OpenFTA and MCS Result 
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C.4 Inconsistency Analysis - Model I & Model II  
This section presents the key results of each phase of the inconsistency analysis between 
Model I and Model II. 
C.4.1 Phase 1 
The two models selected differ considerably in terms of the scope of the components and the 
failure modes involved in the modelling. The OCAS.4761.WBS contains much more 
information than the FT.4761.IB. It took some time to clarify the range of modelling 
elements considered by each model. The knowledge and understanding of the model under 
study is very important for this phase. The ModelReference and ScopeDescription defined in 
this phase are presented in Table 18. 
 
ModelReference Ma: an AltaRica model - OCAS.4761.WBS 
Mb: a traditional fault tree model - FT.4761.IB 
ScopeDescription The shared system elements modelled include: BSCU1, BSCU2, 
BSCU1 Monitor, BSCU1 Command,  BSCU2 Monitor, BSCU2 
Command, (overall) Validity Monitor, Switch. 
The overlapping concern is ‘Inadvertent braking caused by BSCU in 
absence of brake inputs’, coded as FC.casestudy. 
The shared type of substance results is: a set of MCSs. 
The common construction elements include: conditions. A condition 
means a ‘failure event’ shown in Ma and means a ‘basic event’ in Mb. 
Table 18 Phase One Output of the Case Study 
C.4.2 Phase 2 
Consistency relationships defined for the Case study are presented in Table 19. 
 
 
 
Table 19 Consistency Relationships Defined in the Case Study 
CaCR1: This consistency relationship aims to check whether the conditions considered in 
the traditional fault tree have been considered in the AltaRica model. Because the description 
of basic events of FT.4761.IB is not in detail, we do not expect the conditions in two models 
correspond in a strict sense (may not represent the exact same conditions in reality). 
CaCR1: Each ‘condition’ shown in Mb has a corresponding ‘condition’ in Ma.  
CaCR2: Each MCS in Mb associated with the top event has a corresponding MCS in Ma 
that contributes to the overlapping concern (FC.casestudy). 
 283 
 
CaCR2: This consistency relationship aims to check whether the condition combinations of 
MCS considered in the traditional fault tree can lead to the concerned condition of 
FC.casestudy in the AltaRica model. To investigate this consistency relationship, it is 
required to set up relations between corresponding conditions in two models and to examine 
the associated correspondences between MCSs in two models. 
C.4.3 Phase 3 
FT.4761.IB is constructed manually and described entirely in natural language. We manually 
process the model information and try to build up the correspondences between conditions of 
the two models gradually. Table 20 presents the initial corresponding results established 
based on the system components being modelled.  
Through setting up the initial correspondences, we found that:  
• It is not always possible to have ‘equivalent-to’ relationships between modelled 
conditions in two safety assessment models, especially when conditions are described 
with different modelling constructs and with different levels of details. In this case, 
human judgements on whether one condition was considered in another model are crucial 
for determining the violations.  
For example, BSCU2.command has 5 failure events considered in OCAS.4761.WBS, 
whereas only 3 basic events considered in FT.4761.IB. However, it is found that all three 
basic events in FT.4761.IB describe the bad data failure mode of BSCU2.command caused 
by three lower level causes (namely by power supply 2 failure, I/O failure, and CPU failure). 
It is also found that only one of the 5 failure events (CMDprocessStuck) may lead to the 
inadvertent braking output by BSCU2.command in OCAS.4761.WBS. But it is unclear 
concerning the relationships of bad data of BSCU2.command in FT.4761.IB and the failure 
event and the output flow of BSCU2.command in OCAS.4761.WBS.   
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System  
component 
Failure event in Ma 
OCAS.4761.WBS 
Basic event in Mb 
FT.4761.IB 
BSCU1.command ASprocessStuck 
ASprocessTerminated 
ProcessorError 
CMDprocessStuck 
CMDprocessTerminated 
e104 (command bad data by power 
supply 1) 
e110 (command bad data by I/O) 
e111(command bad data by CPU) 
BSCU1.monitor ProcessStuck 
ProcessTerminated 
e107 (failed valid) 
BSCU2.command ASprocessStuck 
ASprocessTerminated 
ProcessorError 
CMDprocessStuck 
CMDprocessTerminated 
e208 (command bad data by power 
supply 2) 
e214 (command bad data by I/O) 
e215(command bad data by CPU) 
BSCU2.monitor ProcessStuck 
ProcessTerminated 
e211 (failed valid) 
(Overall) 
Validity monitor 
ProcessStuck 
ProcessTerminated 
N/A 
Switch  StuckIn1 
SpontaneousTrip 
CircuitFailure 
e204( failed stuck at position 2) 
BSCU1.PSmonitor 
(power supply  monitor) 
N/A e103 (BSCU1 power supply  
monitor failed valid) 
BSCU2.PSmonitor 
(power supply  monitor) 
N/A e207 (BSCU2 power supply 
monitor failed valid) 
(Detector)22 N/A e203 (detected BSCU1 failure) 
N/A: The system element associated with a ‘condition’ in one model is not modelled in other 
model used in the cross-model inconsistency analysis. 
 
Table 20 Initial Relations between Conditions of Two Models 
Another issue is that not all failure events of system components modelled in 
OCAS.4761.WBS are shown in the MCS output of FC.casestudy. It is futile to examine 
those failure events modelled in OCAS.4761.WBS if they are irrelevant to FC.casestudy of 
our concern.  In addition, we assume all the failure events associated with system elements 
modelled by OCAS.4761.WBS, but not by FT.4761.IB, with probability of 0. In this way, we 
cut down the scope of failure events (in OCAS.4761.WBS) under study in this inconsistency 
                                                          
22
 The behaviour of this system component is used in FT.4761.IB. However, it is not depicted as a part of the system 
architecture provided in ARP 4761. 
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analysis. The failure events modelled in OCAS.4761.WBS but not shown in focused MCS 
outputs (that are with members of pure failure events of BSCU components)23 are omitted for 
further inconsistency analysis steps. Then we can shrink the failure events in 
OCAS.4761.WBS that need to consider correspondence with the basic events in FT.4761.IB 
(as shown in Table 21). The correspondence presented in Table 21 is not precise 
‘equivalences’, but approximate matching relations. The ‘conditions’ in two models do not 
correspond with one-to-one relationship. We have adopted intermediate codes to represent 
corresponding conditions in two models for the implementation of the comparison of MCS 
for CaCR2. 
 
System  
component 
Failure event in Ma 
OCAS.4761.WBS 
Xi /Ii Basic event in Mb 
FT.4761.IB 
BSCU1.command  X1 e104 (command bad data by 
power supply 1) 
ASprocessStuck- 
ASprocessTerminated- 
ProcessorError 
CMDprocessStuck 
CMDprocessTerminated 
I1 e110 (command bad data by 
I/O) 
e111(command bad data by 
CPU) 
BSCU1.monitor ProcessStuck X2  
ProcessTerminated I2 e107 (failed valid) 
BSCU2.command  X3 e208 (command bad data by 
power supply 2) 
CMDprocessStuck 
 
I3 e214 (command bad data by 
I/O) 
e215(command bad data by 
CPU) 
BSCU2.monitor ProcessStuck X4  
(ProcessTerminated)∗ X5 e211 (failed valid) 
(Overall) 
Validity monitor 
ProcessStuck X6 N/A 
Switch   X7 e204( failed stuck at position 2) 
StuckIn1 X8  
SpontaneousTrip X9  
BSCU1.PSmonitor 
(power supply monitor) 
N/A X10 e103 (BSCU1 power supply  
monitor failed valid) 
                                                          
23
  The failure events omitted in the following study are shown as members in other MCSs that contain member 
failure events that do not belong to BSCU, e.g. failure events of the Pedal, the Pumps, or the Valves. 
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BSCU2.PSmonitor 
(power supply monitor) 
N/A X11 e207 (BSCU2 power supply 
monitor failed valid) 
(Detector)24 N/A X12 e203 (detected BSCU1 failure) 
N/A: The system element associated with a ‘condition’ in one model is not modelled in 
other model used in the cross-model inconsistency analysis. 
 
Xi: A temporary code of ‘conditions’ that do not have a corresponding ‘condition’ in the 
other model under analysis. 
 
Ii: A temporary code of ‘conditions’ that are viewed as a generic ‘condition’, representing 
groups of corresponding ‘conditions’ in models under analysis. It performs as a media to 
substitute members of MCSs in order to implement the comparison of MCSs in the later 
step. 
 
∗ It is modelled as a model element in OCAS.4761.WBS, but not shown in the MCSs 
generated for FC.casestudy.  
 
NB: e107, e211 do not correspond to ProcessStuck because ProcessStuck only leads to 
StuckNegative output of BSCU monitors according to the specification of the model 
element of Monitor in OCAS.4761.WBS. 
 
Table 21 Refined Relations between Conditions of Two Models 
Based on the refined relations presented in Table 21, we identify six violations for CaCR1 
after the comparison of conditions within the scope of inconsistency analysis.   
• V1-1: The e104 in FT.4761.IB does not have a corresponding condition in 
OCAS.4761.WBS; 
• V1-2: The e208 in FT.4761.IB does not have a corresponding condition in 
OCAS.4761.WBS; 
• V1-3: The e103 in FT.4761.IB does not have a corresponding condition in 
OCAS.4761.WBS; 
• V1-4: The e207 in FT.4761.IB does not have a corresponding condition in 
OCAS.4761.WBS; 
                                                          
24
 The behaviour of this system component is used in FT.4761.IB. However, it is not depicted as a part of the system 
architecture provided in ARP 4761. 
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• V1-5: The e204 in FT.4761.IB does not have a corresponding condition in 
OCAS.4761.WBS; 
• V1-6: The e203 in FT.4761.IB does not have a corresponding condition in 
OCAS.4761.WBS; 
In order to examine CaCR2, we need to take into account of conditions in FT.4761.IB and 
OCAS.4761.WBS that do not have corresponding part in the other.  
• e203 is assumed as a true event in OCAS.4761.WBS. It is indicated by the failure output 
flows of BSCU1.monitor that are defined as false negative or false positive. In the model 
of OCAS.4761.WBS, BSCU1 is supposed to be able to have its failure detected.   
• e103 and e104 are not modelled within BSCU1 in OCAS.4761.WBS. The power supply 
monitors of both BSCUs are not modelled in OCAS.4761.WBS. It is assumed that the 
power supply monitor of BSCU1 does not fail in mission.  
• e207 and e208 are not modelled within BSCU2 in OCAS.4761.WBS. It is assumed that 
the power supply monitor of BSCU2 does not fail in mission.  
• e204 does not have a corresponding condition in OCAS.4761.WBS; any MCS in 
FT.4761.IB results with e204 will not have a corresponding MCS in OCAS.4761.WBS. 
In order to examine CaCR2, we also need to filter out MCSs in OCAS.4761.WBS with 
system elements out of scope of the cross-model inconsistency analysis. After the filtering, 
we shrink the set of MCSs to a smaller range for the comparison purpose. The fifteen MCSs, 
as illustrated in Figure 82, from the total 244 MCSs (generated within order 3 for 
FC.casestudy as shown in Figure 79) are composed of conditions associated with BSCU 
components only.  
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Figure 82 MCSs in OCAS.4761.WBS for Comparison 
If the undeveloped and external events which are assumed with a probability of 0 are 
removed from the tree, and if the failure rate of detecting BSCU1 failure is assumed to be 0 
(to allow e4 sub tree to be the developed tree of e203), the MCS analysis results of 
FT.4761.IB is simplified and shown as below (in Figure 83). 
 
Figure 83 MCSs of Simplified FT.4761.IB 
{'BSCU.BSCU1.COM.CMDprocessStuck', 'BSCU.BSCU1.MON.ProcessStuck'} 
{'BSCU.BSCU1.COM.CMDprocessStuck', 'BSCU.Switch.StuckIn1'} 
{'BSCU.BSCU2.COM.CMDprocessStuck', 'BSCU.Switch.SpontaneousTrip'} 
{'BSCU.BSCU1.COM.ASprocessStuck', 
'BSCU.BSCU2.COM.CMDprocessStuck', 'BSCU.BSCU2.MON.ProcessStuck'} 
{'BSCU.BSCU1.COM.ASprocessStuck', 
'BSCU.BSCU2.COM.CMDprocessStuck', 
'BSCU.ValidityMonitor.ProcessStuck'} 
{'BSCU.BSCU1.COM.ASprocessTerminated', 
'BSCU.BSCU2.COM.CMDprocessStuck', 'BSCU.BSCU2.MON.ProcessStuck'} 
{'BSCU.BSCU1.COM.ASprocessTerminated', 
'BSCU.BSCU2.COM.CMDprocessStuck', 
'BSCU.ValidityMonitor.ProcessStuck'} 
{'BSCU.BSCU1.COM.CMDprocessStuck', 
'BSCU.BSCU2.COM.CMDprocessStuck', 'BSCU.BSCU2.MON.ProcessStuck'} 
{'BSCU.BSCU1.COM.CMDprocessStuck', 
'BSCU.BSCU2.COM.CMDprocessStuck', 
'BSCU.ValidityMonitor.ProcessStuck'} 
{'BSCU.BSCU1.COM.CMDprocessTerminated', 
'BSCU.BSCU2.COM.CMDprocessStuck', 'BSCU.BSCU2.MON.ProcessStuck'} 
{'BSCU.BSCU1.COM.CMDprocessTerminated', 
'BSCU.BSCU2.COM.CMDprocessStuck', 
'BSCU.ValidityMonitor.ProcessStuck'} 
{'BSCU.BSCU1.COM.ProcessorError', 
'BSCU.BSCU2.COM.CMDprocessStuck', 'BSCU.BSCU2.MON.ProcessStuck'} 
{'BSCU.BSCU1.COM.ProcessorError', 
'BSCU.BSCU2.COM.CMDprocessStuck', 
'BSCU.ValidityMonitor.ProcessStuck'} 
{'BSCU.BSCU1.MON.ProcessTerminated', 
'BSCU.BSCU2.COM.CMDprocessStuck', 'BSCU.BSCU2.MON.ProcessStuck'} 
{'BSCU.BSCU1.MON.ProcessTerminated', 
'BSCU.BSCU2.COM.CMDprocessStuck', 
'BSCU.ValidityMonitor.ProcessStuck'} 
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Each individual MCS in the simplified set of MCSs of FT.4761.IB is transformed into a form 
that is represented with the intermediate codes assigned in Table 21. The transformed MCSbi 
for CaCR2 inconsistency analysis is presented in Table 22. 
 
MCSs in Mb 
FT.4761.IB 
MCSbi Comments 
{e103, e104} {X10, X1} Due to power supply monitor is not modelled in 
OCAS.4761.WBS, this MCS in Mb won’t have 
corresponding MCS in Ma 
{e107, e110} {I1, I2} BSCU1.MON.ProcessTerminated, as the 
corresponding failure event of e107 only shown 
in MCSs of OCAS.4761.WBS that are with a 
cardinality higher than 2. 
{e107, e111} {I1, I2} 
{e204, e207, e208} {X7,X11, X3} 
 
None of the events have been modelled in 
OCAS.4761.WBS.  
{e204, e211, e214} { X7, X5,I3} Due to the power supply monitor is not modelled 
in OCAS.4761.WBS, this MCS in Mb won’t 
have corresponding MCS in Ma. However, e211, 
which is modelled in OCAS.4761.WBS, is not 
shown in any relevant MCSs of 
OCAS.4761.WBS under inconsistency analysis. 
{e204, e211, e215} { X7, X5,I3} 
 
Table 22 FT.4761.IB MCS Transformation 
Each individual MCS in the simplified set of MCSs of OCAS.4761.WBS is transformed into 
a form that is represented with the intermediate codes assigned in Table 21. The transformed 
MCSai for CaCR2 inconsistency analysis is presented in Table 23. The manual comparison 
results of MCSai and MCSbi are listed in the final column of Table 23. 
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MCSs in Ma 
OCAS.4761.WBS 
MCSai A member of 
 MCSbi (Y/N) 
{'BSCU.BSCU1.COM.CMDprocessStuck', 
'BSCU.BSCU1.MON.ProcessStuck'} 
{I1, X2} N 
{'BSCU.BSCU1.COM.CMDprocessStuck', 
'BSCU.Switch.StuckIn1'} 
{I1, X8} N 
{'BSCU.BSCU2.COM.CMDprocessStuck', 
'BSCU.Switch.SpontaneousTrip'} 
{I3, X9} N 
{'BSCU.BSCU1.COM.ASprocessStuck', 
'BSCU.BSCU2.COM.CMDprocessStuck', 
'BSCU.BSCU2.MON.ProcessStuck'} 
{I1, I3, X4} N 
{'BSCU.BSCU1.COM.ASprocessStuck', 
'BSCU.BSCU2.COM.CMDprocessStuck', 
'BSCU.ValidityMonitor.ProcessStuck'} 
{I1, I3, X6} N 
{'BSCU.BSCU1.COM.ASprocessTerminated', 
'BSCU.BSCU2.COM.CMDprocessStuck', 
'BSCU.BSCU2.MON.ProcessStuck'} 
{I1, I3, X4} N 
{'BSCU.BSCU1.COM.ASprocessTerminated', 
'BSCU.BSCU2.COM.CMDprocessStuck', 
'BSCU.ValidityMonitor.ProcessStuck'} 
{I1, I3, X6} N 
{'BSCU.BSCU1.COM.CMDprocessStuck', 
'BSCU.BSCU2.COM.CMDprocessStuck', 
'BSCU.BSCU2.MON.ProcessStuck'} 
{I1, I3, X4} N 
{'BSCU.BSCU1.COM.CMDprocessStuck', 
'BSCU.BSCU2.COM.CMDprocessStuck', 
'BSCU.ValidityMonitor.ProcessStuck'} 
{I1, I3, X6} N 
{'BSCU.BSCU1.COM.CMDprocessTerminated', 
'BSCU.BSCU2.COM.CMDprocessStuck', 
'BSCU.BSCU2.MON.ProcessStuck'} 
{I1, I3, X4} N 
{'BSCU.BSCU1.COM.CMDprocessTerminated', 
'BSCU.BSCU2.COM.CMDprocessStuck', 
'BSCU.ValidityMonitor.ProcessStuck'} 
{I1, I3, X6} N 
{'BSCU.BSCU1.COM.ProcessorError', 
'BSCU.BSCU2.COM.CMDprocessStuck', 
'BSCU.BSCU2.MON.ProcessStuck'} 
{I1, I3, X4} N 
{'BSCU.BSCU1.COM.ProcessorError', 
'BSCU.BSCU2.COM.CMDprocessStuck', 
'BSCU.ValidityMonitor.ProcessStuck'} 
{I1, I3, X6} N 
{'BSCU.BSCU1.MON.ProcessTerminated', 
'BSCU.BSCU2.COM.CMDprocessStuck', 
'BSCU.BSCU2.MON.ProcessStuck'} 
{I1, I3, X4} N 
{'BSCU.BSCU1.MON.ProcessTerminated', 
'BSCU.BSCU2.COM.CMDprocessStuck', 
'BSCU.ValidityMonitor.ProcessStuck'} 
{I1, I3, X6} N 
 
Table 23 OCAS.4761.WBS MCS Transformation 
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After examining Table 22 and Table 23, we found the following six violations for CaCR2: 
• V2-1: {e204, e211, e214} does not have an approximate correspondence MCS in 
OCAS.4761.WBS analysis results. 
• V2-2: {e204, e211, e215} does not have an approximate correspondence MCS in 
OCAS.4761.WBS analysis results. 
• V2-3: {e103, e104} does not have an approximate correspondence MCS in 
OCAS.4761.WBS analysis results. 
• V2-4: {e107, e110} does not have an approximate correspondence MCS in 
OCAS.4761.WBS analysis results. 
• V2-5: {e107, e111} does not have an approximate correspondence MCS in 
OCAS.4761.WBS analysis results. 
• V2-6: {e204, e207, e208} does not have an approximate correspondence MCS in 
OCAS.4761.WBS analysis results. 
C.4.4 Phase 4 
Table 24 presents the potential explanations to the identified violations and states whether the 
identified violations are marked out as model inconsistencies. 
Due to the incompleteness of the information from FT.4761.IB, we cannot cross-check the 
coverage of conditions addressed by OCAS.4761.WBS. The inconsistencies identified are 
limited to the scope of analysis. In the converse direction, however, according to 
OCAS.4761.WBS (which is constructed with the help from domain engineers), we can see 
that the FT.4761.IB is very simplified and incomplete version of a traditional fault tree25. For 
example, the multiple failure modes of the switch component of the BSCU should be 
considered in FT.4761.IB. 
 
 
 
                                                          
25
 As the editor notes in ARP 4761 stated, the fault tree example is for illustration of the analysis technique and the 
analysis process only. 
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Violation 
ID 
Explanation Inconsistency 
(Y/N) 
V1-1 e104 are not modelled within BSCU1 in OCAS.4761.WBS. 
The power supply monitors of both BSCUs are not 
modelled in OCAS.4761.WBS. It is assumed that the power 
supply monitor of BSCU1 does not fail in mission. 
N 
V1-2 e208 is not modelled within BSCU2 in OCAS.4761.WBS. 
It is assumed that the power supply monitor of BSCU2 does 
not fail in mission. 
N 
V1-3 e103 are not modelled within BSCU1 in OCAS.4761.WBS. 
The power supply monitors of both BSCUs are not 
modelled in OCAS.4761.WBS. It is assumed that the power 
supply monitor of BSCU1 does not fail in mission. 
N 
V1-4 e207 is not modelled within BSCU2 in OCAS.4761.WBS. 
It is assumed that the power supply monitor of BSCU2 does 
not fail in mission. 
N 
V1-5 e204 does not have a corresponding condition in 
OCAS.4761.WBS; e204 is a condition that should be 
considered in OCAS.4761.WBS. 
Y 
V1-6 e203 is assumed as a true event in OCAS.4761.WBS N 
V2-1 Due to the Omission of e211 in related MCSs of 
OCAS.4761.WBS 
Y 
V2-2 Due to the Omission of e211 in related MCSs of 
OCAS.4761.WBS 
Y 
V2-3 Due to the assumption of non-occurrence of e103 and e104 
in OCAS.4761.WBS  
N 
V2-4 Due to the Omission of {e107, e110} in related MCSs of 
OCAS.4761.WBS 
Y 
V2-5 Due to the Omission of {e107, e111} in related MCSs of 
OCAS.4761.WBS 
Y 
V2-6 Due to the omission of e204 and the assumption of non-
occurrence of e207 and 208 in OCAS.4761.WBS 
Y 
 
Table 24 Explanation of Identified Violations 
C.4.5 Phase 5 
Constrained by the limitations of the models used in this case study, the quality of this 
specific inconsistency analysis cannot be reasonably evaluated. But as we described in 
Chapter 5, the four aspects of the analysis should be carefully examined for the 
‘reasonableness’ of the analysis results. We skip this step in the case study. 
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But as the description of Phase 3 indicated, many subtle judgements are made during the 
implementation of the model comparison. It is desirable to have these judgements recorded 
for the evaluation of the inconsistency analysis at Phase 5. 
C.4.6 Phase 6 
This phase will be illustrated in combination of the case study for the model adequacy 
argument construction in Section C.5. 
C.5 Model Adequacy Argument Construction 
With respect to the evaluation of the expanded Six-Step Method, we looked at the process of 
developing an argument to the point at which the BSCU safety assessment results (used for 
evaluating the inconsistency analysis part) were addressed as evidence items. In this section, 
we first ‘rerun’ the primary safety argument development process to illustrate the 
consideration of the expanded argument construction process.  Then we present an example 
argument for justifying the adequacy of citing OCAS.4761.WBS as an item of evidence in 
the primary safety argument. 
C.5.1 Primary Safety Argument Case Study 
Figure 84 depicts a simplified version of the primary safety argument for demonstrating the 
safety of Aircraft S18 according to the aircraft and system descriptions in ARP 4761. The 
(positive) structure of a primary safety argument outlined in Figure 84 is compliant to ARP 
4754 safety assessment process (it is adapted from an early version of a generic primary 
argument structure presented in MISSA). 
As Figure 84 illustrated, the shaded goals presents safety claims that are formulated based on 
the following safety requirements elicited in ARP 4761 L [181].  
• One of the inputs to WBS PSSA provided by WBS FHA is: “Inadvertent wheel braking 
of all wheels during takeoff roll after V1 is a Catastrophic failure condition; it shall be 
less than 5E-9 per flight”.  
• One of the BSCU safety requirements defined in ARP 4761 example is “No single failure 
of the BSCU shall lead to inadvertent braking”. The planned safety analyses for this 
safety requirement include “CMA and FMEA as necessary”. 
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conditions 
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acceptably safe manner
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G2
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Other system {Systemx} is 
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safe manner
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sufficiently addressed
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Other 
Evidence 
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Sn2
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Undetected inadvertent wheel 
braking on one wheel w/o 
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BSCU
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Aircraft functional 
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on Ground is operated in an 
acceptably safe manner
S18 Aircraft functional
failure condition AFC1 is  
sufficiently addressed
Other S18 Aircraft functional
failure condition {AFCx}is  
sufficiently addressed
ACP1
Other S18 Aircraft functions 
{AFx}is operated in an 
acceptably safe manner
 
Figure 84 Primary Argument with BSCU Argument Elements 
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Through ‘rerunning’ the argument development underlying the primary safety argument 
structure presented in Figure 84 for the ARP 4761 example, we were able to explore how the 
extended process defined in Chapter 6 would have challenged the safety argument being 
developed at different points of the development process. For example, the following 
questions were raised by the expanded process: 
• Is the aircraft S18 failure condition severity category definition compliant with the one 
suggested in ARP 4761? As shown by ACP1 in Figure 84, the failure condition severity 
category definition, as the basis of the goal, should be justified as suggested by the 
expanded step E1. Other severity category definitions can be considered at this point as 
suggested by the expanded step E2 and step E3. 
• Is WBS FHA cited adequate for providing contextual information for the strategy 
employed? As shown by ACP2 in Figure 84, the model adequacy of WBS FHA, as the 
basis of the goal decomposition strategy, should be justified as suggested by the 
expanded step E4. Other potential basis of the strategy can be considered at this point as 
suggested by the expanded step E5 and step E6. 
•  Is the WBS Model by FLM in AltaRica cited adequate for being supporting evidence for 
G3? As shown by ACP3 in Figure 84, the model adequacy of OCAS.4761.WBS, as one 
of the solutions presented, should be justified as suggested by the expanded step E7. 
Other potential counter evidence for G3 should be explored in parallel to the presentation 
of the supporting evidence, as suggested by the expanded step E8 and step E9. 
• Has the BSCU CMA results presented any violation of system independency required by 
FTA.4761.BSCU?  
• Whether FTA.4761.BSCU and OCAS.4761.WBS are consistency models? If they were 
inconsistent, the trustworthiness of both models would be damaged.  
In addition, although it is not shown in Figure 84, the evidence result assertion of 
OCAS.4761.WBS for supporting G3 is ‘MCS analysis of OCAS.4761.WBS indicates 
absence of Order One MCS’. With this evidence result assertion, if elicited, we can see the 
relevance of G3 and Sn2 and the reasoning gap between them.  
C.5.2 Model Adequacy Argument Case Study 
In terms of the focus of the thesis, the key points are to note how evidence items are used 
during the evolution of a safety argument (e.g. WBS FHA is cited as the context of a 
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strategy; BSCU FMEA and BSCU FTA are cited as evidence for a goal). For evaluation 
purpose, we further develop the model adequacy argument associated with ACP3 as an 
example case, demonstrating the applicability of the model adequacy argument pattern and 
the use of evidence assertions. 
Figure 85 presents the overview of the model adequacy argument in ASCE [16]. For 
evaluation and illustration purpose, two branches of argument have been developed with 
more detail. Figure 86 presents the decomposition of confidence argument of 
OCAS.4761.WBS on the basis of the construction elements of the model. Each system 
element being modelled or not being modelled in OCAS.4761.WBS have been considered in 
the example structure. The lower level supporting goals can be supported by the evidence 
descriptive assertions of OCAS.4761.WBS. For example, ‘Gx4-1BSCU1.vaidity monitor is 
included/considered in OCAS.4761.WBS’ can be supported by an evidence descriptive 
assertion of OCAS. 4761.WBS that describes the AltaRica Node of that system component –
‘there is an AltaRica Node specified as BSCU.BSCU1.MON’. 
Figure 87 presents the goals associated with the confidence associated with model 
consistency. The confidence claims based on model consistency have been put forward as 
suggested by the Model Adequacy Argument Pattern Part (b) as defined in Chapter 6. 
However, we cannot use our cross-model inconsistency to support these confidence claims. 
Because the six inconsistencies we identified through the analysis cannot be discharged. 
Some of the identified violations attack our confidence claim significantly. For example, if 
the failure mode ‘failed stuck at position 2’ is not considered for the Switch of BSCU in 
OCAS.4761.WBS, there is little confidence in citing OCAS.4761.WBS as the solution the 
domain safety claim of G3 in Figure 84. As illustrated in Figure 87, the confidence claim 
associated with model consistency have not been supported but been attacked (no tool 
support to described the WeakenedBy relationship in GSN yet). As a result, we should know 
that the top level claim ‘GM1 – sufficient confidence exists in OCAS.4761.WBS as evidence 
for G3’ in the example model adequacy argument is ‘false’ at this stage of safety case 
development. 
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Figure 85 Example OCAS.4761.WBS Model Adequacy Argument 
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Figure 86 Branch of Model Component Representation Justification 
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Figure 87 Branch of Model Consistency Justification 
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Glossary 
  
ACP Assurance Claim Points 
ADAPT Advanced Diagnostic and Prognostics Testbed 
AIF Argument Interchange Format 
AMC Acceptable Means of Compliance 
ARM Argumentation Metamodel 
ARP Aerospace Recommended Practice 
ASA Aircraft Safety Assessment 
BSCU Braking System Control Unit 
CAE Claims, Arguments and Evidence 
CAIB Columbia Accident Investigation Board 
CCA Common Cause Analysis 
CoreDMM Core Data Meta-Model 
COTS Commercial-Off-The-Shelf 
CS Certification Specifications 
DS UK Defence Standard 
DSPN Deterministic and Stochastic Petri Net 
EMF Eclipse Modelling Framework 
ESACS Enhanced Safety Assessment for Complex Systems 
FDA US Food and Drug Administration 
FHA Functional Hazard Assessment 
FLM Failure Logic Modelling 
FMEA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
FPTA Failure Propagation and Transformation Analysis 
FPTC Fault Propagation and Transformation Calculus 
FPTN Failure Propagation Transformation Notation 
FTA Fault Tree Analysis 
GSN Goal Structuring Notation 
EC European Commission 
EviM Evidence Model 
ExCRs Example Consistency Relationships 
HAZOP Hazard and Operability Study 
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission 
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
ISO International Organization for Standardization 
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MCS Minimal Cut Set 
MDD Model-Driven Development 
MDE Model-Driven Engineering 
MISSA More Integrated Systems Safety Assessment 
MOD Ministry of Defence 
MOF Meta-Object Facility 
M&S Models and Simulations 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NLR National Aerospace Laboratory 
OMG Object Management Group 
PASA Preliminary Aircraft Safety Assessment 
PSSA Preliminary System Safety Assessment 
RAF Royal Air Force 
RCC Reinforced Carbon-Carbon 
SAE Society of Automotive Engineers 
SAEM Software Assurance Evidence Metamodel 
SACM Structured Assurance Case Metamodel 
SBVR Semantics of Business Vocabulary and Business Rules 
SCP Supplementary Cooling Pack 
SEAL Safety Evidence Assurance Level 
SEI Software Engineering Institute 
SSA System Safety Assessment 
STS Space Transportation System 
UML Unified Modelling Language 
WBS Wheel Braking System 
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